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ABSTRACT OP THE THESIS • 
THE ISLMIC POLICIES OF THE 




The present w>rk intends to study tho policy that the Anglor 
O p t i o n ruler$ adopted tosards Islam when their j o i n t mile was 
established i n the Sudan, i n 1899. She period covered by the study 
i e extended from 1899 to 192W 
Besides an introduction and the oonoluaion the main body of 
the work has been divided into six chapters. For convenience, each 
chapter has been sub-divided into sections. 
Giving a brief historical background leading to the establish-
ment of the joint Anglo-E&rptian rule i n the Sudan i n 1899* the 
introduction introduces to tho reader the prime necessity for adopting 
a policy of religious non-interferonoe. I t also indicates the 
Government intention to restore the orthodox Islam i n the country. 
Chapter X dwells upon the Government policy towards the. o f f i c i a l 
institutions of the orthodox Islam - vi a , the courts administering the 
Sharl'a Left and the public mosques. Aloas with these i t also throws 
l i g h t on the Government attitude towards the pilgrimage to Hecaa and the 
chief Muslim religious festivals* 
Chapter I I discusses the Government policy towards the traditional 
methods and institutions of education of the Sudanese Muslims, which i n 
different ways represented orthodox Islam i n the Sudan* 
Chapter I I I deals with the Sudanese religious brotherhoods , their 
origin, methods of organisation and their r i t u a l s . Bat more important, 
2. 
I t , at the end, discusses the net? Government's policy towards these 
religious brotherhoods. 
Chapter XV oasts light on the Government policy towards the 
Hahdists and their leader. I t f a l l s into two periods: one from 1899 
to 1913 and the other 1911). to 192k. i t discusses the policy on the 
basis of the four elements of'Mahdism, v i s * i t s doctrine; leader; 
sacred writings, objects and places; and i t s methods of organization. 
Chapter V deals with the Government policy to protect the 
Muslim North from the influence of the Christian Missions. I t also 
indicates . ,the Government missionary ..policy v i s a v i s islam in. the : . 
Southern Sudan, I t shows that at least up to 192k, the controversial 
"Southern policy" of the future did not start operating. 
Chapter VI discusses the wartime (1914-1918) British Muslim 
policy and shows how the religious sentiment of the Muslims of the 
Sudan were exploited for definite political, ends. 
The Conclusion concludes with the explanation why the so called 
policy of religious non-interf erenbe was possible on the part of the 
British rulers. I t also tr i e s to bring to light the effects and impacts 
of twenty-five years of AnglorEgyptian rule on the Sudanese Muslims. 
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The purpose of t h i s small thesis i s to outline the p o l i c i e s that 
the Anglo-Egyptian r u l e r s adopted towards Islam when t h e i r joint r u l e 
was established i n the Sudan i n 1899. The period covered by t h i s study 
extends from 1899 to 192k. 
For the preparation of t h i s work the Wingate Papers, ca r e f u l l y 
preserved i n the School of Oriental Studies, University of Durham, have 
proved to be a mine of information. The other sources used are, Cromer 
Papers i n the Public Record Office, London, Sudan Intelligence Reports 
i n the Foreign Office Library, Sudan Government. Annual Reports i n the 
Marshall Collection, Oriental Section of the Durham University Library. 
The Church Missionary Society Archive, London, should also be mentioned 
for i t s papers r e l a t i n g to the Sudan mission. Besides these, many 
secondary sources, such as period i c a l s , newspapers and some general works 
have been consulted. 
One or two words must be said on the subject of t r a n s l i t e r a t i o n 
from the Arabic S c r i p t s . While the personal names (except i n quotations) 
have been t r a n s l i t e r a t e d with d i a c r i t i c a l marks, the place-names have 
been l e f t i n conventional form. For the words of non-Arabic o r i g i n I 
have again preferred the conventional form. 
To conclude t h i s prefatory note, I must make some solemn 
acknowledgments. F i r s t of a l l I express my deep feelings of gratitude 
i i 
to S i r John C.B. Richmond, K.C.M.&., M.A., who, with his scholarly 
supervision and masterly comments helped me to bring t h i s work to 
the stage of presentation. My thanks are also due to Mr. R.L. H i l l 
who supervised my work while i t was only i n i t s embryonic stage. 
I am also indebted to the G-overnment of Pakistan for awarding me a 
scholarship under the Merit Scholarship Scheme. I am thankful to 
the University of Rajshahi, East Pakistan, for granting me necessary 
study-leave. I thank the .library s t a f f of the Oriental Section for 
t h e i r kind help and active co-operation and Mrs.Conchie for taking every 
pains i n typing the t h e s i s . F i n a l l y , I should express my gratitude to 
my beloved parents i n whose unfailing words of i n s p i r a t i o n I always 
found my guiding l i g h t . 
School of Oriental Studies, 
University of Durham, 
August, 1967» 
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The modern h i s t o r y of the Sudan may be sai d t o have commenced 
w i t h i t s i n v a s i o n i n 1820 by the e x p e d i t i o n sent f o r i t s conquest by 
2 
Muhammad *A1I Pasha, under the command of h i s son, I s m a ^ i l Pasha. At 
t h a t time Egypt i t s e l f was a p a r t of the Ottoman Empire and Muhammad 
^ A l l , h i m s e l f an Albenian Turk, had been appointed the Pasha of Egypt 
i n 1806, by the Turkish Sultan. 
The objects of the Pasha i n invading the Sudan are b e l i e v e d t o 
have been t o destroy the remnants of the Mamluks who had escaped h i s 
persecution and f l e d t o Dongola, to ob t a i n g o l d then r e p o r t e d t o e x i s t 
there i n considerable q u a n t i t y , and the slave r e c r u i t s f o r h i s army. 
As a r e s u l t o f the i n v a s i o n , the p e t t y kingdoms of the main N i l e sub-
m i t t e d , and i n 1821 the Punj Kingdom was overthrown. Muhammad Bey, the 
Defterdar, a subordinate commander and a son-in-law of MuhammadeAli 
Pasha, invaded and occupied Kordofan. I n the course of the next fev; years 
Khartoum developed a centre of Egyptian a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n the Sudan. By 
the year 1841, Egyptian c o n t r o l of the n o r t h e r n and c e n t r a l t e r r i t o r i e s 
of the Sudan was complete. Further expansion of the Egyptian r u l e i n the 
Sudan took place during the r e i g n of I s m a ' I l Pasha, the son and successor 
of Muhammad p A l i Pasha. By the end of 1879, the Egyptian r u l e had been 
1. Sudan means the t e r r i t o r y comprised by the modern Republic of the 
Sudan. 
2. A Turkish word; the h i g h e s t t i t l e i n the Ottoman and Egyptian Court 
h i e r a r c h y . 
2 
extended over the upper N i l e t o the E q u a t o r i a l Lakes, the great 
t r i b u t a r y o f the Bahr El-Ghazal and the former Sultanate of Darfur. 
The Turko-Egyptian occupation of the Sudan l a s t e d from 1821 
u n t i l the capture of Khartoum by Muhammad Ahmad i n 1885. During 
t h i s p e r i o d the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was c a r r i e d on by the Governors-General 
appointed by the Khedives ( t i t l e of the Ottoman Viceroy of Egypt), and 
under them by the governors of the various regions or provinces. I n 
the l a t t e r h a l f of the Turko-Egyptian r u l e i n the Sudan, the slave 
trade assumed such p r o p o r t i o n s t h a t I s m a * I l Pasha had to take a c t i o n 
against i t . For t h i s purpose and also t o secure b e t t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 
he t r i e d the experiment of a p p o i n t i n g a B r i t i s h Governor of Equatoria, 
S i r Samuel Baker, who was succeeded by General Gordon, and then of 
app o i n t i n g General Gordon as Governor-General, which post he h e l d from 
1877 t o 1879. But the changes e f f e c t e d by Isma'Tl Pasha, however, had 
l i t t l e permanence. I n 1882, there occurred a r e v o l u t i o n i n Kordofan. 
I t was organised by Muhammad Ahmad who proclaimed himself the Mahdl, 
the 'expected one 1. By 1885, Khartoum was captured and Egyptian r u l e 
i n the Sudan came to an end^ The Mahdi died f i v e months a f t e r the f a l l 
of Khartoum, and the Government of the Sudan was taken over by K h a l i f a 
•'Abd A l l a h a t - T a ' a i s h i , an Arab of Darfur, who continued h i s r u l e u n t i l 
1898. 
The Mahdist u p r i s i n g i n the Sudan coincided w i t h the B r i t i s h 
3 . For the r e a l causes of the r e v o l t of the Mahdi, see - H o l t , P.M., 
The Mahdist State i n the Sudan. O.U.P. 1958; pp.24-27. 
3 
m i l i t a r y occupation of Egypt i n 1882. I t made the B r i t i s h the r e a l 
masters of Egypt, although i t remained i n name a province of the 
Turkish Empire. During the p e r i o d of the B r i t i s h occupation of Egypt, 
attempt was made to suppress the Mahdist r e v o l t i n the Sudan. An 
Egyptian army under Hicks Pasha was sent f o r the purpose, b u t the army 
was completely a n n i h i l a t e d by the Mahdists. Darfur, then under S l a t i n 
Pasha, f e l l t o the Mahdists. Khartoum, Sennar, and the whole l e n g t h 
of the N i l e from Nubia t o Equetoria were thus threatened by the Mahdists. 
At l a s t the B r i t i s h G-overnment took some a c t i o n . I t sent 
General Gordon, the former Governor General of the Sudan from England 
w i t h the mission of e x t r i c a t i n g a l l Egyptian garrisons and i n h a b i t a n t s 
and abandoning the Sudan. But the course of r e b e l l i o n moved too q u i c k l y . 
Khartoum f e l l i n January 1885, and General Gordon died a t the hands of 
the Mahdists. 
But the f a l l of Khartoum d i d not mean the end of the e f f o r t s on 
the p a r t of the B r i t i s h a u t h o r i t i e s i n Egypt t o reconquer the Sudan. I n 
view of the importance of the N i l e t o Egypt, i t could not be contemplated 
t h a t the upper reaches of t h a t great i r r i g a t i n g and l i f e - g i v i n g r i v e r 
should be l e f t i n d e f i n i t e l y under the c o n t r o l of those who could n e i t h e r 
p r o f i t by i t themselves, nor al l o w others t o do so, and thus i t s recovery 
must be attempted as soon as the time was r i p e ^ But apart from t h i s , the 
more alarming were the r e p o r t s t h a t the French were pla n n i n g t o annex the 
4 . For the diplomatic background of the reconquest of the Sudan, see -
H o l t , P.M., The Mahdist State i n the Sudan.. I b i d . pp.204-210. 
4 
Southern Sudan. Thus, i n 1896 an Anglo-Egyptian army under the command 
of General Kitchener moved forward out of Egypt and occupied Dongola. 
I n 1897 i t advanced t o Abu Hamad. I n 1898 the j o i n t B r i t i s h and Egyptian 
army marched against the K h a l i f a ' s C a p i t a l and shattered h i s power a t the 
b a t t l e s of Atbara and Omdurman. Next year, the f u g i t i v e K h a l i f a himself 
was k i l l e d a t G-edid by a f o r c e commanded by General Reginald Wingate. 
A b r i e f note here i s necessary t o i n d i c a t e the p o l i t i c a l s t atus 
o f the Sudan a f t e r i t s reconquest. I n the f i r s t instance, the reconquest 
of the Sudan was regarded n o t h i n g short o f the r e s t o r a t i o n o f the Sudan 
to Egypt, although Cromer, then B r i t i s h Consul General i n Egypt, had i n 
mind a k i n d of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n which would not repeat the misgovernment 
and chaos t h a t e x i s t e d e a r l i e r . Hence, a f t e r the reconquest, B r i t a i n 
could not hand the Sudan back t o Egyptian r u l e owing t o Egypt's past 
reco r d of misgovernment. Nor could she annex i t h e r s e l f because of 
possi b l e i n t e r n a t i o n a l complications. France d e f i n i t e l y would have 
objected and the Sultan of Turkey had already i n d i c a t e d t h a t over the 
question of the Sudan he might annoy the B r i t i s h i n Egypt by h i s t e c h n i c a l 
5 
and moral power over the Khedive. But more than these, B r i t a i n wanted a 
f r e e r hand i n the a f f a i r s of the Sudan. Hence, t o s a t i s f y p o l i t i c a l 
exigencies and assure the Sudanese a good Government, a "Condominium" of 
Great B r i t a i n and Egypt was created. On the 19th of January, 1899. , the 
Condominium Agreement was signed by the re p r e s e n t a t i v e s of both Governments, 
5 . S a l i s b u r y t o Cromer, No .47, Secret, June 3 , 1898. P.R.O/F.O., 78/5050. 
6. For f u l l t e x t of the Condominium Agreement, see Appendix I . p'p, J.OI-IO<<. 
5 
Cromer f o r the B r i t i s h , and Butros G-hali f o r the Egyptian. I t gave to 
the Sudan a ' c o n s t i t u t i o n ' i n the form of a Condominium. I t recognised 
"the j o i n t m i l i t a r y and f i n a n c i a l e f f o r t s " t o which the conquest was due, 
and the "claims which have accrued t o Her B r i t a n i c Majesty's Government, 
by r i g h t of conquest, t o share i n the present settlement and f u t u r e work-
i n g and development of the system of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and l e g i s l a t i o n . " 
I t provided t h a t "the B r i t i s h and Egyptian f l a g s s h a l l be used together, 
both on l a n d and water, throughout the Sudan". I t l a i d down t h a t the 
Governor-General " s h a l l be appointed by Khedival Decree on the recommend-
a t i o n of Her B r i t a n i c Majesty's Government, and s h a l l be removed o n l y by 
Khedival Decree v/ith the consent of Her B r i t a n i c Majesty's Government". 
I t i n v e s ted the Governor-General w i t h f u l l l e g i s l a t i v e powers. 
I I 
The Condominium Agreement of 1899, p u t the Sudan under the j o i n t 
Anglo-Egyptian r u l e . But i t i s needless t o say t h a t a l l the important 
posts of the Sudan Government, i n c l u d i n g t h a t of the Governor-General, 
were h e l d by the B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s . Only the minor posts were h e l d by 
the Egyptians. Thus, i n f a c t , i f not i n theory, the country became a 
' B r i t i s h Colony'. The immediate, task of the B r i t i s h a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , 
however, was t o r e s t o r e order and t o l e a d the country t o the way o f progress 
and p r o s p e r i t y . 
Judged by the standards of modern m a t e r i a l c i v i l i z a t i o n , Sudan a t 
t h a t time was i n the stage of p r i m i t i v e days. The new B r i t i s h a d ministra-
t o r s found t h a t except f o r mere basic foundations 'a s o c i e t y and a c i v i l 
6 
p o l i t y 1 i n the Sudan had almost "been wrecked "by the previous years' 
misgovernment. This not on l y gave the new r u l e r s a f a i r l y f r e e hand 
t o r e b u i l d the s t r u c t u r e as they pleased, w i t h i n reason, b u t i t also 
l e f t open before them a l a r g e f i e l d f o r experiment and b o l d i n n o v a t i o n s . 
But there was one great d i f f i c u l t y which made the task completely 
impossible. The experiments and innovations can not be attempted i n 
olde r and more complex communities w i t h i n a h i g h l y organised s t r u c t u r e 
and an unbroken t r a d i t i o n . This was true w i t h Northern Sudan whose 
i n h a b i t a n t s were mostly Muslims. 
This d i f f i c u l t y l e d the English r u l e r s t o take i n t o account 
some fundamental con s i d e r a t i o n s . The most important of these was the 
existence of Islam, the r e l i g i o n of the m a j o r i t y of the Sudanese. I f 
the pagan South was excluded, then not only was the Sudan a Muslim country, 
b u t a f a n a t i c a l l y Muslim country, where the C h r i s t i a n had been an i n f i d e l 
w i t h a l l the d i s a b i l i t i e s which had been attached t o an i n f i d e l i n the 
e a r l i e s t days of Islam. The Muslims of the Sudan f i r m l y b e l i e v e d t h a t 
there i s not only one God, b u t also there i s on l y one f a i t h ; and those 
who do not accept the teachings of the Prophet might have many v i r t u e s , 
b u t they cannot stand on the same f o o t i n g as the t r u e b e l i e v e r s . Thus, 
the English r u l e r s i n the Sudan had t o contend against an undoubted 
p r e j u d i c e . They f u l l y r e a l i s e d t h a t , as Englishmen, they might be respect-
ed or even l i k e d ; b u t as C h r i s t i a n s there was a f e e l i n g against them which 
i t was very d i f f i c u l t t o overcome. Furthermore, they could r e a l i s e t h a t no 
matter how much the Sudanese had been oppressed by the Turks and Egyptians, 
b u t s t i l l they were a t l e a s t Muslims. But they were "Nazarenes", and 
7 
obviously t h a t was a p o i n t w h o l l y against t h e i r being accepted as r u l e r s . 
The p o i n t may be i l l u s t r a t e d by an anecdote n a r r a t e d by Sidney Low. 
A f t e r t r a v e l l i n g a whole day w i t h a B r i t i s h o f f i c e r an Arab Shaikh t o l d 
7 
h i s companion: "Ahl i f you could only be a Moslem, how glad we should b e l " 
Indeed, such a sentiment demanded a very c a r e f u l and tender 
handling. Thus, of a l l the p o l i c i e s of the Sudan G-overnment, the p o l i c y 
which i t was t o adopt towards Islam was one of great importance. 
Consequently, from the very outset what the Government emphasised was the 
p o l i c y of r e l i g i o u s n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e . This p o l i c y was f i r s t expressed 
when Kitchener issued h i s remarkable d i r e c t i v e s t o h i s subordinates i n the 
provinces. I t said: "Be c a r e f u l t o see t h a t the r e l i g i o u s f e e l i n g s are 
not i n any way i n t e r f e r r e d w i t h , and t h a t the Mohammedan r e l i g i o n i s 
8 
respected". Besides t h i s c l e a r i n s t r u c t i o n t o h i s subordinates, the tone 
and language of a proclamation of Kitchener t o the Shaikhs of Kordofan 
and Darfur dated November 11th, 1898, i s worth q u o t i n g . " I give you" the 
9 
proclamation sa i d , "the Aman of God, h i s Prophet, and the Aman of His 
Highness the Khedive, and my Aman. Fear n o t h i n g as long as you are true 
10 
and f a i t h f u l t o the Government". Any one w i l l b e l i e v e t h a t the 
proclamation emanated from a Muslim sovereign and not from a C h r i s t i a n . 
The p o l i c y set by Kitchener was f a i t h f u l l y f o l l o w e d by h i s 
successor F r a n c i s Reginald Wingate. Wingate's own deep r e l i g i o u s 
7. As quoted by Sidney Low, Egypt i n T r a n s i t i o n , London,1 914; p.58. 
8 . Reports by Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General on the Finances, 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n and Condition of Egypt and the Soudan i n 1899; 
Egypt No.I (1900); Cd. 95; p.56. 
9• Trus "fc • 
10! Sudan " i n t e l l i g e n c e Report, No .60. 25 th. May t o 3' s t Dec. 1898; (marked 
c o n f i d e n t i a l ) ; Appendix 97, p.14-1!. 
3 
c o n v i c t i o n s made hirn " t o l e r a n t of a l l who s i n c e r e l y b e l i e v e d i n the 
11 • 
f a i t h m which they had been brought up". And he was " w i l l i n g t o 
a f f o r d them every encouragement to f o l l o w the way of l i f e t h a t gave 
them the g r e a t e s t s p i r i t u a l s a t i s f a c t i o n p r o vided t h a t t h i s was not 
1 2 
used as a p o l i t i c a l weapon w i t h which to destroy the Government". 
He f u l l y r e a l i s e d t h a t , w h i l e there must c l e a r l y be no i n t e r f e r e n c e 
w i t h the r e l i g i o n of the Muslims, nothing should be done which could 
be i n t e r p r e t e d , by p r e j u d i c e or malice, as i n t e r f e r e n c e . Therefore, 
one of Wingate's f i r s t a c t i o n s was t o appoint a Board o f e U l a m a — 
doctors of I s l a m i c Lav/ — t o advise him- on matters r e l a t i n g t o Islam. 
Henceforth, on every matter which had a b e a r i n g on the r e l i g i o n of 
Islam, the Governor-General used t o consult the Board before he took 
any a c t i o n . I n the provinces as w e l l , adequate measures were taken 
so t h a t the r e l i g i o u s f e e l i n g of the Muslims might not be i n j u r e d . I n 
1 - -1 3 1L. each province two'Ulama, one Imam and one Mu'adhdhin had been appointed, 
to s a t i s f y the r e l i g i o u s f e e l i n g of the people. 
Apart from r e l i g i o u s non-interference, another aspect of the 
Islamic p o l i c i e s of the Sudan Government p u t emphasis on "the r e s t o r a t i o n 
15 
of orthodox Islam" i n the Sudan and t o create environment i n which the 
Sudanese * Ulama could "lead the Sudanese I s l a m back to the path of 
1 6 
orthodoxy", as i f the Sudanese Muslims had become completely unorthodox 
11 . See, "Papers concerning the proposed Memoir" (by ? of ?) 
Gen.Sir.Reginald Wingate, 1946; W.P. 457. 
12. I b i d . 
13. The man who conducts prayer. 
14. The man who chants the c a l l f o r prayer. 
15. H i l l , R.L., S l a t i n Pasha, O.U.P. 1965; p.81 . 
116. I b i d . 
9 
under the Mahdists. This r e f l e c t s t h a t the B r i t i s h administratdtKs'were 
confused about orthodox Islam and the teachings of the Sudanese Mahdi, 
1 7 
the l a t t e r they regarded h i g h l y unorthodox. 
But i n s p i t e of t h e i r basic confusion, they d i d not f a i l t o r e a l i s e 
what were the l e g a l i n s t i t u t i o n s through which orthodox Islam could 
1'8 
f l o u r i s h . Thus, l i k e the former Turko-Egyptian r u l e r s of the Sudan, 
the new G-overnment p a i d i t s due a t t e n t i o n t o the i n s t i t u t i o n s and 
establishments l i k e , the S h a r i f a courts and the p u b l i c mosques. Together 
w i t h a l l these, the new G-overnment f a c i l i t a t e d the journey t o Mecca t o 
perform p i l g r i m a g e , one of the p i l l a r s of orthodox Islam. 
Among other t h i n g s , the f o l l o w i n g pages w i l l attempt t o elaborate 
a l l these p o l i c i e s and examine t h e i r values. 
17'• This p o i n t of Confusion on the p a r t of the B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s i s 
n i c e l y discussed by H i l l ; see, S l a t i n Pasha, I b i d . p.81. 
118.. For the p o l i c y of the Turko-Egyptian Government towards Sudanese 
Islam, see, H o l t , P.M., The Mahdist State i n the Sudan, o p . c i t . pp.20-21 
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CHAPTER I 
The o f f i c i a l and other r e l i g i o u s i n s t i t u t i o n s 
under the Anglo-Egyptian G-overnment,1899-''92k-» 
I 
The o f f i c i a l r e l i g i o u s i n s t i t u t i o n s - i n the Sudan are represented 
"by-two.sets of organizations — the courts a d m i n i s t e r i n g the SharT'a law 
1 
and the p u b l i c mosques. The Sudan cannot, of course, claim the indigenous 
o r i g i n of the o r g a n i z a t i o n of these two i n s t i t u t i o n s . These two organiza-
t i o n s made t h e i r way i n t o the Sudan when the country was under the Turko-
Egyptian r u l e (11821 -1:822). To understand b e t t e r the status and working of 
these two i n s t i t u t i o n s under the j o i n t Anglo-Egyptian r u l e , i t i s b e t t e r 
to have some idea about them i n the pre-Anglo-Egyptian days. For the sake 
of convenience, we may study these two i n s t i t u t i o n s separately. Let us 
f i r s t take up the courts a d m i n i s t e r i n g the Sharl'a Law. 
During the Turko-Egyptian p e r i o d , the Egyptians were mainly 
responsible f o r the proper o r g a n i z a t i o n of the Isla m i c Law i n the Sudan. 
From the Egyptians, the Sudanese Muslims came t o l e a r n something about 
2 
I s l a m i c Law. The six t y - t w o years of Turko-Egyptian r u l e e s t a b l i s h e d i n the 
Sudan an I s l a m i c l e g a l h i e r a r c h y ^ But the stages by which i t was 
estab l i s h e d are b u r i e d i n o b s c u r i t y . According t o the Sudanese c h r o n i c l e r 
1 . Hamilton, J.A. de.C. ( e d i t e d ) , The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan from w i t h i n ; 
London, 1935; p.208. 
2. H i l l , R.L., Egypt i n the Sudan, 1820-1881. O.U.P. 1959; p . 4 2 . 
3 . I b i d , p . 4 3 . 
there were occasions when the Egyptian a u t h o r i t i e s appointed QadT and 
QadIfUmun^" Of course, the highest posts, from the b e g i n n i n g , i n the 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of I s l a m i c law were f i l l e d up by the q u a l i f i e d persons 
from Egypt. 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note t h a t under the Turko-Egyptian r u l e 
I s l a m i c law was not the o n l y law i n the Sudan. The Egyptians brought 
to the Sudanese the 'codes of c i v i l and m i l i t a r y lav/ .... i n s p i r e d by 
Western p r a c t i c e 1 . By the side of Islamic law the Egyptians e s t a b l i s h e d 
c i v i l law and c i v i l c o u r t s , the operation of which to some exte n t 
' r e s t r i c t e d the area of j u r i s d i c t i o n of I s l a m i c l a w 1 . 
The s t a t u s and o p e r a t i o n of the I s l a m i c Lav/, of course, acquired 
a great s i g n i f i c a n c e a t the hands of the Mahadists. I t i s beyond any 
doubt t h a t d u r i n g the days of the Mahadists who e s t a b l i s h e d a t h e o c r a t i c 
s t a t e , the supremacy of the I s l a m i c law was f u l l y recognised a t l e a s t by 
Muhammad Ahmad. A f t e r the capture of Khartoum i n 1885, the Mahdi i s s a i d 
to have gathered a number of ?Umara ( r u l e r ) and 'Ulama and declared t h a t 
each and every Alim ( s i n g of ^Ulama) whether i n the capacity of judge or 
n o t , should pronounce h i s decrees according t o the Holy Qur'an and Sunna 
(th e sayings of the Prophet)^ At the same time he also empowered h i s Amirs 
to execute those decrees. The Mahdi was a f i r m b e l i e v e r i n the u n i t y and 
s i m p l i c i t y of Islam. To him 1 what wea.kened the power and v i t a l i t y of Islam' 
was the d i v i s i o n of the I s l a m i c w o r l d i n t o f o u r great t h e o l o g i c a l and l e g a l 
4 . T a ' r i k h muluk al-Sudan, p.30. , as mentioned by H i l l , I b i d . p . 43« 
5 . Sudan Lav; Journal & Reports., Khartoum, 1964; P«168. 
6.. I b i d ; p..168. 
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systems and the b i r t h of innumerable r e l i g i o u s brotherhoods. He d i d not ' 
recognise the f o u r kinds of l e g a l systems and abrogated the Hanafi code, 
o f f i c i a l l y f o l l o w e d i n the Sudan du r i n g the Turko-Egyptian p e r i o d . The 
Mahdl was zealous t o b r i n g every aspect of l i f e under the d i r e c t c o n t r o l 
of I s l a m i c law. Even du r i n g the e a r l y years of the r u l e of K h a l i f a f A b d 
A l l a h , the successor of Mahdl, I s l a m i c law had a great h o l d upon the 
state a f f a i r s . During t h i s time, al-Shaikh al-Husain, Ibrahim ordered 
a l l judges t o pronounce t h e i r judgements according t o the tenets of. the 
Holy Qur'an and Sunna. Apart from j u s t i c e , such other t h i n g s as the 
t a x a t i o n , finance and the trade of the country were brought under the 
9 
d i r e c t j u r i s d i c t i o n of Muslim lav/ "adapted and developed by experience". 
Thus, d u r i n g the Mahdiyya, the main core of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n f o l l o w e d I s l a m i c 
law which covered c i v i l , c r i m i n a l , personal — i n f a c t a l l sides of l i f e . 
Against t h i s background provided by the Mahadists and t h e i r 
•predecessors i n matters of I s l a m i c Law, the Anglo-Egyptian a u t h o r i t y had 
t o begin t h e i r work. The great problem t h a t confronted the new Government 
was to decide whether or not t o allow the I s l a m i c law t o continue the great 
c o n t r o l and i n f l u e n c e upon a l l matters c i v i l , c r i m i n a l and the l i k e , which 
i t had exercised during the Mahdist regime. 
Undoubtedly, t h i s was a great issue t o decide. But f o r t u n a t e l y 
enough, the B r i t i s h , the most prominent and dominant p a r t n e r t o the 




7. The S h a f i i t e s , M a l i k i t e s , Hanafites and the Hanbalites. 
8. Sudan Lav/ - Journal & Reports, o p . c i t . , p . 169 . 
9. Theobald, A.B., The Mahdiya, London, 1 9 5 1 ; p.180. 
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I n the second h a l f of the eighteenth century the B r i t i s h 
snatched from the Muslims the p o l i t i c a l power of I n d i a . There i n ' 
i 
I n d i a , the E n g l i s h d i d n o t , a t the beginning, abandon the a p p l i c a t i o n • 
of I s l a m i c law a l l of a sudden. On the co n t r a r y , B r i t i s h p o l i c y i n 
I n d i a a t the i n i t i a l stage was t o r e t a i n the e x i s t i n g l e g a l system — 
the t r a d i t i o n a l HanafI law sponsored by the Mughal Emperors. But 
t h i s p o l i c y was only ephemeral. I n 1772, Warren Hastings f o r the f i r s t 
time framed the r e g u l a t i o n 11 , of 1772. I t was adopted as the Regulation 
of 17th A p r i l , 1780 and i n Section 27 i t was enacted thus: 
" I n a l l the s u i t s regarding I n h e r i t a n c e , Succession, Marriage, ....and 
other r e l i g i o u s usages and i n s t i t u t i o n s , the.laws of the Quran w i t h 
1 0 
respect t o Muhammadans .... s h a l l be i n v a r i a b l y adhered t o " . The Madras 
C i v i l Courts Act I I I , 1873) Sec .16, also gave the s i m i l a r r e c o g n i t i o n t o 
the Muslim law by d e c l a r i n g , - "Where i n any s u i t or other proceeding i t 
i s necessary f o r a c i v i l c o u r t t o decide any question r e g a r d i n g succession, 
i n h e r i t a n c e , marriage .... or any r e l i g i o u s usage or i n s t i t u t i o n , the 
Muhammadan law i n cases where the p a r t i e s are Muhammadan .... s h a l l form 
11 
the r u l e of de c i s i o n ". 
Thus, i t appears t h a t the Hasting 1s r e g u l a t i o n 11, of 1772, and 
the Madras C i v i l Courts Act I I I , of 1873* recognised the I s l a m i c law and ' 
/ 
r e s t r i c t e d i t s operation t o the sphere of personal matters o n l y . The j 
I s l a m i c C r i m i n a l law i n I n d i a was replaced by the I n d i a n Penal Code, 1862. ' 
10. As quoted by Kashi Prasad, S.S., Muslim law as administered i n 
B r i t i s h I n d i a , Allahabad, 1937; p.138. 
11'. Wilson, Sir.R.K., Anglo-Muhammadan Law, Cal. 1930; p.73. 
12 . Coulson, N.J., A h i s t o r y of Is l a m i c law, Edin. 19^4; p . 164 . 
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The Isl a m i c C i v i l law code too, i n I n d i a , became g r a d u a l l y and i n c r e a s i n g l y 
a n g l i c i s e d by v i r t u e of the p r i n c i p l e adopted by the courts of deciding 
cases according t o ' j u s t i c e , e q u i t y and good conscience'. Hence, there 
ensued q u i t e n a t u r a l l y the ' c o d i f i c a t i o n of considerable p o r t i o n of the 
c i v i l law on English basis' w i t h the consequent r e s u l t t h a t from the 
second h a l f of the nineteenth century, I s l a m i c law, i n I n d i a n sub-continent, 
had been confined t o the j u r i s d i c t i o n of f a m i l y and personal s t a t u s only.. 
I n d e a l i n g w i t h the p o s i t i o n a n d status of the I s l a m i c law i n the 
Sudan, the Anglo-Egyptian a u t h o r i t y , b e t t e r c a l l e d the B r i t i s h administra-
t o r s , f o l l o w e d the same p o l i c y as they d i d i n I n d i a . I n t h i s respect 
t h e i r I n d i a n precedent and experience came t o t h e i r help.. I n 1899» "the 
Sudan G-overnment promulgated a Penal Code which was mainly based on the 
1 h-
I n d i a n Penal Code. By the i n t r o d u c t i o n of t h i s Penal Code, the operation 
of I s l a m i c law i n the sphere of c r i m i n a l matters was rendered i n e f f e c t i v e . 
Henceforth, the c r i m i n a l laws of the Sudan took the model not of Isl a m i c 
c r i m i n a l laws, b u t t h a t of E n g l i s h . I n the f i e l d o f C i v i l lav.' too, the j 
gradual A n g l i c i z a t i o n of C i v i l laws replaced the Isl a m i c C i v i l Codes. 
i 
Thus, i n the Sudan, the Isl a m i c l a w was ousted by the new G-overnment 
from the c r i m i n a l and c i v i l j u r i s d i c t i o n s . By the year 1902, the a c t u a l 
f i e l d and j u r i s d i c t i o n of the I s l a m i c law i n the Sudan was c l e a r l y defined \ 
15 
by the 'Sudan Mohammedan L aw Courts Ordinance', May 1902. By t h i s 
13 . I b i d , p . 164 . 
1i4« Reports on the Finances, A d m i n i s t r a t i o n and Condition of the Sudan -
1903, P a r t I , p . 1 7 . 
15 . Laws of the Sudan, V o l . X I , t i t l e X X V I I I , E d i t e d by Bennett, C.H.A., 
London., p.1 . 
15 
Ordinance the S h a r i f a Courts of the Sudan were empowered only t o deal Avith 
"any q u e s t i o n regarding marriage, divorce, guardianship of minors or 
1 6 
f a m i l y r e l a t i o n s h i p ..... waqf, g i f t , succession, w i l l s This 
Ordinance c l e a r l y shows t h a t w h i l e the operation of I s l a m i c law was 
confined only t o f a m i l y and personal matters, the non-Muslim law codes, 
as s t a t e d e a r l i e r , gained supremacy i n c i v i l and c r i m i n a l spheres. 
Although the f i e l d of I s l a m i c law was g r e a t l y narrowed down, y e t 
i t i s not easy t o a s c e r t a i n whether i t was a d e l i b e r a t e p o l i c y o f the 
Government t o r e s t r i c t the o p e r a t i o n o f S h a r l g a law t o the matters of 
f a m i l y s t a t u s . Few reasons may be a t t r i b u t e d t o the a c t i o n s of the 
B r i t i s h a d m i n i s t r a t o r s i n t h i s respect. 
F i r s t l y , as C h r i s t i a n s they had p r a c t i c a l l y no knowledge of 
I s l a m i c law. They thought, from whatever l i t t l e knowledge they had i n 
t h a t f i e l d , t h a t the I s l a m i c law, w i t h i t s o r i g i n i n prophecy and 
r e v e l a t i o n and i t s communication of the p r e c i s e w i l l of God t o man, could 
not i t s e l f be s u f f i c i e n t t o meet the new. exigencies of the modern times. 
Secondly, the h i g h o f f i c i a l s o f the Sudan Government, responsible f o r 
the f o r m u l a t i o n of p o l i c i e s were born and brought up i n an environment 
where there was a sharp and c l e a r cut d i v i s i o n between State and r e l i g i o n . 
This a t t i t u d e s u r e l y i n s p i r e d them' to s t r e s s on the d i v i s i o n of law i n t o 
secular and r e l i g i o u s , the l a t t e r they allowed t o proceed on i t s own way. 
16, I b i d . 
But the Englis h , perhaps, cannot be blamed f o r the i n t r o d u c t i o n 
of non-Muslim law codes i n a predominantly Muslim country l i k e the Sudan. 
Because they were not the f i r s t t o do i t . Long bef o r e , the Muslim' 
c o u n t r i e s l i k e the Ottoman Turkey and her dependency Egypt had e n t e r t a i n e d 
I 
a massipfe i n f l o w and i n t r o d u c t i o n of European laws which beyond doubt J 
replaced many- of p u r e l y I s l a m i c laws. I n the e a r l y p a r t of the nineteenth j 
century, European c r i m i n a l and commercial laws had gained a f o o t h o l d i n 
the Ottoman Empire. The process was f a c i l i t a t e d through the well-known 
17 
system of C a p i t u l a t i o n . A f u r t h e r a c c e l a r a t i o n of the process came about 
when a l a r g e scale r e c e p t i o n o f European law was e f f e c t e d i n the Ottoman 
Empire by the 'Tanzimat' reforms of the second and t h i r d q u a r t e r s of the i 
I 
nineteenth century. I n 1850, the Ottoman G-overnment promulgated commercial 
code which was i n p a r t a d i r e c t t r a n s l a t i o n of the Commercial code of 
18 
France. And i n t e r e s t i n g l y enough, i t contained " p r o v i s i o n f o r the payment 
1 9 
of i n t e r e s t " . Again, the Penal Code t h a t the Ottoman G-overnment 
promulgated i n 1858 was i n f a c t a t r a n s l a t i o n and r e f l e c t i o n of French 
Penal Code. This new Penal Code made a great i n r o a d upon the Sharl'a law 
of the Ottoman Empire; under i t , "the t r a d i t i o n a l hadd or d e f i n e d punish-
ments of Sharl^a law were a l l abolished except t h a t of the death p e n a l t y 
20 
f o r apostacy". The i n t r o d u c t i o n of these non-Muslim law codes was 
f o l l o w e d by the establishment of new secular c o u r t s , known as "Nizamiyya", 
responsible f o r the a p p l i c a t i o n of these new codes. W i t h i n the 
17. A system by which the Western powers got a d e f i n i t e assurance from' 
the Ottoman Government t h a t t h e i r c i t i z e n s l i v i n g i n the Middle East 
would be governed by t h e i r own laws and not by the laws of the Ottoman 
Empire. 
18. Coulson, N.J., o p . c i t ; p . 151 . 
19. I b i d . 20  
17 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of these Secular Courts now f e l l a l l c i v i l matters save 
21 
and except the cases of personal s t a t u s . 
The process of the r e c e p t i o n of European or other non-Muslim 
laws, however, d i d not remain confined only i n Turkey. I n t h i s respect 
Egypt, then g r e a t l y independent of the Ottoman c o n t r o l , was by no means 
l a g g i n g behind. From 1875 onwards, Egypt even surpassed Turkey,- her 
o v e r l o r d , i n the matter of accepting and i n t r o d u c i n g the French laws. 
On French model, Egypt promulgated 'penal, commercial and Maritime Codes'. 
Fo l l o w i n g Turkey, she also set up a system of secular courts t o 
administer these new laws. Apart from these, Egypt e f f e c t e d the enactment 
of C i v i l Codes, based on French model, and i t i s doubtless t h a t a very 
22 
few p r o v i s i o n s f o r these were borrowed from the Shar!* a. 
From the above, i t appears c e r t a i n t h a t before 1899 5 when the 
Anglo-Egyptian j o i n t r u l e was e s t a b l i s h e d i n the Sudan, the Muslim 
c o u n t r i e s l i k e Turkey and Egypt had been i n t r o d u c i n g the non-Muslim laws 
which t o a great extent l i m i t e d the area of the operation of I s l a m i c laws. 
During the Turko-Egyptian r u l e even the Sudan, the area of our present 
discussion, f e l t the pressure of the incoming of 'western i n s p i r e d ' c i v i l 
23 
laws which, r e s t r i c t e d the area of Sharl'a law i n t h a t country. Hence, i t 
i s c l e a r t h a t by i n t r o d u c i n g the non-Muslim laws and thereby r e s t r i c t i n g 
the j u r i s d i c t i o n of I s l a m i c laws i n the Sudan, the B r i t i s h a d m i n i s t r a t o r s 
d i d nothing new. On the other hand, by doing so, they simply added f u e l 
t o the process which e a r l i e r had received i t s momentum of the s t a r t a t the 
hands of the Muslim r u l e r s of Turkey and Egypt. 
21 . I b i d . 
22. I b i d , p . 1 5 2 . 
23. H i l l , Egypt i n the Sudan, 1820-1881 , o p . c i t . , p . 4 3 . 
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No doubt, under the Anglo-Egyptian a u t h o r i t y , the boundary of 
I s l a m i c law was d r a s t i c a l l y r e s t r i c t e d . But there i s , however, no 
evidence t o show t h a t the a u t h o r i t i e s i n the Government, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
the B r i t i s h a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , had ever cherished any idea of a b o l i s h i n g 
the operation of Shari'a law, even i n i t s l i m i t e d sphere. On the 
c o n t r a r y , they r a t h e r expressed f e e l i n g s of optimism about the f u t u r e 
of the .Shari'a lav/ ( o f course i n i t s present l i m i t e d sphere). This 
optimism of the B r i t i s h a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c i r c l e s found i t s expression as 
e a r l y i n 1905, when Cromer recorded: "The f a c t t h a t the Mohammedan Lav/ 
.... i s capable of being worked w i t h o u t producing r e s u l t s which clash 
v i o l e n t l y a t every stage w i t h modern ideas, i f the people who administer 
i t are honest and reasonably i n t e l l i g e n t " . This observation a t l e a s t 
shows t h a t f a r from attempting t o e l i m i n a t e I s l a m i c law r o o t and branch, 
the B r i t i s h a u t h o r i t i e s h e l d h i g h hopes r e g a r d i n g the working of the S h a r i f 
law i n s p i t e of i t s manifold drawbacks r e s u l t i n g from i t s i n e l a s t i c i t y and 
i m m u t a b i l i t y . 
Another important aspect of the problem i s revealed i n the f a c t 
t h a t the r e s t r i c t i o n of the area of I s l a m i c law and i t s replacement by 
non-Muslim laws i n the "sphere of c i v i l and c r i m i n a l matters d i d not 
produce any suspicion i n the minds of the Muslim r e l i g i o u s d i g n i t a r i e s of 
the Sudan t h a t the English were t r y i n g t o cause any major harm t o the 
I s l a m i c lav/ (now rendered a p p l i c a b l e o nly t o personal matters) of t h e i r 
l a n d . This f a c t i s i l l u s t r a t e d when i n 1904 Cromer wrote: " The 
25 
Grand Qadi d i d not look askance a t Mr.Bonham Carter and was not oppressed 
24. Cromer, Review o f r t h e Soudan Reports, 1904; Cairo, 1905; p.25. 
25. Then the Legal Secretary t o the Sudan Government. 
19 
w i t h the idea t h a t the Government i s about to l a y a s a c r i l e g i o u s hand 
26 
on the Sharia". Continuing f u r t h e r , Cromer remarked how the G-rand Qadi 
of the Sudan was pleased w i t h the "judgment w i t h which Mr.Bonham, Carter 
27 » 
t r e a t e d a l l matters connected w i t h the Law of Islam. 
Far from e n t e r t a i n i n g any doubt t h a t the B r i t i s h might ' l a y a 
s a c r i l e g i o u s hand on the Sharia-' , the G-rand Qadi of the Sudan.highly 
appreciated the e f f o r t s of the G-overnment t o organise the Shar? f a courts 
which then were i n a degenerate s t a t e . More than t h i s , the r e a c t i o n of 
the G-ra,nd Qadi who was also an important r e l i g i o u s p e r s o n a l i t y of the 
Sudan, to the i n t r o d u c t i o n of non-Muslim Law Codes i n the country, i s 
worth q u o t i n g . Commenting on the 'stagnant state of the Muhammadan Law 
i n the Sudan' the G-rand Qadi remarked: " though the I s l a m i c law had 
been the o n l y law a p p l i e d t o the people of the Muslim c o u n t r i e s , time had, 
28 
necessitated the i n t r o d u c t i o n of other codes". C e r t a i n l y , i n the 
context of the s t r u c t u r e of the Muslim States i n the Middle Ages, the 
G-rand Qadi was c o r r e c t i n h i s own l i n e of t h i n k i n g . I n the Middle Ages 
the Muslim s t a t e s and s o c i e t y f o r the most p a r t had remained ' b a s i c a l l y 
s t a t i c ' . This s tate of a f f a i r s rendered i t p o s s i b l e f o r the a p p l i c a t i o n 
of Shari'a law i n those days t o meet s u c c e s s f u l l y the ' i n t e r n a l r e q u i r e -
ments' of the Muslim states and s o c i e t y . But the pressures which arose 
out of the contact between Islam and the Western wor l d from the nineteenth 
century onwards, confronted Islam w i t h an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t , d i f f i c u l t 
26. Cromer, Review of the Soudah Reports 1904; o p . c i t . , p.25. 
27. I b i d . 
28. Reports on the Finances,Administration and Condition of the Sudan, 
1902, P a r t I , p . 1 4 . 
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and a l i e n s i t u a t i o n . I t was the challenge of time coupled w i t h the 
m a t e r i a l and te c h n o l o g i c a l s u p e r i o r i t y of the West. To meet t h i s 
challenge, I s l a m had no other way b u t t o abandon the Shari^a and 
replace i t w i t h laws of Western i n s p i r a t i o n i n those spheres where 
29 
Islam f e l t a p a r t i c u l a r urgency t o adapt i t s e l f t o modern c o n d i t i o n s . 
Although i t i s true t h a t the replacement of S h a r l p a by other codes i n 
c i v i l and c r i m i n a l spheres was no p a r t of the B r i t i s h programme t o 
adapt Islam t o modern c o n d i t i o n s , y e t by doing so they paved a way 
which i n f u t u r e was trodden by many Muslim c o u n t r i e s . Thus, against 
the background of the trends and requirements of the modern times, the 
G-rand Qadi was perhaps a c t i n g r i g h t l y when he extended h i s support t o 
the G-overnment actions i n the f i e l d of law and l e g a l a f f a i r s . 
The f o r e g o i n g a n a l y s i s bears out the f a c t t h a t i n a l t e r i n g the 
status of the Sharl*a law, the G-overnment had no h o s t i l e i n t e n t i o n 
whatsoever. And f a r from making any attempt t o a b o l i s h i t , the G-overnment 
adopted most admirable steps t o organise the Muhammadan law courts then 
l e f t i n p i t i a b l e c o n d i t i o n . The'Sudan Muhammadan Law Courts Ordinance, 
1902', no doubt r e s t r i c t e d the f i e l d of Sharl*a law; b u t on other 
d i r e c t i o n the ordinance aimed a t organizing the S h a f i f a courts i n 
d i f f e r e n t classes or ca t e g o r i e s . The Ordinance f a i r l y p r o v ided t h a t , 
"The Sudan Mohammedan Law Courts s h a l l comprise a Court of Appeal, High 
Courts, Courts of I s t class Kadis and Courts of 2nd class K a d i s " ^ 
29. Coulson, N.J., o p . c i t ; p.1^51* 
30. Sect. 2 . , see, The Laws of the Sudan, V o l . X I . o p . c i t . 
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Proceeding f u r t h e r , the Ordinance made c l e a r the c o n s t i t u t i o n of the 
d i f f e r e n t kinds of Muhammadan Law Courts. The 'Court of Appeal 1 was 
to c o n s i s t of the G-rand Qadi, the M u f t i (a State adviser who can e x p l a i n 
31 
the law) and the Inspectors of the Muhammadan Lav/ Courts. Every High 
32 
Court was t o c o n s i s t of a s i n g l e High Court Qadi. Every '1st class' 
Court was t o c o n s i s t of. a s i n g l e '1 s t c l a s s 1 Qadi^and every '2nd class' 
- 34 Court was to c o n s i s t of a s i n g l e '2nd class' Qadi. • 
H i t h e r t o , f o r the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of ' Sharif a f a m i l y lav/', c l a s s i c a l 
Muslim t r a d i t i o n had only one j u d i c i a l organ - the co u r t of a s i n g l e Qadi. 
No h i e r a r c h y and no elaborate o r g a n i z a t i o n e x i s t e d whatsoever. Hence, 
judging from t h i s p o i n t , the 1902 Ordinance of the Sudan G-overnment i s 
undoubtedly commendable, as i t tended t o create such an elaborate 
o r g a n i z a t i o n and j u d i c i a l h i e r a r c h y f o r the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of Muhammadan 
La,w i n the Sudan as was unknown i n the past h i s t o r y of Islam. 
Again, i n organ i z i n g the Sudan Muhammadan Law Courts, the 
Ordinance of 1902 introduced another n o v e l t y . For the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of 
'Shari'a f a m i l y law' there e x i s t e d i n ' c l a s s i c a l Muslim t r a d i t i o n , no 
system of appeal'. But the Ordinance by c r e a t i n g a Court of Appeal 
c o n s i s t i n g of the G-rand Qadi, the M u f t i , and the Inspectors of the 
35 
Muhammadan Law Courts f i l l e d t h a t v o i d . This step undoubtedly ensured 
b e t t e r j u d i c i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n by o f f e r i n g scope t o the l i t i g a n t s not 
s a t i s f i e d w i t h the judgments d e l i v e r e d i n the lower c o u r t s . 
31. Sect. 3 . ( 1 ) . 
32.. Sect.4 . 
33. S e c t . 5 . ( l ) . 
34* Sect.6 . 
35. Sect.2. . 
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Apart from a l l these, the Government was s a t i s f i e d not only w i t h 
the o r g a n i z a t i o n and c r e a t i o n of a Muslim' j u d i c i a l h i e r a r c h y ; a t the 
same time i t made the appointment of s a l a r i e d judges f o r the Muhammadan 
Law Courts p u r e l y a Government r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Thus the Qadis became 
the o f f i c i a l s o f the Legal Department of the Sudan Government; the o f f i c e s 
of the Grand Qadi and the M u f t i and Inspectors of Muhammadan Courts 
became Government posts. 
I n another d i r e c t i o n , the Government took some admirable steps. By 
promulgating Ordinances i t t r i e d t o o f f e r scope f o r i n t r o d u c i n g reforms 
i n the f i e l d of Muhammadan law.. Even i n the e a r l y years of the Sudan 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , wrote Cromer, the Grand Qadi of the Sudan regarded 
F.R.Wingate, the Governor-General of the Sudan, and Bonham Carter, the 
Legal Secretary, 'as f r i e n d s * who desired t o a s s i s t the Grand Qadi i n the 
work of reforms on l i n e s which might "commend themselves a l i k e t o devout 
36 
Muslims and t o those of other creeds". I n f a c t , the 'Sudan Mohammedan 
Law Courts Ordinance 1, May, 1902, l a i d the fo u n d a t i o n and o f f e r e d ample ' 
scope f o r many f u t u r e reforms i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of SharJa law when i t 
empowered the Grand Qadi w i t h i n i t s framework t o make r e g u l a t i o n from time 
t o time, w i t h the approval of the Governor-General, t o r e g u l a t e the 
decisions, procedure, c o n s t i t u t i o n , j u r i s d i c t i o n and f u n c t i o n s o f the 
37 
Muhammadan Law Courts and other matters connected w i t h such c o u r t s . 
36. Reports on the Finances, A d m i n i s t r a t i o n and Condition of the Sudan -
1904; P a r t I , p.38. 
37. Sect.8 . 
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The above power accorded t o the Grand Qadi by the Section 8 of 
the Sudan Muhammadan Law Courts Ordinance, 1902, was f u l l y u t i l i z e d by 
the l a t t e r i n 1912. I n t h a t year, the Grand Qadi, w i t h . t h e approval of 
the Governor-General, issued the 'Maazuns Regulations, 1912' . Among 
other t h i n g s , the 'Maazuns Regulations, 1912', s p e l t a refo r m i n g s p i r i t 
i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n of the S h a r i f a Courts when i t emphasised t h a t the 
- - 3 8 Ma'dhuns must possess, "a good knowledge of Arabic reading and w r i t i n g . . . " , 
and "a good knowledge of the Muhammadan Law r e l a t i n g t o marriage, divorce, 
i d d a t s and wardship, and of a l l r u l e s concerning t h e i r d u t i e s " . Thus i t 
i s needless t o say t h a t the Regulation by s t a t i n g the proper q u a l i f i c a t i o n s 
of the Ma'dhuns ensured the proper f u n c t i o n i n g of the Muhammadan Law Courts. 
But more important than these i s another attempt made i n 1915 t o 
introduce f u r t h e r ' r e f o r m i n g p r i n c i p l e s i n the whole o r g a n i z a t i o n a l set-up 
of the Muhammadan Law Courts of the Sudan. I n t h a t year, the G-rand Qadi, 
w i t h the approval of the Governor-General and under the s e c t i o n 8 of the 
Sudan Muhammadan Law Courts Ordinance, 1902, issued 'The Sudan Mohammedan 
Law Courts Organization and Procedure Regulations, 1916'V3 Under t h i s 
there are as many as three hundred sections d e a l i n g w i t h the various 
a s p e c t ^ of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of Muhammadan Law i n the Sudan and a l l of 
them d i s p e l l e d an i n e r t . d e s i r e t o organize the courts on a sounder b a s i s . 
Thus i n the Chapter I , the Regulations of 191 6 l a i d down the proper 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s f o r the judges of the Muhammadan Law Courts. I t emphasised 
38. S e c t . 2 . ( a ) . 
39. S e c t . 2 . ( c ) . 
40. See, Laws of the Sudan, Vol.XI.,' o p . c i t , p.8. 
41. S e l e c t i o n , appointment and delegation of Shari*a o f f i c i a l s ; j u r i s d i c t i o n 
and competence of courts and the f u n c t i o n of the Grand Qadi; Court 
procedure; Executions; Registers, e t c . 
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t h a t the "persons t o be selected f o r j u d i c i a l posts s h a l l be i n 
possession of Aliraiya c e r t i f i c a t e s from El-Azhar U n i v e r s i t y , or fromi 
a s i m i l a r r e l i g i o u s College i n Egypt, or s h a l l be graduates of the 
Sharia Law Section of Gordon College I t i s f u r t h e r commendable 
t h a t the 1916" Regulations o u t l i n e d the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s not o n l y f o r the 
judges, b u t even f o r the c l e r k s of the Muhammadan Law C o u r t s ^ The 
Regulations l a i d down t h a t , f o r a c l e r k s h i p i n the Mohammedan 
Law Courts .... a good knowledge of the Arabic language, the Sharia, 
Composition, Correspondence .... Mohammedan Law Courts Procedure, 
Regulations and of the r u l e s of moral conduct according t o the Mohammedan 
- i • . ,. 44 
relxgxon was necessary. 
'The Sudan Mohammedan Law Courts Organization and Procedure 
Regulations, 1916 * had also many other b e n e f i c i a l e f f e c t s which can h a r d l y 
escape the n o t i c e of any c r i t i c . The Chapter I I of the Regulation 
c o n t a i n i n g sections 11-53 i s much more important. I t defines i n greater 
d e t a i l the ' J u r i s d i c t i o n and Competence of Courts and f u n c t i o n s of the 
Grand Kadi' and thus sought t o e s t a b l i s h a h i e r a r c h y of courts whereby 
the Qadis of the D i s t r i c t Courts could exercise a wide b u t l i m i t e d 
45 -
j u r i s d i c t i o n } " the Qadis of the Province Courts could t r y by way of 
46 
appeal a l l cases heard by Kadis of D i s t r i c t Courts under them." Besides, 
the Province Courts were empowered to t r y o r i g i n a l s u i t s beyond the 
competence of the D i s t r i c t C o u r t ^ and the High Court was competent t o 
42.. Sect .1 . 
43• Laws of the Sudan, o p . c i t . , p.10. 
44 . Chapt.I., Sect.3 . 
4 5 . Sects. 22, 23, 24. 
46 . Sect. 25. 
47 . Sect. 26-29. 
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"rehear i n appeal s u i t s decided i n f i r s t instance by the Kadis of 
Province Courts"; and also t o 'rehear as a c o u r t of Re v i s i o n 1 the 
decisions of the Province Qadis i n appeal from D i s t r i c t Q a d i s ^ The 
Regulations of 1916 empowered the High Muhammadan Courts so much so 
t h a t they could a t anytime c a l l f o r and r e v i s e any case heard e i t h e r 
50 
"by Province or D i s t r i c t Courts. 
The above Regulations also increased the power of the G-rand 
Qadi i n several ways. I t made the G-rand Qadi such t h a t he could "when 
circumstances so demanded .... hear any case not p r e v i o u s l y decided by 
51 
a Mohammedan Law Court". The Regulations also f u r t h e r made him the 
52 
"general a d m i n i s t r a t o r of the estates of Mohammedan deceased persons ....". 
One of the many m e r i t o r i o u s measures devised by the Regulations 
f o r the proper f u n c t i o n i n g of the Muhammadan Law Courts i s the c r e a t i o n 
of the Committee of Supervision "composed of the Chief J u s t i c e , the G-rand 
53 
Kadi, the M u f t i , the Inspector of the Mohammedan Law Courts The 
main ob j e c t of the Committee was t o " p o i n t out j u d i c i a l e r r o r s i n order t o 
54 
prevent t h e i r recurrence....". The work of a l l the Muhammadan Courts 
except t h a t of the High CourlrVas brought under the supervisory 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Committee of Supervision. Though t h i s Committee had 
56 
no power t o " a f f e c t She judgments given or the matters decided", y e t i t 
48 . Of course w i t h c e r t a i n r e s t r i c t i o n s (see Sect . 3 0 ) . 
49 . Sect.31 . 
50. Sect.35. 
51. Sect.36. 
52. Sect . 3 8 . 





could r e f e r t o the High Court f o r review of. any judgment which i t 
57 
considered c o n t r a r y t o the p r i n c i p l e s of the Shari*a. Thus, the 
Committee, i n s p i t e of i t s l i m i t e d power, c e r t a i n l y acted as a check 
when the cases of the v i o l a t i o n of S h a r l p a lav; could a r i s e . 
There i s another important measure t h a t had teen e f f e c t e d "by 
the above Regulations of I t c e r t a i n l y deserves comment, as i t 
went a l o n g way i n strengthening the p o s i t i o n s of the Muhammadan Law 
Courts i n the Sudan. I t enacted t h a t "The Kadis of the Mohammedan 
Law Courts as regards t h e i r decisions under the Sharia and the exercise 
of t h e i r j u d i c i a l f u n c t i o n s , are independent of and i n no way subordinate 
to the c i v i l a u t h o r i t i e s who must not i n any way i n t e r f e r e w i t h t h e i r 
58 
j u d i c i a l independence". Thus i t ensured the independence of the 
Muhammadan Law Courts from the encroachment of the c i v i l a u t h o r i t i e s , 
and recognised a f a c t o r of most v i t a l importance f o r the proper 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of j u s t i c e . 
The 1 Sudan Mohammedan Law Courts Organization and Procedure 
Regulations, 19'l6' also introduced some other major changes i n the f i e l d 
of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of Muhammadan Law i n the Sudan. The Regulations 
provided t h a t the "Decisions of the Mohammedan Law Courts s h a l l be i n 
accordance w i t h the a u t h o r i t a t i v e d o c t r i n e s of the Hanafia j u r i s t s 
except i n matters i n which the G-rand Kadi otherwise d i r e c t s i n a j u d i c i a l 
c i r c u l a r or memorandum, i n which case the decisions s h a l l be i n accordance 
57. Sect . 4 5 . 
58. Sect . 5 2 . 
11 
w i t h such other doctrines of the Hanafia or other Mohammedan j u r i s t s 
59 
as are set f o r t h i n such c i r u c l a r or memorandum". 
The f i r s t p a r t of the Section, however, i n v i t e s no comment, as 
i t merely represents the r e s t o r a t i o n i n the Sudan of the Hanafi law 
which had been e a r l i e r abrogated by the Mahadists. The Hanafi law, the 
o f f i c i a l code of the Ottomans, had been imposed upon the Sudan by the 
former Turko-Egyptian r u l e r s w h i l e the people of the Sudan were mostly 
M a l i k i . The courts had no scope t o exercise any personal d i s c r e t i o n 
owing t o the dominance of the doctrines of a p a r t i c u l a r School ( i . . e . 
H anafi, i n Sudan) which was regarded as ' a u t h o r i t a t i v e ' . But t h i s 
i n e l a s t i c i t y of the operation of the Muslim Law was g r e a t l y overcome by 
the l a t t e r p a r t of the Section 53, of the 'Sudan Mohammedan Law Courts 
Organization and Procedure Regulations, 1916' . I t c o n t r i b u t e s l a r g e l y 
to the i n t r o d u c t i o n of reforming p r i n c i p l e s by making p r o v i s i o n f o r the 
a p p l i c a t i o n of the other codes of I s l a m i c law, which are also e q u a l l y 
valuable and r e s o u r c e f u l . 
Again the Section 53 of the 'Sudan Mohammedan Law Courts 
Organization and Procedure Regulations, 1916', empowered the G-rand Qadi 
to issue ' j u d i c i a l c i r c u l a r s ' , t o e f f e c t reforms. Accordingly, the 
G-rand Qadi issued a series of c i r c u l a r s almost a l l of them, of course, 
were "based on reforms e i t h e r already promulgated or a t l e a s t under 
60 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n Egypt". Moreover, as the a p p l i c a t i o n of other codes 
than Hanafi was made p o s s i b l e , many of the e a r l i e s t reforms e f f e c t e d 
59. Sect.53. 
60. Anderson, J.N.D., I s l a m i c Law i n A f r i c a , London ,1938. p.311. 
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through the ' j u d i c i a l c i r c u l a r s ' consisted mostly i n the s u b s t i t u t i o n 
of the M a l l k l ( t h e Code to which the Sudanese Muslims were more 
61 accustomed) f o r the Hanafi law i n regard t o c e r t a i n matrimonial cause. 
The Government promulgated not only the Ordinances and Regulation; 
i t was also q u i t e aware of the necessity of p r o v i d i n g the Muhammadan Law 
Courts w i t h t r a i n e d Qadis. I n the e a r l y years of i t s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , the 
62 
Government "badly f e l t the need of t r a i n e d and q u a l i f i e d Qadis. As a 
p a r t i a l s o l u t i o n to t h i s problem, the G-overnment adopted the p o l i c y of 
r e c r u i t i n g Qadis from among the graduates of Gordon College. But the 
problem was f i n a l l y solved when a l e g a l School f o r the t r a i n i n g of the 
Qadis was attached t o Gordon College. I n t h i s s e c t i o n of Gordon College 
the young t r a i n e e s f o r the posts of Qadis received i n s t r u c t i o n s i n Arabic 
language and l i t e r a t u r e , the Qur'an and the Muhammadan Law. The r e s u l t 
was h i g h l y s a t i s f a c t o r y . These trainees could come out as q u a l i f i e d Qadis 
a f t e r passing p r e s c r i b e d examinations and t h e i r subsequent appointments t o 
the new posts obviously ensured b e t t e r and e f f i c i e n t s e r v i c e . I n f a c t , 
t h i s t r a i n i n g college of the Qadis i n the Sudan proved so successful t h a t 
i t was copied i n Egypt where a t r a i n i n g school f o r the Qadis was opened i n 
a l - A z h a r ^ 
Apart from producing t r a i n e d Qadis f o r the Muhammadan Law Courts, 
the Government also adopted s u f f i c i e n t measures so t h a t the working of 
61 . I b i d , pp. 3 1 1 - 3 U . 
62. Reports on the Finances, A d m i n i s t r a t i o n and Condition of the Sudan -
1904; P a r t I , pp.37-38. 
63. Reports on the Finances, A d m i n i s t r a t i o n and Condition of the Sudan -
1903; P a r t I , p. 19. 
64. Wingate t o Kitchener, 26th Oct. 1911; W.P. 301/4. 
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these courts could be p r o p e r l y supervised. To achieve t h i s , Inspectors 
were appointed f o r the r e g u l a r i n s p e c t i o n of the c o u r t s . 
The above analysis should i n no way give us the impression t h a t 
the whole of the Muslim Sudan e q u a l l y and u n i f o r m l y f e l t the impact of 
these r e o r g a n i z a t i o n s and reforms of the Muhammadan Law Courts. While 
the e f f e c t s of a l l these were r e s t r i c t e d mainly t o the p o p u l a t i o n of the 
urban areas, the attempts a t G-overnment l e v e l t o b r i n g the r u r a l areas 
w i t h i t s nomads, a g r i c u l t u r i s t s and p a s t o r a l i s t s under the i n f l u e n c e of 
the Muhammadan Law, appears t o be very meagre. Instead of S h a r l f a law, 
the Muslim nomads and p a s t o r a l i s t s of the Northern Sudan, were governed 
65 
"almost e n t i r e l y by « ada" or Customary Law. The G-overnment adopted no 
measure t o apply the Shari'a lav/ i n t h e i r case. On the c o n t r a r y , i n 1912, 
the Sudan G-ov.ernment, as p a r t of i t s p o l i c y of d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n , 
promulgated the "Powers of Nomad Sheikhs Ordinance" which, i n t e r a l i a , 
accorded the f u l l r e c o g n i t i o n t o the " r u l i n g of F a d a " ^ I t may be 
explained t h a t the m i g r a t o r y nature of the nomads made i t almost impossible, 
even nowadays, t o b r i n g them under the s t r i c t j u r i s d i c t i o n of lav/ and order. 
Moreover, although Muslims, r e l i g i o n could not s i t f i r m l y upon t h e i r 
h e a r t s . To a l l these may, perhaps, be added the p a u c i t y of funds. Hence, 
i n the e a r l y days of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the Sudan, v/hen f a c i l i t i e s f o r 
t r a n s p o r t and communication were meagre and f i n a n c i a l means l i m i t e d , i t 
was perhaps b e t t e r t o allow the nomads t o administer themselves i n t h e i r 
own way. 
65. Trimingham, J.S., Islam i n the Sudan, O.U.P. 1948. p . 1 2 2 . 
66. I b i d , p . 1 2 2 . 
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The second of the o f f i c i a l r e l i g i o u s i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t drew 
the proper a t t e n t i o n of the G-overnment, was the p u b l i c mosques. I n 
t h i s respect, the p o l i c y and a t t i t u d e of the G-overnment bears an 
eloquent testimony t o t h e i r tolerance and non-interference w i t h the 
r e l i g i o u s matters. As "the place f o r the d i v i n e s e r v i c e s " ^ mosques 
are of immense importance t o the Muslims. P r i m a r i l y the mosques are 
68 
the "houses of which G-od has p e r m i t t e d t h a t they be erected 11. 
Herein l i e s the importance of the mosque which represents one of the 
basic r e l i g i o u s needs of the Muslims. 
Prom the v e r y beginning of the Anglo-Egyptian r u l e i n the Sudan, 
the Government was q u i t e conscious t o appreciate the needs and importance 
of mosques f o r the Muslim-, p o p u l a t i o n of the Sudan. This c o n t e n t i o n i s 
borne out by the f a c t t h a t a f t e r the reoccupation of the Sudan, 
Kitchener, the f i r s t Governor-General, assured t h a t the "Mosques i n the 
69 
p r i n c i p a l towns w i l l be r e b u i l t 
Besides t h i s formal assurance, the Government created a 'special 
fund' t o a s s i s t the l o c a l mosques committees i n b u i l d i n g and r e b u i l d i n g 
the mosques!^ This 'special fund' was placed under the charge of S l a t i n 
Pasha, the Inspector General of the Sudani' The c o n s t r u c t i o n of many of 
67. See, Encyclopaedia of Islam, V o l . I l l , Leiden, 1936; A r t i c l e , Masdjid. 
68. Sura, XX.XV.36; vide. Encyclopaedia of Islam, I b i d . 
69. I t i s one of the d i r e c t i v e s issued by Kitchener t o the P r o v i n c i a l 
Governors j u s t a f t e r the reconquest. For the f u l l t e x t see, Reports 
by Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General on the Finances, Administra 
t i o n , and Condition- of Egypt and the Soudan i n 1899; o p . c i t ; pp.55-56 
70. H i l l , S l a t i n Pasha;' o p . c i t , p.82. 
71 . I b i d . 
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these mosques sometimes came under the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the P u b l i c Works 
72 
Department of the Sudan Government, which designed them, w i t h utmost care. 
The 'special fund' t o help the l o c a l mosque committees used to 
o f f e r subsidies i n b u i l d i n g the mosques. The help and subsidies rendered 
by the G-overnment normally f e l l under two c a t e g o r i e s . Sometimes the 
l o c a l mosque committees were given cash money, bu t mostly the Government 
helped the c o n s t r u c t i o n or r e b u i l d i n g of the mosques by "waiving the 
73 
f r e i g h t charges on m a t e r i a l f o r t h e i r c o n s t r u c t i o n . " 
I t may be mentioned here t h a t although the Government assured the 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of the mosques i n the p r i n c i p a l towns, i t d i d not allow the 
" . . . . p r i v a t e mosques t o be r e - e s t a b l i s h e d ...."T^" But f o r t h i s p a r t i c u l a r 
measure the G-overnment should not be misunderstood. I t took t h i s step 
because i t f e l t t h a t these p r i v a t e mosques " g e n e r a l l y formed centres of 
75 
unorthodox f a n a t i c i s m " . Of course, the G-overnment made reasonable 
p r o v i s i o n t h a t any request f o r the establishment of p r i v a t e mosques was t o 
76 
be r e f e r r e d t o the Central A u t h o r i t y f o r proper c o n s i d e r a t i o n . 
The e f f o r t s of the Government to help the mosques produced 
marvellous r e s u l t s . I n the e a r l y years, many mosques received s u b s t a n t i a l 
assistance from the Government. As e a r l y as 1902, two mosques i n the 
Province of Dongola, namely the Dongola Mosque and the Duem Mosque, 
received assistance from the Government towards t h e i r r e c o n s t r u c t i o n ! ^ 
72. I b i d . , 
73. I b i d . 
74. Kitchener's d i r e c t i v e s t o the P r o v i n c i a l Governors, o p . c i t . 
75. I b i d . 
76.. I b i d . . 
77. Reports on the Finances, A d m i n i s t r a t i o n and Condition of the Sudan -
1902; P a r t I I , p . 2b1 . . 
The Dongola Mosque was p r a c t i c a l l y r e b u i l t by the G-overnment a t the 
78 
cost of more than £E .700. The Duem Mosque of the White Wile province, 
i n the same year, received a f i n a n c i a l assistance from the G-overnment 
t o the tune of £E .60?^ I n the same year, the G-overnment extended a i d , 
f i n a n c i a l and otherwise, t o many other P u b l i c Mosques. A small mosque 
a t El-Damer and a l a r g e r one a t Shendi were b u i l t i n 1902, and received 
G-overnment r e c o g n i t i o n ^ Among these, the one a t Shendi received some 
8'i 
assistance from the G-overnment i n the shape of r o o f i n g m a t e r i a l s . 
With s u b s t a n t i a l assistance from the G-overnment, a mosque a t Kavra i n the 
g 
J e z i r a Province, f o r m e r l y made of mud b r i c k s , was b u i l t w i t h b u r n t b r i c k s . 
Besides these, when the i n t e r i o r of the p r i n c i p a l mosque a t Wad-Medani 
collapsed owing t o insecure foundations and bad workmanship, i t was 
r e b u i l t under Government assistance and su p e r v i s i o n . 
I n the subsequent years, the a c t i v i t i e s of the Government i n 
matters of f i n a n c i n g and c o n s t r u c t i n g mosques were q u i t e encouraging. 
Besides the mosque a t Kawa, asalready mentioned, another mosque a t Masid 
i n the same province had been very o l d and r e q u i r e d a good deal of 
r e p a i r . I n 1904, w i t h the assistance of a Government grant of £E .50, i t 
Ql 
was rennovated. S i m i l a r l y , i n the same year the mosque a t Gedarif, the 
only mosque of Kassala, was f i n a n c i a l l y a s s i s t e d by the Government f o r i t s 
78. I b i d . 
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80. Reports on the Finances, A d m i n i s t r a t i o n and Condition of the Sudan -
1902; P a r t I I I , p.243. 
8 1 . I b i d . 
82. Reports on the Finances, A d m i n i s t r a t i o n and Condition of the Sudan -
1902; P a r t I I I , p.275. 
83 . I b i d . , p.333. 
84» Reports on the Finances, A d m i n i s t r a t i o n and Condition of the Sudan -
1904, P a r t IV, p.57. 
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85 r e c o n s t r u c t i o n and r e p a i r . Besides h e l p i n g the mosque of G-edarif, the 
G-overnment also promised a sum of £E.200 f o r the e r e c t i o n of another 
mosque a t Kassala?^ 
At Singa i n Sennar Province- the Muslims had no mosque u n t i l 1907. 
The people, r e a l i s i n g Government's sympathetic a t t i t u d e r a i s e d some 
sub s c r i p t i o n s from among themselves and approached the G-overnment f o r a 
87 
grant. The G-overnment a t once r e a l i s i n g the need f o r a mosque f o r these 
88 
people granted a sum of £E .100. There were even many mosques which 
obtained Government assistance more than once. The Duem mosque of the 
White N i l e Province had received, i n 1902, f i n a n c i a l a i d from the 
89 
G-overnment. But s t i l l when i t was not completed u n t i l 1907 5 the G-overnor-
General g r a c i o u s l y granted £E .300 f o r the completion.of the work of t h a t 
90 
mosque. Apart from a l l these, the Government l i b e r a l l y helped the 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of mosques when they were damaged by n a t u r a l c a l a m i t i e s . 
Thus, i n 1908 when the mosque a t Tokor and the Zawiya (Mosque cum Qur'an 
School) i n the Red Sea Province were destroyed by storm, the G-overnment 
91 
immediately granted the sum of £E.150 towards t h e i r r e p a i r s . Just a f t e r 
-t h i s , the G-overnment extended another f i n a n c i a l a i d f o r the r e p a i r of the 
90 
o l d mosque a t El-Damer i n Berber. 
85. I b i d , p.78. 
86. I b i d . 
87. Reports on the Finances, A d m i n i s t r a t i o n and Condition of the Sudan -
. 1907, P a r t I I I , p.396. 
88. I b i d . 
89• See above p. 
90. Reports on the Finances, A d m i n i s t r a t i o n and Condition of the Sudan -
1908, P a r t I I I , p.685. 
91 . I b i d , p.635. 
92. I b i d , p . 482 . 
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During the subsequent years, the Government took appropriate steps 
t o open so many p u b l i c mosques. I n 1909j f i v e p u b l i c mosques were opened; 
among these, two i n Berber Province, one i n Dongola Province, one i n Blue 
93 
K i l e and one i n White N i l e Province. F o l l o w i n g t h i s , e i g h t p u b l i c 
94 
mosques were opened i n d i f f e r e n t provinces. Again i n 1911 , three were 
95 
opened, one each i n H a i f a , Kassala and the Red Sea Provinces. But the 
year 1912, perhaps, witnessed the opening of the l a r g e s t number of p u b l i c 
mosques i n the Sudan. I n t h i s year the Government recorded the opening of 
96 
as many as t h i r t y p u b l i c mosques i n d i f f e r e n t p a r t s of the Sudan. 
Apart from paying a t t e n t i o n t o the c o n s t r u c t i o n and opening of 
p u b l i c mosques i n d i f f e r e n t p a r t s of the country, the G-overnment i n the 
e a r l y days of i t s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n undertook the c o n s t r u c t i o n of a b i g mosque 
97 
m the c a p i t a l c i t y of Khartoum. The P u b l i c Works Department of the Sudan 
98 
Government was entrusted w i t h i t s c o n s t r u c t i o n . I t i s important t o note 
t h a t as a mosque of the c a p i t a l c i t y , the Governor-General h i m s e l f took 
a c t i v e i n t e r e s t i n i t . The mosque was so b i g i n p l a n t h a t f o r want of 
s u f f i c i e n t funds i t remained u n f i n i s h e d u n t i l 1908, when the Governor-
General a f t e r prolonged n e g o t i a t i o n s succeeded i n o b t a i n i n g an amount of 
£ 2 0 , 0 0 0 from the Egyptian Wakf Department, which was mainly responsible t o 
99 
finance i t s c o n s t r u c t i o n . 
93. Reports on the Finances A d m i n i s t r a t i o n and Condition of the Sudan -
1909, P a r t I I , p.114. 
94. Reports on the Finances,Administration and Condition of the Sudan -
1910, P a r t I I , p.131 . 
95• Reports on the Finances,Administration and Condition of the Sudan -
1911, Vol.T, p.81 . 
96. Reports on the Finances,Administration and Condition of the Sudan -
1912, V o l . I I , p . 3 3 9 ; 
97» Reports on the Finances,Administration and Condition of the Sudan -
1902, Part. I I , p.21 7. 
98. I b i d . 
99. Gorst ,to Wingate, Cairo, 22 Dec.1908; W.P., 284/9. 
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Besides t h i s , the G-overnor-G-eneral made another important move 
to secure funds from' Egypt f o r the mosques of the Sudan. I n p r i n c i p l e 
the maintenance of the mosques of the Sudan was met "by the revenue of 
the Wakf lands i n h e r i t e d "by the Sudan Government 1. 0 0 But as, owing t o 
the opening of the la r g e number of mosques the Sudanese Source was 
considered q u i t e inadequate, the G-overnor-G-eneral asked the Egyptian Wakf 
Department t o c o n t r i b u t e an annual sum f o r the upkeep of the mosques i n 
the Sudan. 
I t may be remembered t h a t the G-overnment i n the beginning d i d not 
allow the c o n s t r u c t i o n of the p r i v a t e mosques f o r the apprehension t h a t 
102 
'they might w e l l t u r n i n t o the centres of unorthodox f a n a t i c i s m ' . But 
very soon the G-overnment r e l a x e d t h i s r e s t r i c t i o n when i t f e l t a b i t 
secure. Thus, as e a r l y in" 1902, a p r i v a t e mosque was b u i l t a t Messalamia 
( J e z i r a ) by Shaikh Muhammad ' A l l , head merchant of the Markaz 0^ and by 
''905, Sudan had as many as 1 70 p r i v a t e mosques as against 370 p u b l i c 
104 mosques. 
Thus, under the a c t i v e care of the G-overnment, so many p u b l i c and 
p r i v a t e mosques were e s t a b l i s h e d i n the Sudan w i t h i n a few years. I n 
various ways G-overnment helped the mosques. Sometimes p l o t s were a l l o t t e d 
t o e s t a b l i s h a Wakf f o r the upkeep of the mosques. I n 1911 such a p l o t 
100. Carter. E.B., Wakf lands i n the Sudan, p.6 . , W.P. 284/12/3. 
101. Wingate t o G-orst, 22 Dec.1908., W.P. 284/9. 
1 02. See above p. 3 1 . 
103. Reports on the F i n a n c e c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n and Condition of the Sudan -
1902, P a r t I I I , p.275. 
104* Reports on the Finances,Administration and Condition of the Sudan -
1906, P a r t I I I , p.378. (Schedule I . ) . 
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was a l l o t t e d t o the mosque of Monagil i n the Blue N i l e Province, on which 
1 05 
the mosque committee b u i l t a row of shops w i t h corrugated i r o n r o o f s . 
Apart from t h i s , v e ry o f t e n the B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s c h e e r f u l l y o f f e r e d 
1 Ob 
c o n t r i b u t i o n as s u b s c r i p t i o n f o r the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f mosques. But the 
most i n t e r e s t i n g and important suggestion of many zealous p r o v i n c i a l 
governors was t o adopt some new ways which could procure funds f o r the 
c o n s t r u c t i o n of new mosques. I n 1903, the Governor of Sennar was s t r o n g l y 
i n favour of l e v y i n g a small and l i g h t u n i v e r s a l tax f o r b u i l d i n g of 
mosques i n each province and suggested,- ^fo o f l a n d tax per v i l l a g e , 
of t r i b u t e from Nomads, on a l l R o y a l t i e s p a i d by merchants from each 
1 07 
v i l l a g e or F e r l k (nomad encampment) of nomads or merchants. 
I n the same way, the Governor of Kassala also proposed t h a t a very 
small percentage of the revenue derived from l a n d tax and herd tax might 
1 08 
be allowed t o go towards the b u i l d i n g of a good mosque a t Kassala. But 
o f f i c i a l records u n f o r t u n a t e l y do not bear any evidence whether these 
suggestions of the e n t h u s i a s t i c Governors were ever accepted. 
The Government not o n l y took steps t o help the b u i l d i n g and 
r e b u i l d i n g of the mosques; a t the same time i t was q u i t e aware of seeing 
105. Reports on the Finances,Administration and Condition of the Sudan -
1911', Vol.11, p.45. 
106. Reports on the Finances,Administration and Condition of the Sudan -
1906, P a r t IV., p.579.' 
107. Reports on Finances,Administration and Condition of the Sudan - 1903 5 
Part IV, p.86. 
108. Reports on Finances,Administration and Condition of the Sudan - 1904» 
P a r t IV, p.78. 
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that the mosques were properly provided with s t a f f . 
Like a l l other Muslim countries, i n the Sudan too i t was a 
general practice that the mosque was f u l l y responsible for maintaining 
i t s s t a f f . But despite t h i s t r a d i t i o n a l convention, the Government on 
different occasions r e a d i l y made recommendations for the grant of money 
for the s t a f f of the mosques. Thus, i n 1902, i t so happened that the 
Governor of Dongola himself made an application to the higher authority 
asking for the grant of s a l a r i e s for the Imam, Mu'adhdhin, and the 
110 
servant of the Duem mosque of Dongola. Even sometimes on request from 
the mosque authority an increase of pay was granted to the Imams of the 
mosques. Such an increase of pay for the Imam was readily accorded to 
111 
the Imam of the Haifa Mosque i n 1908. 
Thus, within the f i r s t twenty-two years of the Anglo-Egyptian r u l e , 
there came to e x i s t more than s i x hundred mosques (most of them public) i n 
112 
the Sudan. Even i n the Southern Sudan which was almost wholly pagan, the 
109. Although Islam does not recognise or require any priesthood to lead 
services and administer other r i t e s , yet for the sake of convenience 
i t had been customary to have a small s t a f f of two or three attached 
to every mosque. I t should be remembered that the only function of 
t h i s small s t a f f consisted i n keeping the mosque i n good order and 
catering to the needs of the worshippers. At the head of t h i s s t a f f 
stood the Imam whose main function i s to lead the congregations i n 
prayer at the appointed times; below him was the Mu'adhdhin, the 
person meant for giving the c a l l s f or prayer and a servant who was no 
more than a caretaker of the mosque. 
110. Reports on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Sudan -
1902, Part I I I , p.262. 
111. Reports on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Sudan -
1908, Part I I I , p.535. 
112. Martin, P.F., The Sudan i n Evolution, London, 1921, p.246. 
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G-overnment made no o f f i c i a l o b j e c t i o n f o r the c o n s t r u c t i o n of mosques to 
meet the r e l i g i o u s needs of the Muslim g a r r i s o n a n d c i v i l o f f i c i a l s 
s t a t i o n e d t h e r e . Before 1905 there e x i s t e d no mosque i n the Southern 
Sudan; b u t by 1915 there came t o e x i s t three mosques i n the South, - one 
113 
a t Wau, the other two a t Renk and Kodok. 
I n b u i l d i n g the mosques the i n t e n t i o n of the G-overnment was not 
merely to f a c i l i t a t e the saying of prayers. Through these mosques, and 
p a r t i c u l a r l y by c o n s t r u c t i n g the Khartoum mosque, the G-overnment hoped 
t h a t they could produce broad minded Muslim notables ivho could guide the 
11 h. 
r e l i g i o n t o the r i g h t path. The other mosques, the G-overnment hoped 
would b r i n g the Muslims more and more c l o s e r t o formal Islam and thereby 
reduce the heat of unnecessary r e l i g i o u s f a n a t i c i s m . 
t 
I I I 
Apart from b u i l d i n g and r e b u i l d i n g the mosques, the G-overnment 
displayed a most favourable a t t i t u d e towards the other r e l i g i o u s 
i n s t i t u t i o n s of the Muslims. Among these H a d j d j , or the annual pilgrimage 
of the Muslims t o Mecca, stands out prominent. From the very i n c e p t i o n of 
the new regime, the G-overnment, r e a l i s i n g the importance of t h i s 
i n s t i t u t i o n t o the Muslims, considered i t t o be a duty t o provide adequate 
f a c i l i t i e s to the Muslims of the Sudan t o perform t h i s sacred r e l i g i o u s duty. 
113. I b i d , p.247. 
114. Reports by her Majesty's Agent and Consul-G-eneral on the Finances, 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n and Condition of Egypt and the Soudan i n 1899; 
o p . c i t , p.58. 
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I t i s a most important p o i n t t o note t h a t during the days of the 
Mahdists the pilgrimage t o Mecca was p r o h i b i t e d ; and some of the scholars 
are prone t o i n d i c a t e t h a t the pilgrimage was replaced by the v i s i t of the 
11 5 
iliahdx. The English w r i t e r s take d e l i g h t i n p o i n t i n g out t h a t the Anglo-
Egyptian r u l e removed the ban which the Mahdists placed on the pilgrimage 
to Mecca. The Government encouraged the pi l g r i m a g e on the understanding 
t h a t the r e t u r n e d p i l g r i m s , as stronghold of orthodoxy, could b e t t e r 
counteract the unorthodox tendencies and p r a c t i c e s of the Muslims of the 
Sudan. 
The r e a l i z a t i o n of t h i s s i g n i f i c a n c e of the pilgrimage l e d the 
Government t o b r i n g the p i l g r i m a g e arrangement under i t s own sup e r v i s i o n . 
A l l the p i l g r i m s were made t o s a i l from Saukin where they were given a 
116 
medical check up f r e e of c o s t . The poor p i l g r i m s used to receive food 
1 17 
and water a t Government expense. On occasion, many p i l g r i m s from 
d i s t a n t p a r t s of the country reached Saukin penniless. For many such 
118 
p i l g r i m s , the Government used t o defray the c o s t . Sometimes i t also 
happened t h a t many non-Sudanese p i l g r i m s from the West o f the Sudan passed 
through Saukin. The rush of these non-Sudanese p i l g r i m s e v e n t u a l l y pro-
duced such abnormal pressure on Saukin p o r t t h a t i t s quarantine camp 
u l t i m a t e l y s u f f e r e d l o s s . The r e s u l t was t h a t i n 1908 the quarantine camp 
115. Theobald, A.B., - The Mahdiya, o p . c i t ; p.1'83. 
H '6. Reports on the Finances,Administration and Condition of the Sudan -
1904, P a r t I I , p.38. 
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119 of Saukin refused t o accept these non-Sudanese p i l g r i m s . But i n s p i t e 
1 20 
of the l o s s of the Saukin quarantine camp, the G-overnor-G-eneral of the 
Sudan d i d not t h i n k i t j u d i c i o u s t o check the passage of the non-Sudanese 
p i l g r i m s through the Sudan and Saukin simply on the ground t h a t i t would 
1 21 
mean the c r e a t i o n of foes", and a t a l l events, the G-overnment 
thought i t b e t t e r t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e i r passage. 
I n the e a r l y years of i t s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , the Government of course 
p u t some r e s t r i c t i o n s on the number of p i l g r i m s and the attendants 
accompanying them. But t h i s came about as a measure t o c o n t r o l slave 
t r a f f i c t o Mecca. I t became a r e g u l a r f e a t u r e w i t h the m a j o r i t y of the 
p i l g r i m s t o take a number of servants w i t h them while on journey, and s e l l 
them i n Arabia as slaves.. Hence there arose the necessity t o l i m i t the 
number pf p i l g r i m s and the number of servants accompanying them. But 
while doing so, the Government was q u i t e aware of the f a c t t h a t the 
r e s t r i c t i o n might be i n t e r p r e t e d by the Muslims otherwise. Thus, i n 1914» 
1 22 
the G-overnor-General fear e d t o impose any f u r t h e r r e s t r i c t i o n s which 
might be m i s i n t e r p r e t e d by the Muslim p o p u l a t i o n as an attempt of the 
Government t o render the pilgrimage d i f f i c u l t o f performanceJ 
1:119. Harvey to Wingate, Cairo, 18 Oct.1908; W.P. 248/10. 
120. The l o s s of Saukin Quarantine Camp i n 1908: Cost of the Camp - £ 4 , 6 2 2 . 
The Quarantine Board received,- ( i ) Government Grant - £ 5 0 0 . 
( i i ) Pees from the P i l g r i m s - £ 4 8 0 . 
From a l e t t e r from Harvey, to Wingate, Cairo., 18th Oct .1908; 0 
121. Wingate t o Harvey, Cairo, 20th Oct., 1908; W.P. 248/10. 
122. As f o r example the other r e s t r i c t i o n was t h a t the p i l g r i m s had to pay 
a deposit money a t Saukin; t h i s was enforced by the Proclamation of 
-1-3fti Jan. 1903. v i d e . * 
* Reports on the Finances, A d m i n i s t r a t i o n and Condition of the Sudan -
-1903, P a r t I I , P.L.11 , , , 
123. Wingate t o Cromer, 7th Feb.1914; P.R.0./F.0., 633/23. 
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Under no circumstances did the Sudan Government f i n d i t wise to 
interfe r e with the question of the journey of Muslims to Mecca f o r 
pilgrimage. This p o l i c y of the non-interference with the a f f a i r s of 
pilgrimage, however, reached i t s climax during the World War I , when the 
relations between B r i t a i n and Turkey became strained. Even during t h i s 
period, the Sudan G-overnmen't did not prevent the Sudanese pilgrims from 
proceeding to Mecca, then under Turkish c o n t r o l . On the contrary, the 
Governor-General considered i t completely i m p o l i t i c to i n t e r f e r e 
with the departure of ... pilgrims ( t o Mecca) from the Sudan 
Moreover, while the war was i n progress, the Governor-General, f o r the 
safety of the p i l g r i m caravan, had sent three batteries to guard the 
coastal road from Medina to Mecca against any Turko-German attack which 
1 25 
might cause inconvenience f o r the pilgrims. 
Apart from providing adequate f a c i l i t i e s f o r making the journey 
to Mecca f o r pilgrimage, the Government was wise enough to respect the 
rel i g i o u s sentiments of the Muslims by recognising the chief r e l i g i o u s 
f e s t i v a l s of the Muslims as public holidays. Among the public holidays, 
the one on the birthday of the Prophet deserves some special mention. 
Though not an o f f i c i a l ' f e s t i v a l ordained by law, the occasion of 
the birthday of the Prophet 'received a general recognition of the 
popular sentiment' of the Muslims. The day was also celebrated during 
the Mahdist days, but what i s important i s that the Anglo-Egyptian 
124. Wingate to Kenny, Khartoum, 23rd Sept. 1914; W.P. 191/3 
125. Wingate to Cromer, 25th Sept. 1916; W.P. 201/8. 
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Government gave i t an o f f i c i a l recognition. 
At the time of the chief religious f e s t i v a l s the Government took 
upon i t s e l f the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to maintain peace and order. For a l l 
occasions of the important r e l i g i o u s f e s t i v a l s , the duties of the 
G-overnment representatives i n Khartoum and at Headquarters of the Provinces, 
1'27 
were defined. Even, during these occasions the G-overnor-G-eneral used to 
in v i t e chief Muslim r e l i g i o u s dignitaries to his palace f o r coffee. I t 
d e f i n i t e l y worked f o r the closer understanding between the high English 
o f f i c i a l s and the Muslim notables. But the most important i n t h i s series 
i s perhaps the recognition of Friday instead of Sunday as an o f f i c i a l day 
128 
of rest,(which w i l l be discussed l a t e r ) . 
Thus, under the Anglo-Egyptian r u l e , we f i n d that the Muslim Law 
Courts were organised, the public mosques were erected, pilgrimage to 
Mecca was f a c i l i t a t e d and the chief r e l i g i o u s f e s t i v a l s were recognised as 
public holidays. By these popular demonstrations of r e l i g i o u s tolerance, 
the G-overnment surely paved the way to win the hearts and confidence of the 
Muslim population. 
a * * 
126.. Trimingham, Islam i n the Sudan, op.cit., p .148. 
127- Vide, Sudan G-overnment confidential c i r c u l a r memo No.31 . -
C.S./C.R.H./1685; May 1st, 1911; W.P.. 300/5/1. 
128. See below P£>, 141-usr. 
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CHAPTER I I 
The positions of the t r a d i t i o n a l methods of 
education and the i n s t r u c t i o n of r e l i g i o n 
under the new educational system. 
I 
" In the Sudan, as elsewhere" says Trimingham, "orthodox Islam 1 
i s represented by: (1) the t r a d i t i o n a l educational system, ; 
(2) the courts administering the Shari'a; (3) the public mosques 
I n the previous chapter the Government po l i c i e s towards the Sharl fa 
courts and the public mosques have been discussed. One of the po l i c i e s 
2 
of the Sudan Government, as stated e a r l i e r , was 'to restore orthodox 
Islam' i n the Sudan. Hence, i n t h i s chapter we shall proceed to outline 
the p o l icy of the Sudan Government towards the t r a d i t i o n a l system of 
education which, along with the Shari*a courts and the public mosques 
'represented' orthodox Islam i n the Sudan. But before s t a r t i n g the 
discussion of the Government p o l i c y i n t h i s respect, i t i s perhaps 
necessary to have an.idea of the t r a d i t i o n a l system of education which 
had existed i n the Sudan p r i o r to the establishment of the Anglo-Egyptian 
r u l e . 
1. Trimingham, Islam i n the Sudan, op.cit, p.11 5• 
2. See above, p.g. 
3. The outline of the t r a d i t i o n a l educational system i n the Sudan, which 
follows i n the subsequent pages, draws mainly upon Trimingham, Islam 
i n the Sudan, op.cit, pp.115-1120. 
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From the beginning of the sixteenth century when the influence 
of new culture of Islam began to be f e l t i n the Sudan, the education of 
the country centred around mainly two i n s t i t u t i o n s — the mosque and the 
Khalwa^" These two were the recognised bodies supposed to assume the 
educational task. 
Both i n the mosques and the Khalwas the entire programme of 
education revolved around the r e l i g i o n of Islam. The only aim of 
education was to study the Sharif a. For the Sudanese Muslims i t was 
'the only subject of true learning.' Besides, the study of the Shari'a, 
the r e c i t a t i o n of the Qur'an also formed one of the chief subjects of 
study. 
5 
I n the Khalwas, the f a k i , i . e . the teacher of the Khalwa, used 
to teach his students how to r e c i t e the Qur'an. The students repeat 
the p a r t i c u l a r sections of the Qur'an i n rhythm f o r many times u n t i l j 
I they are completely memorized. The f a k i did not require the Qur'an as i 
i 
i 
he always used to dictate from memory. The students used to take down J 
i 
the dictated sections on t h e i r wooden slates. When a student completed 
a section, the f a k i used to write the f i r s t verse of the next on his 
slate. The boy then used to take the slate with that verse to his 
parents who then, according to the-custom, sent some presents to the f a k i . 
k» The word 'Khalwa' i s derived from the Arabic word ' I k h t i l a a ' which 
means seeking seclusion or privacy. 
5 . For the wide range of meaning of f a k i , see - Trimingham, Islam i n 
the Sudan, op.cit, p.1V . 
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Besides learning how to rec i t e the Qur'an, the hoys of the 
Khalwas had to do some works f o r the f a k i . Every Wednesday, each 
student had to take some dura, (the staple Sudanese food crop), and 
was supposed to cook and eat that with the f a k i and to take a l i t t l e 
of i t to his home as ba.raka ('an active power of holiness'). The 
students also did some other things f o r the f a k i . These included 
the c o l l e c t i o n of firewood, clearing of the ground and so on. 
The students had to spend normally seven years i n the Khalwa 
learning the r e c i t a t i o n of the Qur'an and working f o r the f a k i . Then 
he was required to recite the Qur'an three times before the f a k i . 
After t h i s , he was examined by another f a k i , and i f he could s a t i s f y 
both, only then was he to be pronounced a hafi z , (one who can re c i t e 
the Qur'an c o r r e c t l y ) . 
Although the students helped the f a k i i n household a f f a i r s , 
s t i l l they did not l i v e with the f a k i . The f a k i usually belonged to 
the v i l l a g e i n which he l i v e d . But sometimes, many young boys of seven 
or eight used to leave t h e i r villages i n search of a f a k i who had a 
good reputation. These boys were known as muhajirin, who used to 
cul t i v a t e lands f o r the f a k i as payment. They read u n t i l the age of 
sixteen, when, very often they themselves became f a k i s . 
Besides the Khalwas, there were Zawiyas or mosques i n the , 
i 
Eastern Sudan where the boys, at about the age of twelve used to continue 
t h e i r studies. I n these Zawiyas or mosques, the curriculum consisted of 
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two branches of learning studied simultaneously: Tawhld—theology, 
according to the madhhab of Al-Ash'arl; and Fiqh, according to the 
madhhab of Ibn Malik. 
The Zawiyas generally grew up centering around the house of | 
the Shaikh. They 'combined the functions of mosque, monastery, 
school and college 1. I n these establishments, the instructions 
were given i n two ways. Usually, the students used to s i t around the f a k l 
w h i l s t he r e c i t e d 'the text and commentary, a.dding his own glosses'. 
Books were seldom used and the pupils used to take down the sections, 
dictated by the f a k i , on slates. 
The a,bove discussion gives a b r i e f outline of the t r a d i t i o n a l 
educational system i n the Sudan. I t becomes evident that i n those 
days education was completely a non-Government obligation. I t was 
financed and administered by independent bodies. I n f a c t , the entire 
system depended on individual e f f o r t s , and the state exercised no 
j 
control over i t . ' 
But i t must be admitted that although there was no state control, 
s t i l l the Sudanese rulers at times showed t h e i r i n t e r e s t i n spreading 
the education. I t i s said that on many occasions, the rulers of the 
Funj dyn asty gave substantial "grants to the Mosques and aids to schools..". 
6. Baghir, K., Religious education: present and future development, 
(Khartoum, Mimeog Paper); p.6. 
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But even during the Turko-Egyptian period education i n the Sudan s t i l l 
remained a non-Government a c t i v i t y . However, a sign of slow progress 
could be noticed during t h i s period. The Government began to subsidise 
the Khalwas by of f e r i n g small grants to t h e i r fakxs, and thus t r i e d to 
strengthen the basis of popular education. I n t h i s respect, the reign 
of Ima c'Il Pasha witnessed a considerable progress. He made s m 3 . l l stipends 
available to young Sudanese students to study i n Al-Azhar; and "as an 
encouragement a l l theological students i n the- Sudan were exempted from 
taxation"! Moreover, i n Al-Azhar there was a separate block f o r the 
students from the Sudan; i t was known as "Riwagal-Sinnariyah". Butthe same 
system of education i n the Khalwas and mosques continued unchanged during 
the time of the Liahdists, with the exception that the number of the 
9 
Khalwas and mosque schools was reduced. 
Thus, when the Sudan was reconquered from the Mahdists, the 
schools which then existed i n the Northern Sudan were the Khalwas and the 
Zawiyas. These were attended almost e n t i r e l y by the Muslim pupils who 
were taught to r e c i t e the Qur'an. This t r a d i t i o n a l system was undoubtedly, 
1 0 
as Trimingham has said, "devoid of a l l joy and discovery". For under 
that system no c r i t i c a l study of Muslim theology as the t r a d i t i o n was 
made. At the same time, the system was thoroughly onesided, as i t l a i d 
stress only on the•religious aspect of the l i f e . These were c e r t a i n l y the 
7. H i l l , Egypt i n the Sudan, 1820-1881"; op.cit, p.126. 
8. Dodge, B., Al-Azhar, Millennium of Muslim Learning., Washington,D.C., 
1961 ; p.202. 
9 . Baghir, K., Religious education: present and future development, 
op.cit., p.8. 
10. Trimingham, Islam i n the Sudan, op.cit., p.120. 
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drawbacks of the t r a d i t i o n a l system of education i n the Sudan. 
Within a short period of time, the Sudan G-overnment developed 
i t s own educational system which was, of course, inspired mainly by 
"purely administrative necessity to provide Sudanese functionaries and 
11 
so reduce the costly imported s t a f f " . But whatever might be the real 
i n t e n t i o n , the G-overnment did not abolish the t r a d i t i o n a l system of 
education which again i n the words of Triminghara formed the "basis' of 
1 2 
orthodox Islam i n the Sudan. As a part of i t s p o l i c y to 'restore 
orthodox Islam', the Government retained i n essence the t r a d i t i o n a l 
system when i t embarked upon i t s new educational programme. This action 
of the Government had another aspect. By ret a i n i n g the old system withi n 
the framework of the nev; one, i t avoided the question of a possible 
interference i n t o the r e l i g i o n of the people. While t h i s may be discussed 
l a t e r , we shall concentrate our attention to the new educational system 
that grew up under the care of the new Government. 
I I 
To any student of B r i t i s h Colonial Administration, the early 
h i s t o r y of education i n the Sudan under the Anglo-Egyptian rule i s 
cer t a i n l y an inte r e s t i n g subject. I n the f i r s t place, the Sudan was not, 
the o r e t i c a l l y , a B r i t i s h possession. Neither did i t form a part of the 
B r i t i s h Colonial system. This f a c t rendered possible many experiments 
11 . I b i d , P.254. 
12. I b i d , P .115. 
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which would have been out of the question under Crown Colony Government 
as i t existed i n 1900. 
I n the second place, owing to the tragedy of General Gordon, the 
Sudan was, i n 1900, the object of universal i n t e r e s t . Every Englishman 
f e l t that the story of t h e i r connection with Sudan a f f a i r s from the time 
of the Gordon mission onwards had been ignoble. Thus, on the reconquest 
of the country i n 1898 when they discovered that a 'ravaged' and depop-
ulated country had come w i t h i n the o r b i t of t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , they 
welcomed the opportunity of making some amends f o r the past. 
Almost immediately a f t e r the b a t t l e of Omdurman, Lord Kitchener, 
r e a l i s i n g the true needs of the Sudan, issued an appeal to the B r i t i s h 
public i n the name and memory of General Gordon, f o r funds to erect and 
endow a college at Khartoum. So generous was the response that w i t h i n two 
months, the sum of £1 ,000,000 had been subscribed. 
I n his appeal, Lord Kitchener said: " certain questions w i l l 
n a t u r a l l y arise as to whom we should educate. We should begin by teaching 
the sons of leading men, heads of vi l l a g e s , and heads of d i s t r i c t s . They 
belong to a race very capable of learning and ready to learn. 
Certain teaching i n i t s early stages would be devoted to purely 
elementary subjects. Later, a f t e r these primary stages have been passed, 
a more advanced course would be i n s t i t u t e d , including a t r a i n i n g i n 
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technical subjects, specially adapted to those who inhabit the Valley 
of the Upper Nile 
The above appeal which Kitchener made to his countrymen casts 
l i g h t on the p o l i c y of the Sudan Government i n the f i e l d of education. 
A General Council of Gordon College was formed i n London, and an 
Executive Committee was elected with f u l l power to give e f f e c t to Lord 
Kitchener's proposals, with such modifications as might be deemed 
necessary. The plans f o r a suitable b u i l d i n g f o r Gordon College were 
at once drawn up, and i t was f i n a l l y agreed that £ 3 0 , 0 0 0 should be spent 
on the buil d i n g , etc., the remainder forming a.n endowment fund. 
Lord Kitchener l e f t the Sudan soon afterwards upon his appointment 
as the Chief of Staff to Lord Roberts i n South Af r i c a , and Sir Reginald 
Wingate became the Governor-General of the Sudan and Sidar of the Egyptian 
Army. I n 1900, James Currie was appointed the f i r s t Principal of Gordon 
College and Director of Education i n the Sudan, and i t was through the 
wisdom and v i s i o n of these three great pioneers that the foundations of 
education i n the Sudan were so well and t r u l y l a i d . 
The watchword of the Sudan Government from i t s e a r l i e s t days was 
economic development, and an insistence, by means of education and research, 
13» As quoted by Udal, N.R., Education i n the Northern Sudan, p . 5» This 
a r t i c l e i s extracted from A t t i d e l l 5 V I I I Convegno, R.Accad. I t a l . 
Oct .1938. 
1if. I b i d . 
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that the inhabitants of the country should be enabled to share i n such 
development, both as beneficiaries and as administrative p a r t i c i p a n t s . 
With these objects i n view,, the immediate aims of the G-overnment1 s 
educational p o l i c y were: 
1. "The d i f f u s i o n among the masses of the people of an education 
s u f f i c i e n t to enable them to understand the machinery of Government, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y ?/ith reference to the equitable and impartial administration 
of j u s t i c e " . 
2. "The creation of a competent artisan class, which was e n t i r e l y 
lacking at the time". 
3 . "The creation of a small administrative class, capable of f i l l i n g . 
many Government posts, some of an administrative, others of a technical 
nature""!^ 
The co r o l l a r y of t h i s p o l i c y was that no post i n t h e i r own 
country which they were capable of f i l l i n g was to be debarred to the 
natives of the Sudan. To give e f f e c t to t h i s , i n so f a r as the very-
meagre funds at the disposal of the Government then permitted, i t was 
16 
decided to provide the following educational f a c i l i t i e s . 
1 . Elementary Vernacular schools. 
2. I n s t r u c t i o n a l Workshops. 
3 . Primary (or Intermediate) Schools. 
4* A t r a i n i n g College f o r Elementary School Teachers. 
5» The Gordon College. 
Let us now discuss the above one by one. 
15* Currie, Sir.James, "The Educational Experiment i n the Anglo-Egyptian 
Sudan 1 900-33", Journal of the African Society, 1934, p.364. 
16. Udal, N.R., op.cit, p.6. 
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1 . Elementary Vernacular Schools. 
At f i r s t , Elementary Vernacular Schools were opened i n the 
capital towns of the various provinces. No fees were payable. The 
Syllabus was of a very simple nature, and any idea that the education 
given was i n anyway a q u a l i f i c a t i o n f o r Government service was 
deliberately and actively discouraged. 
The Khalwas or the Qur'an schools f e l l w i t h i n the category of 
Elementary Vernacular Schools. With a view to improving the teaching 
i n the Khalwas, an in t e r e s t i n g experiment was t r i e d i n certain d i s t r i c t s 
whereby the f a k l s of the Khalwas were persuaded to allow t h e i r sons to 
undergo a short course of t r a i n i n g , a f t e r which the l a t t e r returned as 
teachers to t h e i r fathers' Khalwas, and more modern methods of teaching 
and an improved syllabus were introduced. The teachers of these 
improved Khalwas received a small salary, and th e i r Khalwas were 
inspected regularly by o f f i c i a l s of -the Education Department. The 
experiment proved very successful i n the most northern provinces. 
2. I n s t r u c t i o n a l Workshops. 
As regards the t r a i n i n g of artisans, two i n s t r u c t i o n a l workshops 
and not technical schools were established, one i n Khartoum and 
the other i n .Gmdurman, where t r a i n i n g was given on a production basis. 
This was an innovation at the time, but the objects aimed at — the 
elimination of the pedagogic element and the creation of an i n d u s t r i a l 
atmosphere from the commencement of the t r a i n i n g — were attained. 
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The workshops i n Khartoum were attached to Gordon College. Their 
close connection with the college was of the greatest benefit to the 
boys i n the College, who received t h e i r manual i n s t r u c t i o n i n the 
workshops. 
Carpenters, f i t t e r s and blacksmiths were trained i n Gordon 
College workshops, while b u i l d i n g and pottery were taught at Omdurman. 
There were no fees. 
3. Primary (or Intermediate) Schools. 
Primary Schools were at f i r s t opened i n Khartoum (as part of 
Gordon College) and Omdurman, but l a t e r on other Primary Schools were 
i n s t i t u t e d i n the p r i n c i p a l towns of the Northern Sudan. These schools 
were at f i r s t staffed with Egyptian teachers, who were gradually replaced 
by Sudanese teachers trained at Gordon College. 
The number of boys i n the Primary Schools was c a r e f u l l y l i m i t e d 
to those who were l i k e l y to be required f o r Gordon College, f o r minor 
Government posts, and f o r Commerce, and was adjusted from time to time 
a f t e r close consultation between the educational and administrative 
a u t h o r i t i e s . The main object behind t h i s was to ensure that the product 
of the Primary Schools should a l l be usefully and economically absorbed, 
and to obviate the creation of an unemployed and therefore discontented 
class of i n t e l l i g e n t i a . 
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4. Training College f o r the Elementary School Teachers. 
A three years' course of t r a i n i n g f o r the Elementary Vernacular 
School teachers was given i n the Elementary Training College, f o r which 
promising boys of good Arab family were selected as boarders from the 
"kuttab". I n addition to the p r a c t i c a l t r a i n i n g i n Pedagogy and the 
usual class subjects, p a r t i c u l a r attention was paid to manual i n s t r u c t i o n , 
physical t r a i n i n g and games; and as f a r as possible the boys, on comple-
t i o n of. t h e i r t r a i n i n g , were sent as teachers to t h e i r own d i s t r i c t s . 
5. Gordon College. 
Gordon College was opened by Lord Kitchener on his way to India 
i n 1902. At f i r s t i t contained a Primary School, a Training College f o r 
Arabic teachers, and a School of Law f o r the Qadis. The s t a f f consisted 
of a nucleus of B r i t i s h education o f f i c e r s , but, pending the t r a i n i n g of 
Sudanese school masters, most of the teachers were at f i r s t Egyptian. 
The Sudan Government was anxious that the B r i t i s h education s t a f f 
should take a share i n the normal administration of the country, and an 
elaborate scheme was set on f o o t , by which i t was made possible f o r them 
to do a tour of service on the administrative side, thus enabling them to 
acquire f i r s t - h a n d knowledge of the character of the people and of the 
machinery of the Government. 
By 1908, Gordon College contained a Primary School, a Secondary 
School, a Training College f o r Teachers, 3. School of Law f o r the Qadis, 
and a School of Engineering and Surveying. Later, vocational course§ in. 
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science, accountancy and c l e r i c a l subjects were added and arrangements 
were made whereby the boys i n the various sections spent part of t h e i r 
summer holidays i n the appropriate Government Departments, where they 
were given specialised t r a i n i n g i n th e i r p a r t i c u l a r subjects. 
The education given during the f i r s t two years of Gordon College 
Course was of a general nature and included manual i n s t r u c t i o n , but i n 
the l a s t two years the boys i n the various sections received special 
vocational t r a i n i n g i n addition to t h e i r general educational course. 
The language of in s t r u c t i o n was c h i e f l y Arabic, but p a r t i c u l a r attention 
was paid to the teaching of English, which was entrusted to B r i t i s h 
t utors, who were also responsible f o r the character t r a i n i n g of the boys 
and were i n close contact with them. This character t r a i n i n g was 
similar to that given i n English Public Schools, but adapted to the 
Sudan, and every e f f o r t was made, both inside and outside the classroom, 
to make the boys useful and l o y a l citizens of the Sudan. 
Most of the boys trained i n Gordon College were absorbed i n 
Government Departments on the completion of t h e i r course, and the rest 
found employment i n various banks and commercial firms. 
There were also Mission Schools i n the Northern Sudan. They were 
a l l Primary Schools f o r boys and g i r l s . These schools were opened i n the 
pr i n c i p a l c a p i t a l towns i n the Northern Sudan by the Church of England 
Missionary Society, the Armenian Mission, and the Soman Catholic Mission. 
These schools, indeed, rendered a very valuable service and were attended 
by Europeans as well as by the natives of the Sudan. 
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Besides there, there were also 'Kuttab' f o r the g i r l s . The 
f i r s t Government'Kuttab' f o r g i r l s was opened at Rufaa i n the Blue Nile 
Province i n about 1908, and a few more were opened during the next 
1 7 
decade. But i t was not, however, u n t i l 1920, when Miss J.D.Evans 
was appointed Controller of G i r l s ' Education and Principal of the Girls' 
Training College i n Omdurman, that the problem of g i r l s ' education was 
seriously taken i n hand. 
HI: 
I n formulating i t s educational p o l i c y and i n achieving the 
1l8 
underlying objectives, the Government, however, was extremely cautious 
not to offend the rel i g i o u s sentiment of the Muslim population of the 
Sudan. I n his appeals to the B r i t i s h public f o r r a i s i n g the subscription 
f o r Gordon College, Lord Kitchener made i t clear that "...'there would be 
1 9 
no interference with the r e l i g i o n of the people". Thus, i n spite of 
Lord Cromer's remark about the Khalwas that "such schools are as nearly 
20 
useless as any educational i n s t i t u t i o n s could be", the Sudan Government 
could not a f f o r d to abolish a l l these 'useless' Khalwas when i t launched 
i t s ambitious educational programme. Whatever c r i t i c i s m might be put 
forward against these t r a d i t i o n a l educational i n s t i t u t i o n s , the Government 
f u l l y realised the importance of the role these i n s t i t u t i o n s played i n 
strengthening the f a i t h of the Muslims i n t h e i r r e l i g i o n . Judged by the 
17» Miss J.D'.Evans had been a teacher i n one of the Egyptian Government 
Gi r l s ' Schools, and i t was due to her organising capacity and t i r e -
less devotion to duty that g i r l s ' education made a remarkable progress. 
18. See above, p9,50-51. 
19* As quoted by Udal, N.R., op.cit., p.5. 
20. Cromer, Modern Egypt. (1911 ed.); p .879-
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standards of the West, these educational i n s t i t u t i o n s might 'not comply 
w i t h a s i n g l e canon of education', b ut by teaching the Holy Qur'an they 
w e l l provided a s o l i d f o u n d a t i o n t o the f a i t h of the Muslims of the land. 
Thus, i t i s found t h a t , i n s t e a d of a b o l i s h i n g the Khalwas, the G-overnment 
21 
adopted appropriate measures t o improve and modernise them. Henceforth, 
many of the Khalwas introduced elements of the three R's and these Khalwas 
22 
received subsidies from the Government. Thus, the Khalw as, i n s t e a d of 
being abolished, received l i b e r a l encour agement a t the hand of the 
G-overnment. 
There i s no doubt t h a t i n i t s new educational programme the 
G-overnment l a i d a great stress on those elements v/hich were t o f o r t i f y 
the seculs.r aspects of l i f e . But t h i s does not a i a l l mean t h a t the new 
educational set-up ignored the i n c o r p o r a t i o n of r e l i g i o n and r e l i g i o u s 
i n s t r u c t i o n . Rather, one of the corner stones of Government p o l i c y i n 
t h i s respect was t o include i n the new educational system r e l i g i o n and 
r e l i g i o u s i n s t r u c t i o n s , and by doing t h i s , any appearance of seeking t o 
i n t e r f e r e w i t h the f a i t h of the people was c a r e f u l l y avoided. 
As s t a t e d e a r l i e r , the Khalwas were mainly concerned w i t h the 
teaching of the Qur'an and r e l i g i o n . But i t would be wrong t o suppose 
t h a t the teaching of r e l i g i o n was a monopoly of the Khalwas. I n the 
newly opened Elementary Vernacular Schools, adequate p r o v i s i o n was made 
f o r r e l i g i o u s i n s t r u c t i o n . A glance a t the syllabus of studies o f the 
Elementary Vernacular Schools (Standard I ) can w e l l provide a c o r r e c t 
21 . See above, p. SI. 
22. Udal, N.R., o p . c i t , p . 1 1 . 
p i c t u r e of the s i t u a t i o n . I n these Elementary Vernacular Schools 
"... ten hours ( i n a week) are given t o the 'Koran' and f o u r hours 
t o ' R e l i g i o n ' , and six t e e n hours t o secular education ( r e a d i n g , 
23 
w r i t i n g and a r i t h m e t i c ) . " And i n Standard I I the same p r o p o r t i o n s 
were observed. Commenting on the syllabus t h a t made provision-
f o r r e l i g i o u s i n s t r u c t i o n s Lor Cromer remarked: " I am e n t i r e l y i n 
favour of g i v i n g r e l i g i o u s i n s t r u c t i o n i n these schools" " I n the 
f i r s t p lace", he explained the causes, " f o r p o l i t i c a l reasons i t i s 
an unavoidable necessity. I n the second place, from every p o i n t of 
view, I p r e f e r a r e l i g i o u s t o an i r r e l i g i o u s Mohammedan"?^ Apart from 
the Khalwas and the Elementary Vernacular Schools, G-ordon College 
i t s e l f had adequate p r o v i s i o n f o r the teaching of r e l i g i o n . P a r t i c u l a r l y 
s t r i k i n g was the se c t i o n which was ent r u s t e d w i t h the t r a i n i n g of the 
judges f o r the Muslim Law Courts. The i n c l u s i o n of the I s l a m i c teachings 
i n G-ordon College made the Sudan Government l i a b l e t o a t t a c k s of some 
sections of the B r i t i s h p u b l i c . The Edinburgh Missionary ConferencZ 
v i g o r o u s l y attacked the Sudan G-overnment on the s a i d score. "G-ordon 
College" the Conference remarked, "though launched Q,S a memorial t o a 
great C h r i s t i a n w i t h the money of those who wished t o honour him as such, 
28 
became' the c h i e f Muslim t r a i n i n g i n s t i t u t i o n " . . Wingate, the G-overnor-
G-eneral always apprehended-, an a t t a c k of t h i s s o r t . I n 1908- he wrote: 
23* Cromer, Review of the Sudan Reports, 1904, o p . c i t . , p.42. 
24. I b i d . 
25. I b i d . 
26. I b i d . 
27* See below, p p i^s-nt-
28. I b i d . ' 
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".... I am always a l i t t l e a f r a i d t h a t amongst the thousands of o r i g i n a l 
subscribers t o G-ordon College Fund there are a small number of Exeter -
H a l l i t e s and non-conformists who, i f the c u r r i c u l u m of the G-ordon College 
were f u l l y v e n t i l a t e d , might begin t o question c e r t a i n items, and might 
say they d i d not t h i n k t h e i r money was going t o be expended i n the 
29 
propagation of Moslem r e l i g i o n " . And i n f a c t once he had t o defend and 
j u s t i f y the teaching of the Qur'an and Islam thus: as the m a j o r i t y 
of the youths i n the College (Gordon College) and i n the Primary and 
Elementary Vernacular Schools are Muslims, the teaching of the Qur'an e t c , 
30 
i s p a r t of the c u r r i c u l u m " . This proper r e a l i z a t i o n of the importance of 
the teachings of Islam f o r the Sudanese, the m a j o r i t y of whom were Muslims, 
was responsible f o r the unceasing Government encouragement f o r the 
promotion of r e l i g i o u s i n s t r u c t i o n and r e l i g i o u s s t u d i e s . Thus, when the 
'Ulama of the Sudan showed t h e i r utmost i n t e r e s t i n forming an I s l a m i c 
Academy which afterwards came t o be known as al-ma fhad a l - ' ' i l m i , the 
Government displayed considerable i n t e r e s t . This Academy consisted of 
notable r e l i g i o u s - s c h o l a r s who used t o d e l i v e r l e c t u r e s i n t h e i r own 
houses. Shaikh Ahmad al-BadawI, a great r e l i g i o u s notable of the time 
was the f i r s t p r e s i d e n t of the Academy. One of the c h i e f d u t i e s of the 
Academy was t o spread the I s l a m i c l e a r n i n g . At f i r s t the members opened 
t h e i r houses as the centres of l e a r n i n g . But i n 1912 Abu'l Qasim 
Muhammad Pie,shim, the successor of Shaikh Ahmad al-BadawI, persuaded the 
Government t o give l a n d around the o l d mosque i n Omdurman as waqf f o r the 29. Winga.te t o Gorst, Khartoum, NOTT.17, 1908; W.P. 284/10. 
30. Wingate t o Seely, E r k o i t , A p r i l 18, 1912; W.P. 181 /1 /3 
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b u i l d i n g of a new mosque and the Academy attached t o i t . A s u b s c r i p t i o n 
l i s t was opened and £E16,000 c o l l e c t e d and the G-overnment a l l o t t e d p a r t 
32 
of the market dues. Under the a u t h o r i t y of the Legal Department the 
Academic I n s t i t u t e was administered by a Board of 'Ulami; the teachings 
i n the Academy f o l l o w e d those of the Al-Azhar. For the f i r s t time, the 
p e r i o d of study was d i v i d e d i n t o three stages - Elementary, Secondary 
and Higher - each w i t h defined syllabus and f i x e d t i m e t a b l e s . The 
Academy played i t s p a r t w e l l and i n the course of time produced a number 
of "Ulama, Imams of the mosques, r e g i s t r a r s of marriages and so on. 
While the schools and other i n s t i t u t i o n s i n the Sudan provided 
the f a c i l i t i e s f o r I s l a m i c teachings, the G-overnment was i n favour of 
sending the Sudanese 'Ulama t o Al-Azhar f o r higher l e a r n i n g i n I s l a m i c 
st u d i e s . Thus, when there was a f e e l i n g among the higher Muslim 
d i g n i t a r i e s i n the Sudan ( p r i n c i p a l l y E g y p t i a n ) t h a t the study of Muslim 
Theology was being neglected . . . " ^ t h e G-overnor-G-eneral suggested t h a t , 
the only way t o provide Moslem teachers f o r the Sudanese Ulema was 
to send a few young Sudanese ;.Ulo.nia t o Azhar Mosque i n Cairo where they 
w i l l go through the r e g u l a r c u r r i c u l u m of study - and r e t u r n t o the Sudan 
•zi 
as q u a l i f i e d teachers". 
Besides encouraging the teachings of r e l i g i o n , the G-overnment, i n 
pursuing i t s educational p o l i c y , was always cautious so t h a t the people 
might not f e e l t h a t i n t r a i n i n g t h e i r sons the G-overnment had some u l t e r i o r 
3'l . Trimingham, Islam i n the Sudan, o p . c i t , p.121. 
32. I b i d . 
33. Wingate t o Kitchener, Oct.26, 1911; W.P. 301/4. 
34. I b i d . 
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motive. To overcome t h i s n a t u r a l suspicion of the Sudanese Muslims, 
the senior B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s of the Education Department toured the 
country and v i s i t e d the Shaikhs i n t h e i r homes, thus winning t h e i r 
confidence and persuading them to send t h e i r sons t o schools and 
35 
p a r t i c u l a r l y t o G-ordon College. 
Again, p r o s e l y t i z i n g i n the Northern Sudan was not p e r m i t t e d 
36 
by the Government. But i n s p i t e of t h i s , as noted e a r l i e r , a few 
Primary Schools f o r boys and g i r l s were opened by the missionaries i n 
37 
the p r i n c i p a l towns i n the Northern Sudan. These schools were attended 
both by European and n a t i v e s of the Sudan. But i n t h i s respect the 
grea t e s t care was taken t h a t no Muslim parent should send h i s c h i l d t o 
one of these schools w i t h o u t c l e a r l y understanding before-hand the 
nature of the i n s t r u c t i o n given. To avoid the suspicion of Muslim, parents 
i t was t h e r e f o r e l a i d down i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e g u l a t i o n s of the Sudan 
Government t h a t f u l l consent of the parents or guardians must be obtained 
by the D i r e c t o r or Head of the school before any p u p i l was given 
r e l i g i o u s i n s t r u c t i o n , no matter of what n a t i o n a l i t y or r e l i g i o n the 
p u p i l might be. And i t was also l a i d down i n the r e g u l a t i o n t h a t when 
r e l i g i o u s i n s t r u c t i o n w as being c a r r i e d out, no other c h i l d r e n except 
those whose parents had given the necessary consent might be present. 
These i n s t r u c t i o n s were s t r i c t l y f o l l o w e d ^ 
35• Udal, N.R., Education i n the Northern Sudan, o p . c i t . , p.10. 
36. For d e t a i l s see Chapter V. 
37. For the reasons why these missionary schools were allowed i n the 
Northern Sudan see, I b i d , pp. 
38.. I b i d . 
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I n the educational sphere the Govei-nment was extremely cautious 
not t o of f e n d the sentiment of the Muslim i n h a b i t a n t s of the country i n 
r e l a t i o n t o the education of g i r l s . I n view of the suspiciousness and 
pre j u d i c e s of the Sudanese Muslims on the subj e c t , the p o l i c y of the 
Government i n t h i s respect was t h a t no g i r l s ' school should be opened 
39 
except a t the request of the i n h a b i t a n t s . 
I n conclusion, we f i n d t h a t the Government formulated i t s new 
educational p o l i c y mainly t o meet the demands of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e machinery. 
Consequently the new system, beyond doubt, l a i d a greater emphasis on the 
secular aspects of l i f e . But a t the same time we have also found, how by 
r e t a i n i n g and improving the t r a d i t i o n a l educational system i t t r i e d t o 
provide r e l i g i o u s i n s t r u c t i o n t o young generations. Undoubtedly, through 
the new educational system, the Government aimed a t i n t r o d u c i n g " j u d i c i o u s -
l y a modicum of Western c u l t u r e " ^ But i n attempting so, i t never, as 
Wingate once asserted, intended t o " a l i e n a t e the sympathies of the student 
from the t r a d i t i o n a l Eastern c u l t u r e " . 
* # * 
39. U.dal, N.R., education i n the Northern Sudan, o p . c i t . , p . 1 3 « 
40 . B e l f a s t News L e t t e r , Nov. 11, 1912. 
iul . I b i d . 
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CHAPTER I I I * 
The tarxqas of the Sudan and 
the p o l i c y of the G-overnment. 
I 
L i t e r a l l y , the word t a r i q a means 'road, way, path'. I t i s 
p o p u l a r l y a p p l i e d t o c e r t a i n organizations composed of r e l i g i o u s l y 
minded people u n i t e d by a common f a i t h i n the v i r t u e of some 
p a r t i c u l a r teacher, and p r a c t i s i n g a common r i t u a l of prayer and 
devotion. The basic idea u n d e r l y i n g t h e i r existence i s the b e l i e f 
t h a t common man, i n order t o a t t a i n s a l v a t i o n , needs the guidance of 
some person endowed w i t h ' p e c u l i a r ' s p i r i t u a l v i r t u e (baraka), who 
acts as i n t e r m e d i a r y between him and God. 
The tarxqas are i n f a c t , 'the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d expression 
1 
of Sufism'. The teachings of Sufism were spread throughout the 
• • 
I s l a m i c w o r l d through the growth of these r e l i g i o u s orders. The 
tarxqas themselves are the organisations which are the r e s u l t of the 
development of the p r a c t i c e of mysticism by groups of devout Muslims. 
But t o acquire t h i s stage i n which we mean them now, the f o r m a t i o n 
and s t r u c t u r e of the t a r i q a s had t o pass through several stages. 
*' The f i r s t two sections of t h i s Chapter are mainly based on: 
(a) Trimingham, Islam i n the Sudan, o p . c i t , pp. 187-241 ; Chapter V I , 
The R e l i g i o u s Orders. 
(b) S.N.R., Vol.IV, No .4, '1921; pp.l 75-1 94; A r t i c l e , R e l i g i o u s 
C o n f r a t e r n i t i e s of the Sudan { b y C-.A.Willis). 
( c ) The Encyclopaedia of Islam, Vol.TV, o p . c i t ; A r t i c l e Tariqa. 
1 . For d e t a i l s of SufismJ see, The Encyclopaedia of Islam, Vol.IV, 
I b i d , A r t i c l e : T asawwuf. 
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I n the e a r l y days of the h i s t o r y of Sufism, the e a r l y S u f i s 
u s u a l l y wandered about alone. But by nature, the m y s t i c a l experience 
can never be completely s o l i t a r y . I t i s also exogenous. Although 
Sufism i n p r a c t i c e consists of f e e l i n g r a t h e r than knowledge, there 
i s a n a t u r a l succession which involves example and t r a i n i n g . F u r t h e r 
the e a r l y mystics were f u l l y conscious of the dangers inhe r e n t i n 
Sufism through the development of heterodox theophanistic mysticism. 
Hence,, they f e l t the need f o r guidance and t r a i n i n g . So g r a d u a l l y , 
a s p i r a n t s t o the m y s t i c a l t a r i q a ('path') came t o put themselves under 
the guidance of older men. A t a r i q a a t f i r s t meant no more than the 
graded method of contemplative mysticism f o l l o w e d by one who had had a 
mystic c a l l . C i r c l e s of d i s c i p l e s would gather around some venerated 
Shaikh, such as al-Juna-yd (d.A.D.909) and S a r i SaqatI (d.A.D.866), and 
a community would be formed. Although the community was always mobile 
and i t s members wandered about the country supported by alms, a r e t r e a t 
or rest'house would o f t e n be founded as a c e n t r e . We hear of such a 
r e t r e a t a t Damascus as e a r l y as 767 A.D. and i n Khora,ss,n about 815 A.D^ T 
I n the Middle East, these developed i n t o monastaries during the eleventh 
century A.D. 
These schools, however, represented only the teaching of the 
Shaikh and had a very l i m i t e d i n f l u e n c e . Therefore, f o r c e n t u r i e s these 
groups broke up on the death of the Shaikh. They were not the d e f i n i t e 
2 . Macdonald, D.B., Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and C o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
Theory, (Handbooks i n Semi t i c s I X ) , 1903; p . 177 . 
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orders i n the sense we know them now, but simply groups of d i s c i p l e s 
gathered around a loved and honoured teacher, which d i s i n t e g r a t e d 
a f t e r h i s death - the bond of all e g i a n c e being a personal one. At 
t h i s stage when these groups used t o break up on the death of the 
Shaikh, c e r t a i n eminent p u p i l s would ascribe themselves t o t h e i r 
leader and bestow the t a r i q a on others as from the dead Shaikh. The 
Shaikh ceased t o t r a i n h i s d i s c i p l e s d i r e c t l y and a spec i a l c u l t then 
developed around h i s person. At t h i s stage we f i n d a change i n the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n of the body of adherents. While the dedicated d i s c i p l e s 
devoted themselves t o asceticism and the d u t i e s of the order, the 
membership was now extended to include lay-adherents who took the t a r i q a 
from the Shaikh b u t were allowed to c a r r y on the normal d u t i e s of l i f e . 
The f a r i q a by t h i s w i d t h of membership thus became a k i n d of ' r e l i g i o u s -
p h i l a n t h r o p i c body 1 . 
Such a body came t o be c a l l e d a t a r i q a , the word which then 
meant the p a r t i c u l a r system of s p i r i t u a l t r a i n i n g a t t r i b u t e d t o the 
founder of an order. Each £ariqa i s supposed t o h ave been handed down 
through a continuous chain ( s i l s i l a ) and adherents can produce a 
s p i r i t u a l succession (isnad) from the Prophet through e A l i or Abu Baler 
t o the e x i s t i n g Shaikh of the order. So the Shaikh i s regarded as being 
the s p i r i t u a l h e i r of the o r i g i n a l founder, d e r i v i n g h i s a u t h o r i t y from 
h i s immediate predecessor. 
I t was not u n t i l the t h i r t e e n t h century A.D., t h a t corporations 
e s t a b l i s h e d themselves w i t h the d e f i n i t e purpose of c a r r y i n g on the name 
6 
and r u l e of l i f e of the master. But once s t a r t e d , they developed a 
vigorous l i f e and m u l t i p l i e d w i t h great r a p i d i t y . 
The t a r i q a s or r e l i g i o u s brotherhoods should not be confused 
w i t h sects. Here a c l e a r - c u t d i s t i n c t i o n may be made between the two. 
The sect i s exclusive and demands t o t a l a l l e g i a n c e and views a l l those 
who are not members as h e r e t i c s i n v a r y i n g degrees. But the members 
of a r e l i g i o u s brotherhood, on the other hand, do not view those of 
other brotherhoods or even u n a f f i l i a t e d Muslims as h e r e t i c s , b u t r a t h e r 
as i n d i v i d u a l s f o l l o w i n g another l e g i t i m a t e p ath t o G-od. Members of 
d i f f e r e n t r e l i g i o u s brotherhoods pray i n the same mosque and a t t e n d the 
r e l i g i o u s ceremonies of others. 
The r e l i g i o u s orders were not intended t o replace the formal 
Muslim r e l i g i o u s o r g a n i z a t i o n . They d i d not c l a i m t h a t the 'path' each 
endorses i s a s u b s t i t u t e f o r orthodox r e l i g i o u s p r a c t i c e s . On the 
con t r a r y , orthodox p r a c t i c e s were incorporated i n t o the 'way', and even 
i f they were not e n t i r e l y so incorporated, a l l r e l i g i o u s brotherhoods 
even now a days agree t h a t orthodoxy i s the basis of t h e i r r e l i g i o u s 
f a i t h and any 'path' i s only an a i d to e n r i c h i n g r e l i g i o u s experience. 
Indeed, some brotherhoods and i n d i v i d u a l mystics i n the past 
found themselves i n t r o u b l e w i t h the orthodox h i e r a r c h y i n the Muslim 
w o r l d because they had, on occasion, e i t h e r not made the above p o i n t 
c l e a r , or had gone so f a r as t o claim t h a t , r a t h e r than t r a d i t i o n a l 
r i t u a l s , the e s s e n t i a l t h i n g was the i n d i v i d u a l ' s p u r s u i t of the 'path' 
to union w i t h G-od. This c l a i m , coupled w i t h the f a c t t h a t such m y s t i c a l 
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experiences tended t o encourage i n d i v i d u a l i s t , schismatic or h e r e t i c a l 
ideas, made such organisations the obje c t of suspicion among the orthodox. 
The orthodox canonists c o n s t a n t l y attacked the brotherhoods f o r such 
innovations as, t h e i r 'supererogatory exercises' and t h e i r dispensations; 
t h e i r use of st i m u l a n t s , t h e i r j u g g l e r y , t h e i r b e l i e f i n the supernatural 
e f f i c a c y of baraka. I n p a r t i c u l a r , the canonists devoted s p e c i a l 
a t t e n t i o n t o the c r i t i c a l h i s t o r y of the i s n i d of i n i t i a t i o n , exposing 
the lacunae and i m p r o b a b i l i t y of t h e i r chains. 
Apart from the att a c k s of the orthod.ox canonists, the r e l i g i o u s 
orders very o f t e n became objects of suspicion t o governments, because 
being w e l l organised mens' s o c i e t i e s , they sometimes became embroiled i n 
3 
l o c a l p o l i t i c s . 
I I 
I n the h i s t o r y of the Sudanese Islam, the r e l i g i o u s brotherhoods 
played a h i g h l y s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e . I n the Sudan, Islam was spread by pious 
meri^cormected w i t h one or other of the numerous r e l i g i o u s orders which were 
then found a c t i v e throughout the I s l a m i c w o r l d . Although the work of 
p r o s e l y t i z a t i o n was c a r r i e d out by these pious men, i t was not backed i n 
any formal way by the orders t o which they belonged. The e f f o r t s of these 
3- G-ibb, H.A.R., and Harold, B., Is l a m i c Society and the West, O.U.P., 1937; 
Vol . 1 , P a r t 2; pp. 70-80. 
4« I n the e a r l y 19th century, Muhammad al-Nur - W.Dayfallah wrote Tabaqat 
which gives the biographies of many of these h o l y men. Excerpts are 
given i n Mac Michael, H i s t o r y of the Arabs i n the Sudan, Vol.11, 
pp.,217-323; S . H i l l e l s o n , 'TabaqatWad DayfAllah. Studies i n the Lives 
of the Scholars and Sain t s ' . S.N.R. VT /2 , 1923, pp .191-230. 
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i n d i v i d u a l s won not only converts t o Islam i n a general sense, but also 
adherents t o p a r t i c u l a r orders. Some of these pious men gained such 
success i n t h e i r l o c a l i t i e s t h a t they developed autonomous order or at 
l e a s t sub-orders ' i n v i r t u a l independence of the parent order'. Such 
successful r e l i g i o u s teachers came t o be regarded as Saints (Wall, p i . 
A wliya) and miracles were a t t r i b u t e d t o them. They were revered as 
possessors of baraka which might be t r a n s m i t t e d by i n h e r i t a n c e or contact*? 
Thus t h e i r tombs became places of p i l g r i m a g e , t h e i r possessions acquired 
the q u a l i t y of r e l i c s and the headship of t h e i r orders became h e r e d i t a r y . 
The i n t r o d u c t i o n of the r e l i g i o u s brotherhoods i n the Sudan goes 
back t o the days of the Funj Kingdom, the f o u n d a t i o n of which l e d t o the 
great missionery a c t i v i t y i n those p a r t s of the country which were s t i l l 
unconverted t o Islam. The i n t r o d u c t i o n of the r e l i g i o u s brotherhoods i n 
the Sudan passed through two main stages. I n the f i r s t , the orders were 
introduced only t o spread Islam. This coincides w i t h the i n t r o d u c t i o n 
of the orders l i k e the Qadiriyya, Shadhiliyya and the Majdhubiyyal But 
i n the second stage the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the orders was i n f l u e n c e d by event 
l i k e the r e v i v a l of Islam i n the 18th and 19th c e n t u r i e s , which was going 
on outside the Sudani 
5. For the snread of Islam i n the 19th Century by the r e l i g i o u s orders, see, Arnold, T.W., The Preaching of Islam,London,lo9b., pp .258 f f . 0 . See. lYestermarck. E . , Pagan s u r v i v a l s i n Muhammedan c i v i l i z a t i o n , London, 1933, p p ^ - f W u . 
7. Each i s discussed separately. See below, pp.£9-71. 
8. Trimingham discusses i t f u l l y , see, Islam i n the Sudan, o p . c i t . , p.189 
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The f o l l o w i n g i s a b r i e f d e s c r i p t i o n of the r e l i g i o u s brotherhoods 
of the Sudan. 
( i ) Qadiriyya: I n the e a r l y t h i r t e e n t h century, the Qadiriyya was the 
f i r s t t o develop i n t o a d e f i n i t e s e l f - p e r p e t u a t i n g order, designed t o 
ca r r y on not only the teaching, but a l s o the name and the r u l e of a Shaikh. 
The founder of t h i s order was 'Abd al-Qadir a l - J i l a n i who had h i s 
seat i n Baghdad. Although *Abd al-Qadir d i d not p l a n t o e s t a b l i s h an order, 
his devoted d i s c i p l e s , a f t e r h i s death, spread h i s teachings, h i s e c s t a t i c 
p r a c t i c e which c o n s t i t u t e d the founda t i o n f o r a body of r u l e s , d o c t r i n e s 
and p r a c t i c e . The f o l l o w e r s of fAbd al-Qadir continued t o ascribe them-
selves t o him and t o i n i t i a t e f o l l o w e r s i n h i s name. 
The Qadiriyya order was introduced i n the Sudan by one Taj ad-DIn 
a l Bahari i n the second h a l f of the t e n t h century, A.H. I t i s reported 
t h a t TSj ad--Din was advised by Da'ud b. fAbd a l - J a l i l Muhammad, a wealthy 
slave t r a d e r of A r b a j i , who met the former w h i l s t on pil g r i m a g e . 
Taj ad-Din remained i n the Sudan f o r seven years, and appointed a number 
of K h a l i f a s , who l a t e r became the temporal and s p i r i t u a l head of f a m i l i e s , 
and even t o t h i s day, t h e i r descendents continue i n double f u n c t i o n i n 
J e z i r a . 
Nowadays, u n l i k e the other orders, the Qadiriyya order has only 
nominal adherents. I f i t has any stronghold i n the Sudan a t a l l , i t i s 
i n J e z i r a . 
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( i i ) Shadhiliyya: I t was more a school of S u f i d o c t r i n e than an 
organised order. I t was founded by Abu'l-Hasan f A l i b. fAbd A l l a h 
ash-Shadhill. He was born i n 11 96 A.D., i n Tu n i s i a . While studying 
i n I'as he was inf l u e n c e d by the I s h r a q i ( i l l u m i n i s t i c ) School of Sufism. 
But h i s order was never consolidated and he even d i d not i n i t i a t e h i s 
p u p i l s i n t o any s p e c i a l r u l e or r i t u a l . A f t e r h i s death, h i s teaching 
was spread by h i s d i s c i p l e s . One Shar i f Hamad Abu Dunana i s said t o 
have introduced the order i n the Sudan i n 1445 A.D. S h a r i f Hamad was 
the son-in-law of Abu fAbd A l l a h Muhammad b. Sulaiman a l J a z u l i , the 
propagator of the Shadhiliyya order i n Morocco. The Shadhiliyya order 
acquired considerable i n f l u e n c e i n the Sudan du r i n g the Funj regime 
through one K h o j a l i b. eAbd ar-Rahman (d .1743) p o p u l a r l y known as the 
Saint of T u t i I s l a n d . K h 5 j a i l had not only numerous d i s c i p l e s but also 
great i n f l u e n c e . He was succeeded by h i s son Ahmad who was the K h a l i f a 
f o r n e arly s i x t y years. But the Shadhiliyya order could not m a i n t a i n i t s 
i n f l u e n c e f o r l o n g . I n course of time, the other orders l i k e the 
Sammaniyya, Majdhubiyya and the Mirghaniyya won away i t s adherents i n 
J e z i r a , Damar and n o r t h of Khartoum. 
( i i i ) Majdhubiyya: This order was founded i n the Sudan i n the e a r l y 
18th century by Hamad i b n Muhammad al-Majdhub a l - K a b i r (1693-1776). 
The founder was a member of the J a ' a l i y y l n t r i b e . But the order derived 
i t s t r a d i t i o n from the t a r i q a of Abu'l Hasan ash-Shadhili. Muhammad a l -
Majdhub s t a r t e d the order i n Damar d i s t r i c t which s h o r t l y became the main 
centre of education f o r such r i v e r a i n t r i b e s as the J a * a l i y y i n , Sha'iqiyya, 
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and Hasaniyya. Under Muhammad al-Majdhub as-Sughayyir, the grandson of 
Muhammad a l Majdhub, there opened a new era i n the h i s t o r y of the order. 
• —— 
I t i s sa i d t h a t the Majdhub unsuccessfully r e s i s t e d the i n v a s i o n of 
I s m a f i i Pasha. Following t h i s , Muhammad al-Majdhub f l e d t o Saukin and 
from there t o Mecca, where he became a f o l l o w e r of the Shadhiliyya order. 
But when he returned t o Saukih i n 1830, he got a good number of f o l l o w e r s 
i n t h a t d i s t r i c t . 
The f o l l o w e r s of the Majdhubiyya order believed t h a t the Mahdi 
would come from the W es t , and they warmly extended t h e i r support t o the 
Mahdi. Even nowadays, the order has i t s adherents i n Damar, and i t also 
has i t s f o l l o w i n g s amongst the 3eja t r i b e s on the Red Sea Coast. 
( i v ) Sammaniyya: H i s t o r i c a l l y , the Sammaniyya order i s connected w i t h 
the IQ i a l v f a t i y y l order of the 14th century. But i n i t s e l f i t i s of much 
more recent c r e a t i o n . I t was introduced i n t o the Sudan by Shaikh Ahmad 
at-Tayyib b. al-Ba s h i r who was i n i t i a t e d i n Medina e i t h e r by As-Sammani 
or his successor Muhammad S h a r i f Nur ad-Da'im. Along both banks of the 
White N i l e the order has gained i t s numerous f a m i l y branches and f o l l o w e r s 
( v ) I d r l s i y y a : This order was founded i n the. 18th century by Ahmad 
i b n I d r i s a l - F a s i . He was o r i g i n a l l y a f o l l o w e r of the Shadhiliyya 
order. At the beginning of the 19th century he played an important p a r t 
i n the r e f o r m i s t movement i n Islam. A f t e r h i s death i n 1837> the h i s t o r y 
of the order was one of d i s s e n t i o n and d i s c o r d ; two of his famous p u p i l s , 
9. The order i s now very weak i n the Sudan. 
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Muhammad i b n ' A l t as-Sanusi and Muhammad e Uthman al- M i r g h a n l entered 
i n t o r i v a l r y f o r t h e i r master's s p i r i t u a l h e r i t a g e . The r e s u l t was t h a t 
both of them founded two separate orders, the Mirghaniyya and the 
Sanusiyya. When there appeared d i v i s i o n i n the order, Muhammad, a son 
of Ahmad a l - I d r l s , recognised a p u p i l of h i s f a t h e r , Ibrahim aa*-Rask£d*g^wi, 
as h i s • f a t h e r ' s successor. Meanwhile, eAbd a l - M u t a 4 a l , another son of 
Ahmad a l - - I d r i s , at f i r s t attached himself t o the SenusI and then went t o 
Dongola where he gained considerable success i n r e c o n s t r u c t i n g the order 
of h i s f a t h e r . Another branch of the f a m i l y i n Arabia was headed by 
Muhammad i b n ' A l l b. Muhammad b. Ahmad I d r i s (1876-1923) who could e s t a b l i s h 
the I d r x s l dynasty i n Asi'r. He had also considerable i n f l u e n c e i n Dongola 
where he had married. 
The f a m i l y of Ahmad i b n I d r i s always claimed the leadership of the 
f o l l o w e r s of the Mirgjianiyya and the Sanusiyya on the grounds t h a t the 
founders of these orders were p u p i l s of t h e i r ancestor. But none of the 
orders t r e a t e d the claim s e r i o u s l y . 
( v i ) Rashidiyya: The order was founded by Ibrahim ar-RasJxidiyya.-a d i s c i p l e 
of Ahmad i b n I d r i s . I t i s an off-shoot of the I d r l s i y y a order. The order 
has a number of f o l l o w e r s i n Dongola, Omdurman and on the White Wile. 
( v i i ) Mirghaniyya or Khatmiyya: Mirghaniyya i s one of the best known 
and widely d i s t r i b u t e d r e l i g i o u s orders i n the Sudan. I t was founded by 
Muhammad eUthman al- M i r g h a n i (1795-1853), one of the most famous d i s c i p l e s 
of Sayyid Ahmad i b n I d r i s , the founder of the I d r i s i y y a order. E a r l i e r 
i t has been s t a t e d how a f t e r the dee,th of Sayyid Ahmad i b n Idrais, h i s two 
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p u p i l s Muhammad fcUthman and Muhammad P A 1 I as-Sinusi contended together 
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f o r the leadership of the I d r i s i y y a order. The r e s u l t of the r i v a l r y -
was the s e t t i n g up of two independent Shaikhs. Because of h i s S h a r i f i a n 
o r i g i n Muhammad f Uthman could win the support of the Meccan Sha r i f s 
against the Sanusi. He completely modified the r u l e of Ahmad b. I d r i s 
and h i s order derived i t s name 'Mirghaniyya' from Sayyid r A l x MirghanT, 
an ancestor of h i s . Muhammad ?Uthman now sent h i s son al-Hasan t o 
Eastern Sudan which had "been p r e v i o u s l y i n f l u e n c e d by h i s own teachings 
when he was sent t o t h a t r e g i o n as a propagandist by Ahmad i b n I d r i s . 
I n Saukin, al-Hasan won over the Beja t r i b e s of the Banl'Amir, the 
Hatanqa and Habab. Prom Saukin he also t r a v e l l e d other areas of the 
Sudan and had an outstanding success i n Northern Kordofan, Dongola and 
Nubia. 
Before h i s death i n 1853J Muhammad gUthman had h i s order f i r m l y 
e s t ablished i n the Northern Sudan. The death of Muhammadf Uthman v/as 
fo l l o w e d by an i n t e r n a l r i v a l r y among h i s descendents. I n the Sudan, 
al-Hasan established himself as a great r e g i o n a l leader. He s e t t l e d a t 
Kassala and founded as the centre of h i s a c t i v i t y a v i l l a g e , Khatmiyya, 
a f t e r which the order i n the Sudan i s also p o p u l a r l y c a l l e d the Khatmiyya. 
On h i s death i n 1869, al-Hasan was succeeded by h i s son Muhammad *Uthman 
Taj a s - S i r r . On the outbreak of the Mahdist r e v o l t , Muhammad e Uthman 
Taj a s - S i r r supported the Egyptian G-overment. N a t u r a l l y , Muhammad f Uthman 
Taj a s - S i r r was force d t o f l y t o Cairo where he died i n 1886. 
10. See above pp( 
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( v i i i ) I s m a ' I l i y y a : The Isma f.Iliyya order was an off- s h o o t of the 
Mirghaniyya. I t was founded by I s m a f i l a l - W a l l (1793-1863). I t i s 
said t h a t when Muhammad fUthman al-Mirghanicame t o Kordofan, he was 
i n i t i a t e d as one of h i s f o l l o w e r s . I n 1842, a f t e r h i s r e t u r n from 
pilgrimage I s m a e I l a l - W a l l was p e r m i t t e d by h i s Shaikh t o found h i s 
own branch which came t o be known as the I s m a < l l i y y a . I s m a f i l a l - W a l l 
was succeeded by his son Muhammad al-Mekkl, a r e l i g i o u s leader who 
played a considerable p a r t d u r i n g the days of the Mahdists and was 
g r e a t l y t r u s t e d by the K h a l i f a . Muhammad al-Mekkl died i n 1906, l e a v i n g 
a number of sons, and a grandson, Muhammad Mirghani I s m a ' i l a l Mekki, who 
became the head of the f a m i l y by s e n i o r i t y of descent. The f o l l o w e r s of 
t h i s order are mainly found i n the Western Sudan. 
( r x ) T i j a n i y y a : This order v/as founded at Fez i n the 18th century. 
I t i s perhaps the most important order i n West A f r i c a where i t played a 
s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n the spread of Islam . I t was founded by .Ahmad j 
b. Muhammad b. al-Mukhtar a t - T i j a n l , who at f i r s t was a f f i l i a t e d t o many 
orders. But i t was not u n t i l 1781 when he founded h i s own r u l e on s t r i c t 
l i n e s . S h o r t l y before the outbreak of the Mahdist r e v o l u t i o n , t h i s order 
was introduced i n t o the Sudan from Egypt by Muhammad b. al-Mukhtar (d . 1 8 8 2 ) . 
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I t s adherents i n the Sudan are c h i e f l y found among the P e l l a t a immigrants, 
and i n c e r t a i n p a r t s of Darfur. 
( x ) Hindiyya: This order was s t a r t e d i n the Sudan d u r i n g the e a r l y days 
of the Anglo-Egyptian regime. I t was founded by Sh a r i f Yusuf a l - H i n d i , 
11 . These are u s u a l l y West A f r i c a n p i l g r i m s who, during the nineteenth 
century, on t h e i r r e t u r n from Mecca, have s e t t l e d permanently i n the 
Sudan.• 
I 'M f 
o r i g i n a l l y a f o l l o w e r of the Sanraianiyya order. I n t h i s sense i t i s an 
off- s h o o t of the Sammaniyya order. I t was s t a r t e d as a small group of 
devotees of the S h a r i f i n the J a z i r a area e a r l y i n t h i s century. I t s 
founder (d . 1 9 4 1 ) / was one of the important r e l i g i o u s p e r s o n a l i t i e s of 
the Sudan during the Anglo-Egyptian regime. 
( x i ) <Azmiyya: L i k e the Hindxyya t a r x q a , the fAzmiyya order was s t a r t e d 
i n the Sudan during the Anglo-Egyptian regime. I t wa,s founded by an 
Egyptian Shaikh, Muhammad MadI Abu'l - fAza'im, (1870-1936). From 1905 t o 
1915, he was a teacher i n Gordon College. O r i g i n a l l y , Muhammad MadT was a 
f o l l o w e r of Shadhiliyya order. I t i s said t h a t the r e f o r m i s t p r i n c i p l e s 
'of Wahhabism, i n f l u e n c e d him very much. L i k e the Wahhabis, he attacked 
the Saint worship, the v e n e r a t i o n of the Shaikhs and mourning at f u n e r a l s . 
I n 1915 he was deported t o Egypt f o r h i s 'tendentious p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s 
( x i i ) Sanusiyya: This i s not a Sudanese r e l i g i o u s brotherhood and 
consequently not prominently represented w i t h i n the country i t s e l f . But 
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s t i l l i t s mention i s necessary as t h i s order i n i t i a t e d a movement, which 
was of considerable importance i n a country bordering on the Sudan. 
The founder of the order, Muhammad i b n f A l i a l - S a n u s I . a native 
of A l g e r i a , was a prominent r e l i g i o u s teacher i n the second h a l f of the ' 
19th century. A f t e r making an extensive t r a v e l i n Egypt and the Hezaj ' j 
i 
i 
he established h i s order i n Cyrenaica. The keynote of t h i s order was t o 
oppose the innovations introduced i n t o the l i f e and manners of Muslim 
countries by the ever i n c r e a s i n g contact w i t h W e s t e r n c i v i l i z a t i o n , an 
12. For d e t a i l s o f the movements of the Sanusiyya c o n f r a t e r n i t y , see, 
Evans . - P r i t c h a r d , E.E., The Sanusi of Cyrenaica, Oxford, 1949; pp . 1 -
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o p p o s i t i o n which took the form, less of a c t i v e h o s t i l i t y than of passive 
r e s i s t a n c e . As i n many other reforming movements i n I s l a m , the advocates 
of t h i s order made attempts t o base l i f e e x c l u s i v e l y on the Qur'an and 
the Sunna of the Prophet, and t o eli m i n a t e a l l accretions not expressly 
sanctioned by these two sources of a u t h o r i t y . 
The connection between the Sanusiyya order and the Sudan was but 
s l i g h t . Impressed by the p r e s t i g e of Muhammad al-Mahdi, the son and 
successor of Muhammad i b n c A l i al-Sanusi, the Sudanese Mahdi asked him t o 
be h i s t h i r d K h a l i f a , but the o f f e r was r e j e c t e d . During the time of 
f A l l Dinar, the S anus'is- could e s t a b l i s h a number of Zawiya i n Darfur, 
But except f o r a few immigrants from the Western Desert, there are almost 
no follo?/ers of the order i n the Sudan. 
Beside the orders mentioned above, there are a few more which 
were brought i n t o the Sudan from Egypt during the time of the Funj. Such 
orders are the Ibrahxmiyya, R i f a ' i y y a and Badawiyya. A l l these have 
adherents amongst the Egyptians and 'some blacks of slave o r i g i n ' who had 
not any t a r i q a a f f i l i a t i o n . 
Any d e s c r i p t i o n of the r e l i g i o u s orders i n the Sudan w i l l remain 
incomplete unless something i s said about t h e i r methods of o r g a n i z a t i o n , 
d o c t r i n e s and t h e i r r i t u a l s . An attempt w i l l be made i n the f o l l o w i n g 
paragraphs t o enumerate each of them. 
The organizations of the r e l i g i o u s orders are more or less 
s i m i l a r . They d i f f e r only i n such secondary d e t a i l s as grades, l i t a n i e s 
and r i t u a l s . At the head of each order stands the Shaikh whose d i g n i t y 
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i s u s u a l l y h e r e d i t a r y . Immediately under, the Shaikh are the K h a l i f a s , 
entrusted w i t h the charge of a p a r t i c u l a r r e g i o n . Under the r e g i o n a l 
K h a l i f a are the s e c t i o n a l leaders, muqaddams, who can e n r o l and i n i t i a t e 
new members; they are also responsible f o r the propaganda and management 
of the order. 
I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o e x t r a c t the d o c t r i n e s of many orders, as they 
are not always s y s t e m a t i c a l l y formulated. But i t i s beyond doubt t h a t as 
the orders are t h e ' i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d expression of Sufism', they must 
have S u f i d o c t r i n e behind them. But as Sufism was always regarded w i t h 
suspicion by the orthodox canonists, the f i r s t o bject of the founder of 
an order -was t o prove h i s orthodoxy and thus t o avoid the reproach of 
i n n o v a t i o n . The t a s k of proving the orders orthodox could, however, be 
done i n a simple way. On founding an order, i t s founder at once trac e d 
a l l h i s teachings and d o c t r i n e s t o some well-known orthodox S u f i who 
t r a n s m i t t e d i t t o him from the Prophet h i m s e l f . As a second measure t o 
prove t h e i r orthodoxy, the orders accept the Law ( S h r l f a ) 'as the s t a r t i n g 
p o i n t of the S u f i path'. This i s f u l l y expressed i n the f o l l o w i n g e x t r a c t 
from a Mirghaniyya manual: 
"Hold f i r m l y , my b r o t h e r , t o the Sharl'a, because you cannot 
approach the 'path' except through the S h a r i f a , nor can you approach 
the ' t r u t h ' except through the t a r i q a Shari'a i s the r o o t , 
. . . . -] 7, 
t a r i q a i s the branch and thenaqcLqa ( t r u t h ) i s the f r u i t " . ^ 
13. Minhat al-ashab by Ahmad b. fAbd ar-Rahman a r - R u t b l , p.96; as quoted 
by Trimingham, Islam i n the Sudan, o p . c i t . , p.207. 
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Although Sufism, w i t h i t s d o c t r i n e and teachings i s the basis of t h e 
orders, but s t i l l i n the Sudan most of the f o l l o w e r s of the orders are 
completely ignorant of i t . The a b s t r a c t d o c t r i n e s of Sufism are 
to o d i f f i c u l t f o r the masses t o understand. Hence,to make t h e i r orders 
acceptable t o t h e masses, the Shaikhs, instead of a t t a c h i n g top p r i o r i t y 
t o the d o c t r i n e s of Sufism, i n s i s t e d mainly on t h e S u f i form of devotion, 
a s c e t i c d i s c i p l i n e , m a t e r i a l o b l i g a t i o n , s p i r i t u a l experiences and 
miracles of the Saint. 
The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c r i t u a l of the orders i s the performance of 
d h i k r , a d e v o t i o n a l exercise based on the Qur'anic i n j u n c t i o n t o 
1 U-
'remember G-od w i t h frequent remembrance' ( X X X i i i , 4 l ) . The essence of 
the d h i k r i s the r e p e t i t i o n many times of such phrases as 'G-od i s g r e a t ' , 
'There i s no God but G-od', 'peace and blessings upon the Prophet', and 
the d i f f e r e n t names of G-od. S p i r i t u a l songs and hymns may be introduced, 
as also r h y t h m i c a l movements of the body, resembling dancing. The a c t u a l 
d e t a i l s of the r i t u a l v a r y from order t o order. Dhikrs are held a t 
r e g u l a r weekly s e r v i c e s , but may also be organised f o r sp e c i a l occasions, 
such as p u b l i c or p r i v a t e f e a s t s . Another p a r t of the r i t u a l of t h e 
t a r l q a s i s contained i n c e r t a i n prayers and s e l e c t i o n s from the Qur'an, 
which are used both f o r p u b l i c and p r i v a t e devotion. These are known as 
hi z b or wird,, 
14. As quoted by Trimingham, i s l a m i n the Sudan, o p . c i t , p.212. 
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i n 
Whatever might be the l e g a l status of the r e l i g i o u s orders 
v i s a v i s the orthodox Islam, i t can not be denied t h a t these orders 
played an important r o l e i n the h i s t o r y of Sudanese Islam. Even 
according t o some devoted members, the s t a t e d aim of the t a r i q a , even 
• i n these days, ' i s t o educate people i n the p r i n c i p l e s of Islam'. I n 
f a c t , the education of the Sudanese f o r several hundred years during 
the Funj Kingdom was i n the hands of the v a r i o u s E'aklP who had t h e i r 
t r a i n i n g w i t h some t a r i q a Shaikhs. The t a r i q a s , as they c l a i m , 'taught 
the Law and the Qur'an'. 
Apart from the educational f u n c t i o n s , t h e r e l i g i o u s orders had 
some other d i s t i n c t i v e r o l e s t o p l a y . For the masses they provided 
supplementary aids or devices f o r o b t a i n i n g f u l l e r r e l i g i o u s experience. 
To average people, the formalised I s l a m of the mosque does not permit 
much f r e e expression,of r e l i g i o u s devotion and emphasizes a r a t h e r 
removed and d i s t a n t r e l a t i o n s h i p of the i n d i v i d u a l t o G-od. The b r o t h e r -
hoods represent the organised expression of popular Muslim mysticism, 
p r o v i d i n g the devotee w i t h a method f o r achieving more intimacy w i t h the 
supernatural, and breaking down the formalism of the mosque. 
I n the Sudan the r e l i g i o u s brotherhoods also played an important 
s o c i a l r o l e . I n a country l i k e the Sudan, t r a d i t i o n a l l y d i v i d e d by t r i b a l 
l o y a l t i e s , the brotherhoods have i n some respects f u n c t i o n e d as a s o c i a l 
f o r c e , c u t t i n g t r i b a l l i n e s and b i n d i n g members of d i f f e r e n t t r i b e s and 
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lineages together as s p i r i t u a l b r o t h e r s . On the other hand, t a r l q a s 
o f t e n encouraged d i v i s i v e n e s s , as when one t r i b e becomes a f f i l i a t e d 
c h i e f l y w i t h one brotherhood, while another becomes a f f i l i a t e d w i t h a 
second. Further, the r e l i g i o u s brotherhoods and t h e i r leaders have 
o f t e n been in s t r u m e n t a l i n the establishment of new communities. Thus, 
f o r example, a r e l i g i o u s man establishes a r e t r e a t c o n s i s t i n g of h i s 
home and school, around which h i s f o l l o w e r s , derived from heterogeneous 
t r i b a l o r i g i n s , s e t t l e . Their u n i t y i s i n t h i s common residence around 
the r e l i g i o u s leader and membership i n h i s t a r x k a . The group i n t e r -
marries, acquires a name a f t e r t h e i r r e l i g i o u s leader and takes on some 
of the character of a t r i b e . 
Owing t o the manifold important f u n c t i o n s performed by the 
r e l i g i o u s orders, t h e i r r e l i g i o n s Shaikhs commended a great i n f l u e n c e 
during t h e days of the Funj. Sometimes the Funj kings i n v i t e d the 
r e l i g i o u s Shaikhs or 'holy men', as they were c a l l e d , from outside. 
Although at t h a t time the orders were not organised i n the sense we 
now know them, yet the teaching and i n f l u e n c e of these 'holy men' was 
g r e a t l y impressed upon the country. They not only captured t h e hearts 
of the i n t e l l e c t u a l l y backward masses, but many of t h e i r successors 
became i n f l u e n t i a l guides of the Funj kings and p r i n c e s , not only i n 
s p i r i t u a l , but even i n p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s . They were h i g h l y regarded 
and subsidized by th e Funj kings. At the same time the common people 
sought t h e i r i n t e r c e s s i o n , not only w i t h God but also w i t h t h e i r r u l e r s . 
During t h e i r l i f e these r e l i g i o u s Shaikhs enjoyed r o y a l favour and the 
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a d o r a t i o n of the people, and a f t e r t h e i r death they became in t e r c e s s o r s 
w i t h G-od and t h e i r tombs places of p i l g r i m a g e . 
During the c e n t u r i e s preceding the Turko-Egyptian conquest of 
the Sudan, the i n f l u e n c e of the r e l i g i o u s orders was so deep-rooted i n t o 
the Sudanese s o i l t h a t the conquest could h a r d l y undermine i t s power and 
i n f l u e n c e . Of course, the establishment of one or two schools i n the 
Sudan and the f a c i l i t i e s provided i n the al-Azhar f o r the Sudanese p u p i l s , 
s l i g h t l y reduced the educational f u n c t i o n of the r e l i g i o u s orders. But 
the l oss was adequately compensated i n another d i r e c t i o n . The conquerors 
now attached a new value t o the existence of the t a r i q a s . As the Turko-
Egyptian conquest destroyed the l o c a l c h i e f t a i n s , the new r u l e r s had t o 
t u r n t o the r e l i g i o u s Shaikhs or the heads of the r-eligious orders as the 
n a t u r a l leader of the people. Hence l i k e t h e t r i b a l c h i e f s , these r e l i g i o u s 
S haikhs were very o f t e n used a.s the instrument of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . As the 
new r u l e r s had t o do t h i s as a l o g i c a l consequence of the conquest, t h i s 
p o l i c y made the r e l i g i o u s Shaikhs wealthy and respected members of the 
community. Thus, when the Mahdi r a i s e d h i s Standard i n Aba I s l a n d , they 
were a l l , w i t h the exception of the Majadhib, h o s t i l e t o , h i s claims which 
they knew a s s a i l e d t h e i r a u t h o r i t y . 
The status and i n f l u e n c e enjoyed by the r e l i g i o u s orders under the,-
Turko-Egyptian r u l e r s met i t s t r a g i c end at the hand of the Mahdi when he '. 
i 
established h i s temporal and s p i r i t u a l a u t h o r i t y over the country. The ' 
Mahdi was uncompromisingly h o s t i l e t o the r e l i g i o u s orders and t h e i r 
leaders. He at once abolished the r e l i g i o u s orders, as he considered 
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them t o he unnecessary and u n s c r i p t u r a l . But t h i s was perhaps not the 
only reason why they were abolished by the Mahdi. The v i t a l issue which 
concerned him most was the f a c t t h a t the leaders of the orders denied h i s 
claims. Although h o s t i l e at the beginning, the m a j o r i t y of the leaders 
of the orders afterwards found i t expedient t o j o i n the Mahdi when the 
l a t t e r gained dramatic v i c t o r y against the Egyptians. Only one or two 
l i k e the head of the Mir^haniyya, who s t i l l opposed him, had t o escape 
from the country. The Mahdi h i m s e l f , at f i r s t a Shaikh of the Sammanij^a, 
r e f u t e d a l l who thought t h a t he was founding a new . t r i q a by h i s change 
of the name of h i s f o l l o w e r s whom he c a l l e d Ansar. He wrote i n a l e t t e r 
t o the Shaikh a l - I s l a m , "the Prophet ... announced t o me t h a t my f o l l o w e r s 
are as h i s f o l l o w e r s and t h a t the commonest of them i n the s i g h t of G-od i s 
1 "5 
l i k e unto Sheikh Abd e l Kader e l G-ilani". A f t e r the Mahdi, the K h a l i f a 
maintained the a b o l i t i o n of the orders q u i t e s u c c e s s f u l l y and looked upon 
them w i t h s u s p i c i o n as being s e d i t i o u s . 
A f t e r the reconquest of the S udan, the p o l i c y of the G-ovemment 
towards the Sudanese r e l i g i o u s brotherhoods f o l l o w e d more or l e s s the 
pre-Mahdist Turko-Egyptian l i n e s . Under the Condominium Government the 
Shaikhs of t h e orders returned t o the Sudan and q u i c k l y reclaimed the 
al l e g i a n c e of the people who were attached t o them by personal l o y a l t i e s , 
except i n c e r t a i n p arts of the White and Blue K i l e provinces, where many 
clung t o the b e l i e f i n the Mahdi and h i s son. 
15. Wingate, F.R., Mahdism and t h e Egyptian Sudan, London, 1891; p.47. 
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Although the Shaikhs of t h e orders r e - e s t a b l i s h e d themselves under 
the new regime and f l o u r i s h e d as days passed, yet i t appears t h a t i n the 
beginning the B r i t i s h a d m i n i s t r a t o r s i n t h e Sudan could not appreciate 
the r e a l i n f l u e n c e of the r e l i g i o u s brotherhoods i n the popular Sudanese 
Islam. This view i s confirmed when i t i s found t h a t from the very beginning 
F.R.Wingate, the Governor-General of the Sudan, was u n c e r t a i n what t o do 
w i t h the numerous r e l i g i o u s orders. I n June 1901, the Governor-General 
formed a Board of ^Ulama t o advise him i n matters r e l a t i n g t o I s l a m . I n 
r e p o r t i n g h i s a c t i o n t o Cromer i n Cairo, he pointed out t h a t the number of 
the t a r i q a s had been on the increase and he hoped t h a t w i t h the a i d of the 
- 16 Board of fUlama he could deal w i t h them q u i e t l y but f i r m l y . He also 
p o i n t e d out t h a t i f anything was not done the orders might be very 
17 
troublesome i n the f u t u r e . This c l e a r l y r e f l e c t s Wingate's ambiguity as 
t o what he wanted t o do w i t h the r e l i g i o u s orders t o suppress them as 
the Mahdi d i d , or what? 
I n s p i t e of Wingate's o b s c u r i t y , there are f a c t s which i n d i c a t e 
t h a t i n the beginning the Government was excessively d e f e r e n t i a l t o the 
o f f i c i a l view of t h e al-Azhar U n i v e r s i t y and the ^Ulama. of Egypt which 
held t h a t "... the orders were a d e v i a t i o n from orthodox Islam and should 
18 
be discouraged". This was also made s u f f i c i e n t l y c l e a r by S l a t i n Pasha, 
the Inspector General of the Sudan Government. S l a t i n was very much 
16^ Wingate t o Cromer, 13~June, 1901, W.P. 271/6. • 
17. I b i d . 
18. H i l l , S l a t i n Pasha, o p . c i t . , p.87. 
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committed t o the views of the a l - A z h a r i t e eUlama. I t i s from him t h a t we 
come t o know t h a t under the Anglo-Egyptian G-overnment, "the t a r i q a s were 
19 
simply t o l e r a t e d and not o f f i c i a l l y recognised". When, i n 1912, the 
l o c a l branch of the I d r i s i y y a order i n Dongola persuaded a young i n s p e c t o r , 
H.C.Jackson, t o give approval t o the appointment of a f r a t e r n i t y o f f i c i a l , 
a K h a l i f a , S l a t i n Pasha w i t h great annoyance remarked: "He does not know 
t h a t t a r i k a s are only t o l e r a t e d and not o f f i c i a l l y recognised, and t h a t we 
20 
n e i t h e r appoint nor dismiss Khalifas"-. I n the face of t h i s , i t i s hard t o 
accept t h a t a f t e r the reconquest of the Sudan the Shaikhs of the orders 
r e t u r n e d t o the Sudan w i t h what Trimingham c a l l e d , "the o f f i c i a l 
21 
r e c o g n i t i o n " . 
I n 1911j R.Savile, the Governor of Kordofan, appointed a leader of 
the Mirj^haniyya f r a t e r n i t y and thus g a v e ' o f f i c i a l r e c o g n i t i o n t o the 
o f f i c e ' . This time also S l a t i n expressed h i s d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n t h a t the 
22 
a c t i o n of the Governor of Kordofan was wrong. According t o S l a t i n 'the 
Government should have nothing t o do v/lth these r e l i g i o u s orders' as he 
thought the leaders were only a f t e r the monetary p r o f i t t h a t accrued t o 
them from promising people a place i n heaven i n the next w o r l d , making 
women pregnant e t c . Consequently, he thought the leaders were r e a l l y 
frauds and t h a t the G-overnment could not be responsible f o r t h e i r a c t i o n . 
19. This view of S l a t i n on the t a r i q a s i s recorded by Major G-eneral S.S. 
B u t l e r , i n h i s d i a r y , 23rd Oct.1911 , when he had an i n t e r v i e w w i t h 
S l a t i n and had t a l k s on the t a r i q a s - see, Butler's d i a r y , W.P. 400/10. 
20. H i l l , S l a t i n Pasha, o p . c i t , p.93; 
21. Trimingham, Islam i n the Sudan, o p . c i t . , p.201. 
22. B u t l e r ' s Diary; o p . c i t . W.P. 400/10. 
23. I b i d . 
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S l a t i n further held that " i f the Government appoints a man i t must be 
responsible for h i s actions. The only r e l i g i o n recognised by the 
Government i s the orthodox Mohametanism. I f these sects or tardkas 
have quarrels and the quarrels become rows and disturbances the 
offenders must be t r i e d under Penal Code. Or i f they go against 
2k » 
Mohametan tenets they must be t r i e d by Mohametan Law. 
While t h i s was the o f f i c i a l attitude of the Sudan Government 
towards the r e l i g i o u s orders, s t i l l i t cannot be denied that the orders 
flourished under the Condominium Government while they had been suppressed 
by the Mahdi. The new Government had to tolerate them for the same 
reason which required the former Turko-Egyptian r u l e r s to favour the 
orders 
But the new Government did not treat a l l the orders equally. 
The orders with more influence and high prestige were treated accordingly. 
Thus, following the policy of the Turko-Egyptian days, the new regime 
showered more favour on one pa r t i c u l a r r e l i g i o u s order as i t commanded 
great influence and significance i n the country. This was the 
Mirghaniyya order. A b r i e f background i s perhaps necessary to indicate 
why, leaving aside the others, the new regime favoured t h i s p a r t i c u l a r 
order. 
The Mirghaniyya order had long been established i n the Sudan and 
drew most of i t s adherents from the natives i n the Northern and Eastern 
Sudan. They were more peaceably incl i n e d than the nomad Arabs of Western 
24. I b i d . 
25. See above p. s i . 
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Kordolfan. Many of them s e t t l e d down t o a g r i c u l t u r a l p u r s u i t s tending 
t h e i r water wheels along the banks of the K i l e between Khartoum and the 
Egyptian f r o n t i e r . They had a stake i n the country and an i n t e r e s t i n 
i t s peaceful development. Not only was t h e m i l i t a n c y of Mahdism a t h r e a t 
t o t h e i r own 'way of l i f e ' but i n p a r t i c u l a r many of the f o l l o w e r s of the 
Mirghaniyya had t i e s of blood and c u l t u r e w i t h Egypt. I t was only n a t u r a l , 
t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h e i r sympathies l a y w i t h t h e people of Egypt w i t h whom 
they had these sentimental l i n k s . Thus they looked t o Egypt as the only 
power who could prevent t h e i r t a r l q a from being overrun by the more w a r l i k e 
Mahdists. 
The f a c t t h a t the f o l l o w e r s of the Mirghaniyya order had remained 
l o y a l t o t h e Egyptian Government had a determining i n f l u e n c e on the 
p o l i c y of the Sudan Government a f t e r the reconquest. A f t e r the Mahdists 
had been overthrown, the Condominium Government discovered t h a t the t r i b a l 
o r g a n i z a t i o n had d i s i n t e g r a t e d ; the temporal chiefs had e i t h e r become the 
Mahdist supporters or been k i l l e d . Hence, the Government found t h a t amid 
the ebb and f l o w of r i v a l r e l i g i o u s denominations, the important t a r l q a 
Mirghaniyya provided the only s o l i d rock upon which any kind of admi n i s t r a -
t i v e e d i f i c e could be b u i l t . As t h e Mirghaniyya order had so many f o l l o w e r s 
l i v i n g i n many p a r t s of the Sudan, Wingate, the Governor-General, f e l t t h a t 
t o back them up, and make use of t h e i r proved l o y a l t y , would g r a d u a l l y 
exercise a s t a b i l i z i n g i n f l u e n c e over much of the country"?^ Thus, even 
26. S ee - Papers concerning the Proposed Memoir (by ? of ?) Gen. S i r 
Reginald Wingate., 1946, o p . c i t . , W.P. 457. 
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before the Condominium was e s t a b l i s h e d , when the Anglo-Egyptian troops 
were s t i l l f a r d i s t a n t from Khartoum, but f a s t approaching the c i t y , the 
army busied i t s e l f w i t h the r e b u i l d i n g , as f a r as p o s s i b l e , of the 
Khatmiyya mosque which also contained the tomb of the celebrated Persian 
missionary, S h a i k l i a l - M i r g h a n i . Moreover, h i s descendent Sayyid * A l x 
a l - M i r g h a n i , then l i v i n g i n Egypt, was sent f o r and i n s t a l l e d as custodian 
27 
of the tomb and mosque of M s ancestor. A l l t h i s was the idea of Wingate 
even when he headed the I n t e l l i g e n c e Department i n Cairo. The idea of 
Wingate was p r u d e n t l y adopted and when he himself became the G-overnor-
General of the Sudan, he gave p r e f e r e n t i a l treatment t o the Mirghaniyya 
order. I n 1901, he created the Board of fUlama, the members of which 
28 
were l a r g e l y drawn from among the f o l l o w e r s of the Mirghaniyya order. 
And i t was w i t h the help of t h i s Board o f e U l a m a , dominated mainly by 
the Mirghaniyya t h a t Wingate wanted 'to deal q u i e t l y but f i r m l y ' w i t h 
other tarxqas which were then growing i n c r e a s i n g l y i n number. This 
c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e s the amount of favour t h a t the Mirghaniyya order could 
draw from t h e G-overnment. 
Apart from the prominent p o s i t i o n the Mirghaniyya held i n the 
Board of pUlama, t h e i r leader, Sayyid ' A l l al-Mirghanx, vras presented t o 
the King, when the l a t t e r paid a v i s i t t o the Sudan on h i s way back from 
I n d i a . I n the same year (1900) the Sayyid was honoured w i t h the C.M.G-. 
f o r h i s l o y a l t y t o the G-overnment. A l l these were r a r e honours which t h e 
27. W i l l i s , C.A., An account of the v i s i t t o H.M. the King of a 
d e p u t a t i o n of Sudanese Notables - (A type s c r i p t manuscript) p.12; 
28. Papers concerning the Proposed Memoirs (by ? of ?) G-eneral [W.P.204/1 . 
S i r Reginald Wingate, o p . c i t . 
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leaders of other orders could not even t h i n k of at t h a t t i m e. 
The l o y a l t y of the Mirghaniyya was counted much i n ensuring the 
good Government of the country. The Mirghaniyya f a m i l y l i v e d i n various 
places throughout the Sudan. Although they were under the l o c a l a u t h o r i t y 
of the d i s t r i c t i n which they l i v e d , the Government looked upon Sayyid e A l x 
al-Mirghani as t h e i r head. Wingate was so concerned f o r the l o y a l t y of 
the Mirghaniyya f o l l o w e r s , t h a t from time t o time he used t o advise the 
Sayyid t o devote s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n on h i s f o l l o w e r s ' doings, e s p e c i a l l y i n 
29 
matters of r e l i g i o n , so t h a t they might always be good and l o y a l . 
Among many other favours enjoyed by the Mirghaniyya order was a 
f i n a n c i a l allotment which the rep r e s e n t a t i v e s of this order used t o receive 
from t h e Government. I t i s , of course, d i f f i c u l t enough t o give a precise 
amount of t h i s a l l o t m e n t , as they were h i g h l y c o n f i d e n t i a l . But whatever 
might be the amount, under no circumstances was the Government prepared t o 
discontinue t h i s payment. I n 19"!6, C e c i l put forward a suggestion t o 
W in g a t e t o stop t h i s payment and thereby t o c u r t a i l the f i n a n c i a l l i a b i l i t y 
of the Government, But Wingate promptly opposed the idea, and considered 
the move h i g h l y i m p o l i t i c . I n p l a i n words he wrote C e c i l : "The cessation 
of the payment .... would be a mistake and not w o r t h w h i l e " ^ 
Although the apparent i n t e n t i o n of the Government was 'to deal w i t h ' 
the r e l i g i o u s orders through the 3oard of <" Ulama, i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o 
measure the amount of success i t achieved i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n . I n s p i t e of 
29. Wingate t o Sayyid ' A l l a l - M i r g h a n i , 28 May, 1912; W.P. 101 / 5 . 
30. Wingate t o C e c i l , E r k o i t , 5 J u l y , 1916; W.P. 201/2. 
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i t s s p e c i a l favours t o the Khatmiyya, the C-overnment d i d not appear t o 
stand i n the way by b l o c k i n g the f o r m a t i o n of some nevv orders which were 
created under i t s very nose. M-Hindiyya, one of the most i n f l u e n t i a l 
r e l i g i o u s brotherhoods of the Sudan was formed during t h e e a r l y days of 
the Condominium regime. I t i s p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t i n g t o note t h a t i t 
was created by Shar i f Tusuf a l - H i n d i , a man who even happened t o serve i n 
the Mahdist G-overnment. The G-overnment appeared t o have made no o b j e c t i o n 
when he established near Khartoum a r e s t house and a r e l i g i o u s school. I n 
the l a t t e r the older men were prepared f o r the r o l e of K h a l i f a , i . e . the 
representatives of the S h a r i f , who fun c t i o n e d i n the more remote d i s t r i c t s 
as r e l i g i o u s teachers and missionaries of the order. S i m i l a r l y another 
52 _ order e Azmiyya came i n t o being i n 1915-16. I t was s t a r t e d by Muhejnmad 
a l Madf, who even served i n the Egyptian Education Department u n t i l 19"15 • 
' As s t a t e d e a r l i e r , the G-overnment had. t o bestow favour on the 
Mirghaniyya f o r great p o l i t i c a l b e n e f i t J but t h i s d i d not make i t b l i n d l y 
p a r t i a l t o t h i s p a r t i c u l a r order. On the c o n t r a r y , i n many i n t e r - o r d e r 
quarrels which f e l l w i t h i n the j u r i s d i c t i o n of Penal Code, the G-overnment' s 
d e c i s i o n on many occasions went against the Mirghaniyya. On two such 
occasions, the Majdhubiyya order, which was pro-Mahdist, gained G-overnment 
v e r d i c t i n i t s favour when there arose quarrels between i t s e l f and the 
Mirghaniyya. As p r e v i o u s l y s t a t e d , the f o l l o w e r s of Majdhubiyya order 
join e d Mahdiyya, while the Mirghaniyya kept l o y a l t o t h e Egyptian G-overnment. 
31 . See above, p. nOf. 
32. See above, p. 75. 
90 
A f t e r the conquest of Kassala by the Mahdists, Shaikh Muhammad al-Majdhub 
took a slave woman belonging t o fUthman al - M i r g h a n l . From t h a t slave woman 
Shaikh Muhammad al-Majdhub had a daughter. On the reconquest, the Mirghani 
people r e s t o r e d the slave woman and her daughter. Shaikh Muhammad a l -
Majdhub then complained t o the Government which allowed him t o have h i s 
33 
daughter. S i m i l a r l y , a t Baukin, which was under the Egyptian r u l e even 
during the Mahdiyya, the Egyptian a u t h o r i t y gave a Zawiya of the Majdhubiyya. 
order t o the Mirghaniyya. But sometime a f t e r the reconquest, when SauRiir 
was brought under the Sudan G-overnment, the K h a l i f a s of the Ma jdhubiyya 
complained t o the G-overnment which persuaded the Mirghaniyya f o l l o w e r s t o 
give the Zawiya back t o the people of the Ma jdhubiyya order^" 
I n t h e i r i n t e r n a l matters such as o r g a n i z a t i o n , r i t u a l s e t c , the 
orders enjoyed complete freedom from the G-overnment i n t e r f e r e n c e , so long as 
35 
they d i d not go against the basic p r i n c i p l e s of Islam. Each order had i t s 
own source of income over which t h e G-overnment exercised no c o n t r o l . Their 
main income came from the c o l l e c t i o n of Zakat, a k i n d of r e l i g i o u s o f f e r i n g 
ordained by the Muslim Law t o be set aside f o r r e l i g i o u s purposes. I t was 
the custom of many t o o f f e r t o the head of t h e i r order t h i s Zak&t, f o r the 
r e c e i v i n g of which t r i b a l and r e l i g i o u s leaders very o f t e n competed. The 
c o l l e c t i o n of Zakat, t h e r e f o r e , gave r i s e t o jeal o u s i e s between the chiefs 
of t r i b e s and the leaders of the orders. To t h i s complicated issue the 
G-overnment adopted a very sound a t t i t u d e . I t maintained t h a t , "whereas 
3% Nauin Sukayr, "History of the Majdhabiyya t a r i k a " , (A type s c r i p t 
m anuscript), p .16 . W.P. 195/7« 
34.' I b i d ; 
35. This S l a t i n made cle a r t o B u t l e r , see above, p. 85". 
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the v o l u n t a r y payment of Zeka, being a matter of p r i v a t e conscience, 
could be l e f t t o the i n d i v i d u a l , the c o l l e c t i o n of Zeka e i t h e r by 
" 36 
t r i b a l or r e l i g i o u s leaders was not t o be countenanced. 
I n s p i t e of t h e . f a c t t h a t the r e l i g i o u s orders enjoyed freedom 
i n t h e i r i n t e r n a l matters, y e t i n one of t h e i r i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s , such as 
the question of succession, the Government t r i e d t o i n t e r f e r e , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y when the issue i n v o l v e d some p o l i t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s . This 
happened w i t h the Sanusiyya order, which though not o r i g i n a l l y a Sudanese 
order, had a small number of f o l l o w e r s i n Darfur. . I t i s necessary here 
t o throw some l i g h t on the r e l a t i o n between the Sanusi c o n f r a t e r n i t y and 
the .Anglo-Egyption Government. 
I n the beginning of the 20th century, the r e l a t i o n -of the Anglo-
Egyptian Government was f r i e n d l y w i t h the Sanu3iyya c o n f r a t e r n i t y . ' 
Wingate himself advocated a p o l i c y of f r i e n d l i n e s s and g o o d - w i l l , j u s t 
as he d i d w i t h the Sha r i f of Mecca, Sayyid ? A l I al-Mirghani and other 
r e l i g i o u s p o w e rs^ On the death of the Great Sanusi i n 1902, and the 
e l e c t i o n of his cousin Sayyid Ahmad t o take h i s place during the m i n o r i t y 
of the Great S&nusl's son, Sayyid Muhammad I d r i s , Wingate's view was 
s t i l l t o continue the same l i n e of p o l i c y and t o t r e a t Sayyid Ahmad 
ver y much on the same l i n e as h i s predecessor. 
When the I t a l o - T u r k i s h war broke out, i n which the Sanusis 
subsequently sided w i t h the Turks i n Cyrenaica, the I t a l i a n Government 
36. Hamilton, J.A. de.6 ."(edited) - The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan from w i t h i n ; 
o p . c i t , p.211. 
37. Wingate t o M i l o T a lbot, June 14, 1916; W.P. 131/10. 
38. I b i d . 
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requested the B r i t i s h G-overnment t o mediate between the I t a l i a n Government 
39 
and the Sanusl. The B r i t i s h G-overnment,however, refused t o do so, as 
i t d i d not wish t o jeopardise i t s f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n w i t h Turkey. But i t 
j u s t i f i e d i t s i n a b i l i t y on the ground t h a t the Sanusl r e f r a i n e d from 
undertaking any h o s t i l i t y e i t h e r against Egypt or against the S u d a n i 
Even during the e a r l y days of the beginning of World War I , the G-rand 
SanusI, Sayyid Ahmad maintained f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Anglo-Egyptian 
G-overnment by r e f u s i n g t o be in f l u e n c e d by G-ermans or Turks.1" And i n view 
of t h i s f r i e n d l i n e s s on the p a r t of the Sanusi c h i e f , Clayton proposed t o 
Wingate t o give the Sanusl some kind of subsidy as was giv e n t o s i m i l a r 
i 2 
c h i e f s elsewhere by the B r i t i s h G-overnment." When the Foreign O f f i c e i n 
London authorised the G-overnor-G-eneral t o act as he thought as regards the 
subsidy f o r the Shaikh S a n u s l ^ t h e G-overnor-G-eneral was i n favour of 
making some money advance f o r the o s t e n s i b l e purpose of improving h i s Zawiyas 
i n Jughbub and other places w i t h i n Egyptian f r o n t i e r ^ " 1 " A l l these Anglo-
Egyptian a u t h o r i t y were prepared t o do only because i n i t s dealings w i t h 
the SanusI i t was p r i n c i p a l l y actuated by a desire t o secure the g o o d - w i l l 
of an independent r e l i g i o u s c h i e f , who could r e f r a i n the f a n a t i c i s m of h i s 
f o l l o w e r s and prevent them from j o i n i n g a Jihad. 
So long as t h i s f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n e x i s t e d between the Sanusi and 
the Anglo-Egyptian G-overnment, there was no attempt on the p a r t of the 
39. Clayton t o the P r i v a t e Secretary of the G-overnor-G-eneral of the Sudan, 
1.3th A p r i l , 1915, V/.P. 131/10. 
40. I b i d . 
41 . Prom the Copy of a telegram from Clayton t o the Governor-General, 
March 9, 1915, W.P. 131/4. 
42. I b i d . 
Z(_3• From the Copy of a telegram from Clayton t o the Governor-General, 
Cairo, 10th March, 1915; V/.P. 131/4. 
l+k. I b i d . 
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l a t t e r to in t e r f e r e with the former's i n t e r n a l matters — such as the 
question of succession or otherwise. But with the progress of the World 
War I , when Turkey eventually joined against Great B r i t a i n , the Pan-Islamic 
party i n Constantinople made strenuous efforts to induce Sayyid Ahmad, the 
45 
Sanusi Chief to proclaim a Jihad against England and to attack Egypt. 
When the Sanusx chief yielded to the pressure of the Pan-Islamio party, 
Wingate suggested a policy with the object of "...breaking up the Senussi 
confraternity on divide et impera l i n e s ' ' ^ And t h i s Wingate t r i e d to 
achieve by running Muhammad I d r f s SanasI, the son of the l a t e Great Sanusi, 
Muhammad al-Mahdl, against Sayyid Ahmad^ Henceforward, the Anglo-
Egyptian Government began to support the cause of Muhammad I d r l s to the 
r e a l headship of the f r a t e r n i t y . I n return, Muhammad I d r l s also gave an 
undertaking to Wingate, now the High Commissioner i n Egypt, to the effect 
I o 
that he would be l o y a l to the B r i t i s h and Egyptian Governments. 
During the World War I , the Sanusi Chief was not the only person 
who had to be deterred from the proclamation of a Jihad. For in t e r n a l 
security and the l o y a l t y of the subjects, the Sudan Government mainly 
depended upon the r e l i g i o u s leaders such as the heads of the re l i g i o u s 
orders, who exercised a strong influence on t h e i r followers. I n t h i s 
c r u c i a l moment, the influence of these r e l i g i o u s leaders were u t i l i z e d 
49 
f o r a d e f i n i t e p o l i t i c a l purpose. These rel i g i o u s leaders did t h e i r 
best to keep t h e i r followers quiet. Wingate, i n turn, was not ungrateful. 
45^ "Note on the Senussi", I n t e l l i g e n c e Department, War Office, Cairo., 
26th A p r i l , 1915; W.P. 131/4. 
46. Wingate to Milo Talbot, 14th June, 1916; W.P. 131/10. 
47. I b i d . 
48* Muhammad I d r i s al-Mahdl al-Sanusi to Wingate, 17th April,1917; W.P.100/19 
49* See below, p.114. 
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He t r i e d to reward those r e l i g i o u s leaders who rendered to the Government 
such a valuable service. For his l o y a l t y to the Government, Sayyid 
e A l I al-Mirghani was honoured with the K.C.M.G. For the Sayyid's 
brother, Sayyid Ahmad al-Mirghani, Wingate made strong recommendation to 
50 
the Secretary of State for Foreign A f f a i r s . Recalling the past services 
of the Mirghaniyya order to the Government, Wingate wrote: Head of the 
important Mirghaniyya family at Kassala, "the influence of Sayyid Ahmad 
al-Mirghani over the t r i b e s of Eastern Sudan had been consistently exerted 
51 
i n the i n t e r e s t of the Sudan Government". For Sayyid Ahmad al-Mirghani, 
he recommended a C.M.G. S i m i l a r l y for Sharif Yusuf al-Hindi he wrote to 
the said authority: "A relig i o u s notable of outstanding personality and 
wide spread influence, whose declaration of adhesion to the B r i t i s h 
Government during the war had a most b e n e f i c i a l e f f e c t . Since then he 
rendered valuable service i n inducing the Arabs to supply transport camels 
required for m i l i t a r y operations i n S i n a i , Egypt and Darfur." For the 
Sharif, Wingate recommended an Honorary C.M.G. 
As no native princes were l e f t i n the Sudan, the Government under 
the pressure of circumstances had to tolera t e the emergence of the heads 
of the re l i g i o u s orders. Even the Government tended to foster some of 
them such as the Mirghaniyya. While doing so, the Government was, of course, 
quite aware of the views of the Al-Azhar *Ulama that 'the orders were 
deviation from the orthodox Islam and should.be discouraged 1. Offi c i a l l y . , 
50. Wingate to S ecretary of S tate for Foreign A f f a i r s , Khartoum, 
Oct.8th, 1916; W.P. 202/1. 
51. I b i d . 
52. I b i d . 
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the Sudan Government was committed to the al-Azharite views. But when 
the p o l i t i c a l and administrative expediency required the Government to 
take the help of the r e l i g i o u s orders, i t created a dilemma for the 
Government. This explains why Wingate was confused as to what to do with 
the orders. Although the orders were never o f f i c i a l l y recognised by the 
Government, s t i l l , i n practice, the p o l i t i c a l necessity of the country 
ultimately prevailed over the orthodoxy of the al-Azharite e Ulama. The 
existence of the re l i g i o u s orders and t h e i r leaders were greatly valued; 
the powers and influence of the heads of the re l i g i o u s orders were 
u t i l i z e d for p o l i t i c a l purposes whenever such need arose. I n f a c t , i t was 
an extremely d i f f i c u l t task to suppress or abolish the orders. Because 
i n contrast with other countries where i t i s only c e r t a i n groups or s t r a t a 
of the population who belong to a tar l q a , a l l Muslims i n the Sudan have an 
attachment to one or other of the tarxqas. This made the abo l i t i o n or 
suppression of the orders by the Condominium Government an impossible task. 
Moreover, there appears to have been no persistent demand on the part of 
the fUlama, either Egyptian or Sudanese i n t h i s respect, as the^Ulama 
themselves were members of one or the other of the orders. 
Undoubtedly, during the period of the Anglo-Egyptian r u l e , the 
heads of the r e l i g i o u s orders, were made to play the ro l e of native princes 
i n the Sudan. But t h i s did not lead to a policy on the part of the 
53 
Government, "of playing off one re l i g i o u s leader against another....". 
This might have happened i n the l a t e 1920*3 and onwards when Sudanese 
p o l i t i c s quite naturally revolved around two great r e l i g i o u s leaders l i k e 
53. Trimingham, Christian approach to Islam i n the Sudan, e;yU;E;,,1,92f8; p.26. 
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Sayyid CA1I al-Mirghani and Sayyid «Abd ar-Rahman b. al-Mahdi. But the 
existing papers give no encouragement to the view that t h i s happened well 
before 1919 when with the Egyptian revolution r e l a t i o n s between Egypt and 
Great B r i t a i n became strained. 
On the whole, the r e l a t i o n between the Government and the leaders 
of the orders was one of c o r d i a l i t y . On the occasions of state functions 
and ceremonies they were very often invited. I t helped not only the exchange 
of greetings between the high Government o f f i c i a l s and the leaders of the 
orders, but also the ideas and f e e l i n g s . Although nowadays a handful of 
Sudanese 'Muslim Brothers' accuse the B r i t i s h f or destroying t h e i r Islamic 
52. 
Society and corrupting t h e i r r e l i g i o u s leaders, the Government was lucky 
enough that the more powerful of the Sudanese orders, the Khatmiyya and the 
al-Hindlyya were favourable to i t . The attitude of the orders towards the 
Government depended e n t i r e l y upon that of the leaders. Naturally the 
leaders who had an assured position did not t r y to encourage fanaticism. 
This attitude of the orders was, of course, not inspired by t h e i r sympathy 
for the B r i t i s h ^ on the contrary, i n adopting t h i s attitude the leaders and 
orders were s o l e l y inspired by t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s . 
Whatever i t might be, t h i s attitude of the orders and t h e i r leaders, 
as time passed on, proved to be very valuable for the steady development of 
a stable rule i n the Sudan. 
* * * 
54. Berkley, H.B., Burri al-Lamaab, a Suburban Sudanese V i l l a g e near 
Khartoum; New York, 1964; p.162. 
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CHAPTER IV 
The Government policy towards 
Mahdism, Mahdists and t h e i r leader. 
I 
I n the early years of i t s administration, the Anglo-Egyptian 
authorities i n the Sudan very often f e l t that the battles of Omdurman 
and Omdiwaykarat served as death blows to Mahdism1and the Mahdists i n 
the Sudan. I n the battle of Omdurman, September 2, 1998, Kitchener 
completefydefeated and routed the army of the Mahdist Khalifa, with the 
exception that the Khalifa *Abd Allah with some of his followers managed 
to escape. The bat t l e of Omdiwaykarat, however, witnessed the fug i t i v e 
Khalifa defeated and k i l l e d by Wingate, the future Governor-General of 
2 
the Sudan. 
Following the battle of Omdiwaykarat i n which the Kha l i f a of the 
Mahdl was k i l l e d , Wingate sent two telegrams, one to Lord Cromer, then 
His Majestyjs Agent and Consul General i n Egypt, and another to h i s wife. 
These two wires l a r g e l y substantiate the views held i n the previous 
paragraph that these two batt l e s destroyed Mahdism i n the Sudan. To Lord 
Cromer, Wingate wired: Mahdism received i t s coup de grace on the 
3 
24th and I hope a new era w i l l open for the unfortunate Sudanese people". 
1. For d e f i n i t i o n see below, p. 103. 
2. For the d e t a i l s of these campaigns see, Churchill, W.S., The River War, 
Vol.11, London, 1900; pp.1-165. 
3. Wingate to Cromer, 25th Nov. 1899; W.P. 269/11. 
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To his wife he expressed his inner feelings of joy, r e s u l t i n g from the 
v i c t o r y over the enemy: "HurrahJ Mahdism finished..."^ The same degree 
of optimism was entertained by the people of B r i t a i n as w e l l . "Mahdism 
has been", commented a B r i t i s h d a i l y , "destroyed root and branch ". 
A l l these expressions were hardly more than emotional outbursts 
of the v i c t o r s , and contained very l i t t l e i n t r i n s i c value. I n f a c t , these 
two battles by no means meant the death of Mahdism i n the Sudan. I n 1902, 
only three years a f t e r the battle of Omdiwaykarat, Reginald Wingate, then 
the Governor-General of the Sudan, recorded i n his diary confessing that 
"there i s plenty of latent Mahdism,and u n t i l the generation born and brought 
up i n that f a i t h has died out, we s h a l l be subject to i t s outbreak i n one 
form or another....."^ He even maintained the same view i n 1908: " 
Mahdism i n t h i s country i s not r e a l l y dead; i t has been s t i f l e d , but there 
i s s t i l l plenty of v i t a l i t y i n i t and we must be prepared for a 
recrudescence from time to time"! 
The apprehension of the Governor-General, of course, had some r e a l 
b a s i s , f o r the early years of the Anglo-Egyptian r u l e i n the Sudan witnessed 
several attempts of the Mahdist followers to revive and propagate the f a i t h . 
E a r l y i n 1900, a party of Mahdist followers i n Omdurman, who expected the 
8 
coming, of the Prophet Jesus, since the Khalifa of the Mahdl was dead, 
threatened public security. I n 1903, a 'Mahdl1 appeared i n Kordofan and 
t r i e d to propagate the Mahdist ideas. Again i n the following year there 
4. 'Wingate to Lady Wingate, 24th Nov.1899; W.P. 269/11. 
5. The Daily Telegraph, 27th Nov. 1899. 
6. Wingate's personal Diary - Eob.1902; W.P. 272/8. 
7. Wingate to Gorst, Khartoum, iiOth May, 1908; W.P. 282/5. 
8. The Mahdists believed that the revelation_of the Mahdl was to be 
followed by the second coming of NabI e I s a . I t i s an a r t i c l e of t h e i r f a i t h . 
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appeared a Nab! f I s a at S i n j a on the Blue N i l e . A l l these events tended 
the authority to change i t s view that Mahdism was dead i n the Sudan. 
Realising that Mahdism was by no means a spent force, the Govern-
ment f e l t that unless c a r e f u l l y watched and checked at every turn t h i s 
f a i t h might again become a danger to the peace and security of the country. 
I n the s u r v i v a l of the Mahadist c u l t , the Government could c l e a r l y a s c e r t a i n 
two d i s t i n c t tendencies: 'the f a n a t i c a l s p i r i t of a die-hard remnant, and 
the slow but steady transformation of Mahdism into an orthodox tarlqa' 
despite the f a c t that the Mahdl denied that h i s followers constituted an 
order and proclaimed the l i q u i d a t i o n of a l l orders. The f i r s t tendency was 
displayed i n the b e l i e f held by the Mahdists that as Muhammad Ahmad was the 
true Mahdi, the propheoies must be f u l f i l l e d which foretold that the 
revelation of the Mahdi was to be followed by the short r e i g n of Anti-Christ 
and the Second Coming of Jesus. The new Government was accordingly cast 
for the role of the D a j j a l , and the dreamers of t h i s dream looked anxiously 
f o r the coming of the Nab! t I s a . Even many spurious prophecies began to 
c i r c u l a t e . They were attributed to Farah who l i v e d i n the seventeenth 
century. One such prophecy said "At the end of time the English w i l l come 
to you, whose soldiers are c a l l e d polioe .... There w i l l be no deliverance 
- 10 
except through the coming of e I s a " . 
Thus, from the very beginning the Government was very cautious to 
deal with any symptom of Mahdist revivalism, however i n s i g n i f i c a n t they might 
appear, because i t knew very well how from an i n s i g n i f i c a n t beginning the 
idea ultimately caused enormous danger. As part of t h e i r policy, the 
T. Anti-Christ. 
10. Quoted from H i l l e l s o n , Sudan Arabic Texts, p.159. 
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conquerors, just a f t e r the reoccupation of the Sudan, made attempts to 
shake the b e l i e f of the people i n Mahdl and Mahdism. As a means to t h i s 
end, Kitchener, after the bat t l e of Omdurman, destroyed the tomb of Mahdi, 
the source of re l i g i o u s i n s p i r a t i o n of the M.ahdists. After the battle he 
ordered the embalmed body of the dead to be turned out of the grave; the 
11 
head was wrenohed off and the trunk was cast into the N i l e . When t h i s 
action was questioned i n the B r i t i s h Parliament, Kitchener, j u s t i f y i n g h is 
own action, wrote to Lord Cromer that the tomb of the Mahdl was destroyed 
a f t e r due deliberation and that i t was prompted solely by p o l i t i c a l 
12 
considerations. And i n a further telegram, explanatory of the same action, 
Kitchener expressed himself i n the following terms: 
" I t was advised, a f t e r the taking of Omdurman that i t would 
be better to have the body removed, as otherwise many of the more ignorant 
people would consider that the sanctity with which they surrounded the Mahdi 
prevented us from doing so . ..."1^ 
Hence, the destruction of the tomb of Mahdl and the desecration of 
hi s body were two attempts by.the authority to undermine the people's b e l i e f 
i n Mahdl and his mission. Apart from these, other measures were adopted to 
weaken the cause of the cu l t by making i t s p r i n c i p a l votaries p r a c t i c a l l y 
i n a c t i v e . Of the three Khalifas of the Mahdl,, Khalifa <?Abd Allah and Kh a l i f a 
e A l i , died i n the course of b a t t l e . Khalifa Muhammad Sharif, and two 
11. Contemporary Review, Vol. LXXV, London, 1899; p.295. 
12. Kitchener to Cromer, 1st Feb, 1899; P.R.O./F.O. 30/57/14. 
13* Quoted from a l e t t e r of Lord Cromer to the Marquess of Salisbury, Cairo, 
12th March, 1899; P.R.O./F.O. 30/57/14. 
14. Following the pri n c i p l e of early days of Islam, the Mahdl appointed ... . . 
four Khalifas of successors: (a)^ I Q i a l l f a fAbd Allah; (b) Khalifa <A1I, 
( c ^ A l l ai-Sariusi; (d) K h a l i f a Sharif. e A l I al-Sanusi rejected the offer 
and consequently that seat remained vacant. 
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of the Mahdl's sons al-Bushra and a l F a d j i l who survived the battles were 
banished to Shukkaba where they were intended to lead a normal l i f e under 
close police supervision. Other important followers of Mahdl were sent to 
Rosetta prison to lead a l i f e of complete i n a c t i v i t y . 
But by destroying the tomb of Mahdl and putting into prison his 
p r i n c i p a l followers, the Government could hardly achieve i t s desired end. 
I n f a c t , a l l the attempts made to destroy the influence that lingered around 
the name of Mahdl and the K h a l i f a proved hardly successful. No doubt the 
crushing m i l i t a r y defeat that the Mahadists suffered at the hand of Lord 
Kitchener d i s p i r i t e d them, but i t could not shatter t h e i r b e l i e f s i n the 
Mahdl. The Mahadists, beyond doubt, l o s t what l i t t l e sympathy remained 
among the people i n the Nile Valley north of Omdurman; but along the White 
Nile and i n the J e z i r a the movement was s t i l l strong. I n f a c t , the majority 
of the Mahdists continued to revere the memory of the Mahdl and the K h a l i f a . 
I n t h e i r mind the Mahdl enjoyed a very strong position; whether he was 
defeated or victorious — he was t h e i r hero. I f victorious, i t would be 
c l e a r l y because God fought on his side and gave him v i c t o r y over his enemies. 
I f vanquished, he was a martyr who f e l l fighting for his God. Hence, 
everyway — the veneration of the Mahdl was assured. I n the early years of 
the administration, H.H.S.Morant, the Governor of Haifa, discovered that 
f i v e Mahadist prisoners i n the Zabtia prison had s t i l l f irmly adhered to 
t h e i r b e l i e f that Muhammad Ahmad was the Mahdl and that the N a b l e I s 3 was 
to come. He was simply astonished to fi n d that the defeat of the Mahdists 
and t h e i r subsequent misfortune could not upset t h e i r b e l i e f i n Mahdl and 
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Mahdism. S t i l l more, the survi v a l of the Mahdism and the attitude of 
the Mahdists towards the Government was best summed up by a contemporary 
B r i t i s h d a i l y , "Inspite of the crushing defeats of the Mahdists i t 
continued, "the people almost adore the Mahdi....; they hate the enemy, 
16 
whoever he may be, but most of a l l when he i s a foreigner". The Government 
could also correctly estimate the gravity of the si t u a t i o n . I n his annual 
report for 1908, the Governor-General recorded that the f i n a l overthrow of 
the authority of the Khal i f a "has not resulted i n the t o t a l extinction of 
Mahdism as a f a i t h . I t i s true the Mahdi died, but the i n q u i s i t i e s and 
the subsequent f a l l of h i s Khalifa have not yet altogether destroyed the 
17 
b e l i e f of many of his followers i n his divine mission". 
The Government was thus quite a l i v e to t h i s s i t u a t i o n and had to 
adopt a d e f i n i t e policy towards Mahdism and the Mahdists so that the latent 
Mahdism might not again constitute a threat to the established authority and 
the Government. 
I I 
Mahdism i n the Sudan, l i k e other r e l i g i o u s movements, had i t s s p e c i a l 
doctrines, venerated leader, sacred writings, places and objects and method 
of organization. I t i s better to study the policy of the Government towards 
the cult and i t s followers, not only i n the pronouncements which from time to 
time had been formulated, but i n i t s p r a c t i c a l application to these several 
15. Reports on the Finances,Administration and the Condition of the Su3ftn>;. 
1906, Part IV; p.640. 
16. The Liverpool Daily Post, 15th A p r i l , 1910. 
17. Reports on the Finances, Administration and the Condition of the Sudan^ 
1908, p.42. 
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elements. Hence, as a f i r s t step, I t would be useful to explain and 
indicate b r i e f l y what each of them meant to the Mahdists themselves. 
(a) The doctrine of Sudanese Mahdism: 
Mahdism, i n general, i s a Messianic b e l i e f held by the orthodox N 
Sunn! Islam that &od w i l l send the 'Rightly G-uided One' (Mahdl) who w i l l 
i 
be the precursor of the millenium and the second coming of the Christ and I 
l 
w i l l d eliver the world from e v i l , i n s t i t u t i n g the reign of perfect. I n ,' 
i 
orthodox Islam the Mahdi i s s t i l l to come. But the history of Islam records 
the r i s e of many Mahadist movements, a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a l l being that they 
are m i l i t a n t , directed against abuses and heresies and i n accordance with 
the Mahdi's claim to supreme s p i r i t u a l and temporal authority, h o s t i l e to 
established i n s t i t u t i o n s , c i v i l as well as r e l i g i o u s . 
The basic truth of the Sudan Mahdism i s that the Mahdists of the 
Sudan believe that the true Mahdl appeared i n the person of a Dongolawi 
rel i g i o u s Shaikh c a l l e d Muhammad Ahmad, who proclaimed himself i n that 
character i n 1881, and ca l l e d upon his countrymen i n the name of true 
r e l i g i o n to r i s e against the worldly and h e r e t i c a l Government. 
(b) The leader of the Mahdists: 
I n the early years of the Anglo-Egyptian r u l e , the Mahadists 
d e f i n i t e l y lacked a potential leader. Muhammad Ahmad, the Mahdi, died i n 
1885. K h a l i f a fAbd Allah and Khalifa f A l l died i n the b a t t l e of Omdiwaykarat. 
Kh a l i f a Muhammad Sharif was courtmartialled as a ringleader of the Shukkaba 
incident which aimed at a Mahdist uprising. 
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Of course, Khalifa ?Abd Allah i n his l i f e time had designated his 
son euthman as 'Shaikh al-Din' to succeed him; but fUthman was k i l l e d at 
Kereri and none of his brothers seemed to have been regarded as a claimant 
to the throne. No doubt they were competent men and a credit to h i s father, 
but they did not possess the 'baraka', the abdour of sanctity, which 
attached to the house of Mahdl. 
Of the four sons of Mahdl, a l F a d j i l and al-Bushra were court 
martialled for t h e i r complicity i n the Shukkaba incident. *A1I, a boy of 
eighteen was interned at Rosetta u n t i l 1905. The youngest son of Mahdl was 
^Abd ar-Rahman who was being brought up by one of his r e l a t i v e s . Now upon 
one of these two surviving sons of Mahdl, the Mahdists sought for a leader. 
f A l i was older than {Abd ar-Rahman, but i t i s a recognised f a c t that i n 
the Arab world, premogeniture does not bestow an unquestioned claim to 
succession. What i s counted most i s the personality i n which ?Abd ar-Rahman 
f a r superseded his elder. Thus, during the Anglo-Egyptian rule fAbd ar-Rahman 
was recognised by h i s father's followers as the heir to his father's baraka. 
His elder brother ? A l t quietly receded into the background. 
(c ) The Sacred writings, places and objects of the Cult. 
Among the sacred writings of the Mahdists, the chief i s the Ratib, 
the prayer book of the Mahdl. I t i s believed by the Mahdists that the Ratib 
was dictated to Mahdl by the Prophet at Jebel Gedir. Among other sacred 
writings of the Mahdists are the various l e t t e r s and proclamations of the 
Mahdl himself. For the Mahdists, the most sacred place was the Cave (al-G-har) 
on the Aba I s l a n d , i n which Muhammad Ahmad received the c a l l to h i s mission. 
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I t i s also said that Mahdi himself ordained G-edir, Kaba and G-unzara, i n that 
order of precedence, t o be regarded as the holy places. Reasons for such i s 
that at G-edir he received the Ratib, at Kaba he collected force to attack 
SL-Obeid, throughout the seige of which town G-unzara was his headquarters. 
The lasttwo places witnessed the a r r i v a l of many tri b e s t o tender t h e i r 
18 
submission and were f o r a time centre of r e l i g i o u s a c t i v i t i e s . Besides 
these, a f t e r the death of the Mahdt i n 1885, his tomb i n Omdurman also became 
an object of veneration and-visits. 
Among the sacred objects are the sword, r i n g and the mole of the 
Mahdi which he used as divine signs to convince his followers, who 
subsequently regarded them as sacred. 
(d) The organization of Mahdism. 
I n the Sudan, a l l who believe that Muhammad Ahmad was the true Mahdi, 
are i n theory, the Mahdists; but i n practice the symtoms of organised Mahdism 
are meetings of the Mahdists under appointed leaders f o r prayer and reading 
the Ratib, pilgrimage t o Aba Island and the payment of ZakSt or religious 
offerings to the leader of the c u l t . 
I n b r i e f , these are the various elements of Mahdism i n the Sudan. 
Now an attempt can be made t o ascertain what was the G-overnment po l i c y , i n 
i t s p r a c t i c a l application, t o each of these elements of Mahdism. 
18. Memorandum on the policy of the Sudan Government towards the Mahdist 
cu l t - by R.Davies, Acting Director of I n t e l l i g e n c e , Khartoum, 
December 11th, 1926; pp.1-2. 
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i n 
The a t t i t u d e of the Anglo-Egyptian Government towards Mahdl and, his doctrine. 
The a t t i t u d e of the Turko-Egyptian authority towards Mahdl and his 
doctrine i s of great significance. I n the early days of the Mahdist 
r i s i n g , ^Abd al-Qadir Pasha was appointed the Governor-General of the Sudan 
i n 1882. I t i s said that t o the Grand Qadi and the Mufti he entrusted the 
task of compiling treatises against the presumption of the Mahdl. They 
dwelt upon the p r i n c i p l e of obeying the authorities and declared that there 
was no need f o r such a 'Messiah1, as the people were enjoying peace and good 
government of the Khedive, and the Governor-General and a l l Muslims owed 
allegiance t o the Khalifa of Islam i n Constantinople. Even i f the time were 
ripe f o r the advent of the 'Messiah1, they further added, the present 
'impostor* was not the man expected, as there was nothing i n him that 
19 
conformed t o the description they had read i n t h e i r books. 
Thus the Egyptian authority i n the Sudan recognised neither the Mahdl 
nor his' doctrine. I n most of his correspondence with the Khedive, Ra'Qf 
Pasha the predecessor of rAbd al-Qadir as the Governor-General i n the Sudan, 
20 frequently termed Muhammad Ahmad as 'false Prophet', 'impostor', and along • • 
with the ruiama of Cairo, those i n Constantinople too declared the Sudanese 
Mahdl to be a 'false Prophet*. 
After the establishment of the j o i n t Anglo-Egyptian r u l e , the 
o f f i c i a l representatives of Islam i n the Sudan Government had done nothing 
to invalidate the former view that Muhammad Ahmad was an 'impostor' and that 
19. Shebikha,M., The Independent Sudan, New York, 1959, p.62. 
20. I b i d , p.47. 
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his doctrine was f a l s e . On the contrary, i n 1908, the Governor-General 
21 
i n a memorandum, clearly referred t o Mahdism as "the prescribed creed". 
A man with great foresight, the Governor-General thought that a f t e r a 
generation or two, the Mahdi might assume his place as a 'founder of a 
religious t a r i k a * . Under such circumstances, the Governor-General thought 
that i n the meantime "the Government should not leave i t i n doubt that i t 
22 
regarded him as an impostor". The Governor-General was so keen t o pass 
o f f Muhammad Ahmad as an impostor, that as early as 1901 i n a l e t t e r t o 
23 
Lord Cromer, he branded Muhammad Ahmad as an "impostor". The same feeling 
of the Governor-General was also shared by his subordinates. I n 1910, a 
pro v i n c i a l Governor, i n a l e t t e r t o the Governor-General, impressed the 
l a t t e r on the necessity of "... Compiling a t r e a t i s e showing that the Mahdi 
. "24 was an impostor. 
I t i s very interesting to note that although the Government declared 
Mahdism a 'prescribed c u l t 1 , yet i t did not persecute those who held b e l i e f 
i n Mahdi aril his doctrine. On the other hand, a f t e r the b a t t l e of Omdurman, 
a general amnesty was proclaimed and many of the followers of the Mahdi 
25 
returned to t h e i r property. Further more, a f t e r the b a t t l e of Omdiwaykarat, 
Khalifa Muhammad Sharif and two of Mahdi's sons were simply banished to 
Shukkaba, a v i l l a g e between Wad Medani and Sennar, and they were neither 
prosecuted nor executed. S i m i l a r l y , ''All, the t h i r d son of Mahdi was not 
executed but was interned at Rosetta. 
21. Memorandum on the policy of the Sudan Government towards the Mahdi c u l t , 
op.cit, p.3. 
22 . I b i d . 
23 . Wingate to Cromer, Khartoum, 24 th Feb.1901; W.P. 271/2 . 
24. Asser t o Wingate, 2nd Sept. 1910; W.P. 217/3 . 
25: Reports on the Finances,Administration and Condition of Egypt and the 
Soudan, 1908, Egypt N o l l (1909) cd. 4580, p.55. 
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But the absence of active persecution of the Mahdists on the part 
of the Government did not i n any way confer on the followers of the Mahdl 
the l i b e r t y to preach the doctrine of Mahdl. On the other hand, any attempt 
t o propagate the idea or any e f f o r t s on the part of the Ansar-that tended 
t o assume a messianic form was severely and promptly dealt with. 
The above policy of the Government came t o l i g h t f i r s t i n 1899. 
As stated e a r l i e r , the Khalifa Muhammad Sharif and two of the Mahal's sons 
were banished t o Shukkaba and were not persecuted. But when i n August, 1899, 
the authority learned that they were planning a Mahdist r i s i n g , they were 
arrested, t r i e d before a m i l i t a r y court and shot dead. Again i n 1901, the 
Government released e A l I eAbd al-Karim and his followers from Haifa prison, 
knowing f u l l w e l l that they s t i l l held f a i t h i n Mahdl. But when i n 1902, 
E.A.Stanton, the Governor of Haifa, received reports that f A l I eAbd al-Karlm 
and his followers were carrying on the old propaganda of millenium — they 
26 
were arrested and t r i e d before the religious and legal authorities. 
From the above analysis, i t emerges that although the Government did 
not persecute those who held f a i t h i n Mahdl fs doctrine, yet i t d i d not give 
them the freedom t o propagate that doctrine. This very policy of the 
Government was based on the deliberation and sound recommendations of the 
Board of <*Ulama, Following the events of the early years, when there arose 
a number of Kabi 'IsS who t r i e d t o propagate the Mahdist ideas, the Governor-
General consulted Bonham Carter, the Legal Secretary to the Sudan Government, 
as to whether an o f f i c i a l proclamation should be issued declaring 'Mahdism 
26. Reports on the Finances,, Administration and Condition of ?gypt~ .:andxther • "•• 
Soudan, 1902; p.30?, 
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t o be i l l e g a l * . But a f t e r consulting the M u f t i and the Board of eUlama, 
the Legal Secretary considered the execution of the Governor-General's 
27 
view quite unwise. The Legal Secretary's decision was backed by good 
reasons. After the reconquest, there were i n f a c t a considerable number 
of men who believed i n Mahdl. Although l o g i c a l l y a b e l i e f i n Mahdism 
necessarily involved d i s l o y a l t y to the existing Government, i n f a c t i t did 
not always do so, because most of the followers of Mahdl were ignorant and 
i l l o g i c a l . Moreover, others who were a b i t educated and i n t e l l i g e n t were 
attracted by the puritan element i n the Mahdl's teaching and rejected the 
p o l i t i c a l side of the teaching. Hence, these men, so long as they did not 
embark on active propagation of t h e i r views, were not necessarily dangerous. 
The Board of cuiama, the Legal S ecretary communicated to the Governor-
General, did not "recommend the Government to punish men merely because they 
28 
were believers i n Mahdism." 
The following are the arguments put forward by the Legal Secretary. 
I n the f i r s t place, the Board of fUlama recognised that such a policy would 
savourof persecution and p a r t i c u l a r l y as some of these men were morally of 
good l i v e s . Secondly, i f the Government issued a proclamation making 
b e l i e f i n Mahdism punishable, i t would in e v i t a b l y lead t o false charges 
29 
being put forward from spite or motives of private revenge. I n the opinion 
of the Board of eUlama, the man who might have become a danger was the 
27. Memorandum on the policy of the Sudan Government towards the Mahdist 
Cult, op.cit, p.2. 
28. I b i d , p.3. 
29. I b i d . 
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Mahdist who, either from a desire f o r gain or a desire f o r influence 
a c t i v e l y propagated the teachings and the doctrine of Mahdi. Thus, i n 
spite of the Governor-General•s desire t o declare Mahdism a 'prescribed c u l t 1 
the Government policy towards the Mahdist doctrine did not become so. The 
Board of CUlama considered i t advisable on the part of the Government t o 
issue a proclamation stating that "persons who collected together others 
f o r the purpose of propagating Mahdi's doctrines or who actively teach such 
doctrines, w i l l be punishable"^ 
(b) The Government policy towards Sayyid eAbd ar-Rahman, the leader of 
of the Mahdists. 
We have discussed e a r l i e r , how the leadership of the followers of 
Mahdi devolved upon Mahdi's fourt h son, pAbd ar-Rahman, during the Anglo-
31 
Egyptian regime. Now we can proceed t o study the Government policy towards 
t h i s leader of the Mahdists. Up t o the outbreak of World War I , the 
Government, i n the words of S l a t i n Pasha, followed a deliberate policy of 
32 
non-recognition towards f Abd ar-Rahman. Just a f t e r the conquest of the 
Sudan, fAbd ar-Rahman along with-the family of Mahdx, was kept under s t r i c t 
supervision. I t can w e l l be remembered that when Sayyid CAlx al-Mirghanl, 
the head of the Khatmiyya order was being honoured and feted i n 1900, a 
young man, i l l dressed, and mounted on an inexpensive donkey, could be seen 
proceeding to the D i s t r i c t Office i n Omdurman. This was Sayyid <*Abd ar-Rahman. 
From the D i s t r i c t Office he used to draw the pension of £E5 a month, which 
the Government awarded to him. I t i s said that S l a t i n Pasha, the Inspector 
30 . I b i d , ' 
3 1 . See above, pp, los-M. 
3 2 . Memorandum^ on the policy of the Sudan Government towards the Mahdist 
Cult, op.cit, p.2. 
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General was very s t r i c t with the sons of Mahdi. I n about 1909, S l a t i n 
Pasha issued instructions that Sayyid cAbd ar-Rahman was not t o be 
accorded the t i t l e of 1Sayyid 1, nor was to be permitted, " i n o f f i c i a l 
correspondence, t o sign himself Abdul Rahman el-Mahdi, but only Abdul 
Rahman Muhammad Ahmed "V*" 
This policy of the Government produced sharp reaction i n the family 
of Mahdi and of Khalifa, which could not any more tolerate the po s i t i o n of 
obscurity t o which they were relegated. Thus, i n 1911, both the families;*. 
made 'a w r i t t e n appeal f o r the better treatment, social and economic1. 
Among other things, they also asked that those of them who were worthy 
should be i n v i t e d t o levees and public functions. But unfortunately they 
35 
"received a severe and public snub at the hands of S l a t i n Pasha"". 
Besides t h i s , the new Government from the very beginning carefully 
watched the every movement of Sayyid 9Abd ar-Rahman. Thus i n 1912, the 
A.D.C. of Omdurman noted that pAbd ar-Rahman "had taken to r i d i n g at night, 
unescorted and with his face v e i l e d , that he sat next t o the Shaikh of UELemai-
i n the mosque, that he was constantly i n Zaptia f o r no special reason and 
that certain clerks used t o kiss his hand"?^ From a l l these f a c t s , the 
A.D.C. concluded that "Abdul Rahman was getting somewhat too large f o r his 
bootsi" 
33 . H i l l , S l a t i n Pasha, op.cit. p.139. 
34 . Memorandum on the policy of the Sudan Government towards the Mahdist 
Cult, op.cit, p.3. 
35 . I b i d . 
36 . I b i d . 
37. I b i d . 
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(c) Government a t t i t u d e and policy towards the Mahdist w r i t i n g s , 
sacred places and objects. 
As the new Government always apprehended the resergence of Mahdism 
and Mahdist ideas, so i t s t r i c t l y prohibited the reading of the Ratib, i n 
public assemblies. I n spite of t h i s p r o h i b i t i o n , many people possessed the 
book and they used i t i n t h e i r home. But no action was taken against them 
u n t i l and unless they used i t openly i n public assemblies. 
I n the early days of the new regime, pilgrimage t o the sacred 
places of Mahdism, except t o the Mahdl's tomb i s not recorded. I n 1908, 
Sayyid CAbd ar-Rahman was permitted by the Government t o begin the develop-
ment of the Aba Island. But at the same time, the pilgrimage t o the 'cave' 
TO 
was forbidden by the Inspector General. 
Another place f o r the pilgrimage of the Mahdists was the tomb of 
the Mahdl, the fate of which has been described e a r l i e r . I n spite of i t s 
destruction and desecration, the followers of Mahdi continued to revere the 
v i s i t of the tomb as one of t h e i r sacred duties. Government did not raise 
any protest with these v i s i t s t o the tomb of Mahdl, but "the prayers and 
offerings at the tomb were not permitted and any observed tendency t o make 
39 
them was counteracted by picketing i t with police." 
Among the sacred objects of the Mahdists, the most important i s the 
•Sword of Victory*, the sword which Mahdl himself used. But the veneration 
of the 'Sword of Victory" did not a t t r a c t the at t e n t i o n of the Government 
because no one knew then where i t was. According t o one story, i t had 
38 . I b i d , p . 4 . 
39 . I b i d , 
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passed t o Khalifa <Abd Allah a f t e r the death of the Mahdl; while acoording 
t o another, i t was entrusted by Mahdl t o Khalifa Sharif and guarded by his 
w i f e , a daughter of Mahdl^ Whatever might be the f a c t , the stories agree 
i n stating that the Sword completely disappeared during the campaign of 
reoccupation. As i t was not traceable, the Government did not bother about 
i t . 
(d) The organization of Mahdism and the Government policy. 
We have t o l d e a r l i e r what the organization of Mahdism means i n 
theory and i n practice. Under the new Government the organization of 
Mahdism was altogether forbidden. They were not allowed t o be re-formed. 
The reading of the Ratib i n public assemblies, one of the manifestations 
of t h e i r organization, was not permitted. I n f a c t , under the close 
supervision of the Government the re-organization of Mahdism through i t s 
prescribed methods was a l l the more impossible. But i t may be remarked 
that the d i s t i n c t i o n between veneration of Muhammad Ahmad and the organization 
of Mahdists, even i n i t s simplest form, was beginning t o be appreciated by 
instructed native opinion w i t h i n a few years of the new administration. Thus, 
i n June 1910, the Acting Governor of Sennar, recorded the following observa-
t i o n by one of his most r e l i a b l e notables: "Many people read the Ritab; i t 
i s not bad i f a man reads i t by himself, but i f f o r t y or f i f t y men collect 
42 
and read i t , i t i s bad." 
I b i d . 
See.above, p.io5\ 
Memorandum on the policy of the Sudan Government towards the Mahdist c u l t , 
o p.cit, p.4. 
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The above i s the outline of the Government policy towards the 
Mahdists and Mahdism up t o the outbreak of the World War I , i . e . up t o 
1914. To sum up, up t o that period the Government policy towards Mahdism 
was, i n the words of S l a t i n Pasha, " t o l e r a t i o n but no r e c o g n i t i o n " ^ 
This meant that they were not recognised as a corporate body, rel i g i o u s 
or otherwise, nor *Abd ar-Rahman as t h e i r leader. 'Toleration', here, 
d e f i n i t e l y means absenoe of persecution of those holding Mahdist b e l i e f ; 
but i t did not, i n any way, mean the l i b e r t y t o propagate those b e l i e f s . 
But the outbreak of the World War I and the eventual entry of 
Turkey i n i t against Great B r i t a i n , proved t o be a turning point i n the 
policy of the Sudan Government towards the Mahdists and t h e i r leader. 
Turkey's entry i n t o the World War I , i n November 1914, brought Great B r i t a i n 
i n t o d i r e c t c o n f l i c t w i t h the Caliph of Islam. This awkward s i t u a t i o n 
inspired the Sudan Government t o change i t s t r a d i t i o n a l policy and to 
u t i l i z e the influence of ^ Abd ar-Rahman to counteract any pro-Turkish 
tendencies or propaganda among the population of the country. The B r i t i s h 
administrators i n the Sudan knew very w e l l that fAbd ar-Rahman's father's 
arch enemy were the Turks, 'the great corruptor of Islam*. I t i s said that 
following the event of Turkey's entry i n t o the war, the Governor-General 
summoned *Abd ar-Rahman, and asked him t o go t o the Jezira and to u t i l i z e 
h i s influence there against any pro-Turkish tendenoiesV*" Accordingly, 
^Abd^a^Rahman went on tour with the object of allaying fear of Pan-Islamic 
propaganda, leaving an agent i n every d i s t r i c t he v i s i t e d . A f ter the war 
he was given the wood contract f o r the Sennar Dam construction, which amongst 
4 3 . I b i d , p.2. 
4 4 . I b i d , p . 9 . 
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other things, gave him an opportunity t o acquire enormous c a p i t a l . A l l 
these meant a reversal of the former policy , and the step thus taken 
constituted a deliberate recognition of the Sayyid as the leader of a 
section of the community. WheneAbd>arHRahman appointed agents, t h i s 
action was not objected t o by the Government. After t h i s other concessions 
soon followed. I n 1917, a party of Mahadist merchants and nazirs asked i f 
they might erect a marquee at the public celebrations of the anniversary 
of the Prophet's birthday. Consent would d e f i n i t e l y force the Government 
to admit the Mahdist community to equality with other Muslim f r a t e r n i t i e s . 
C.A.Wallis, then Deputy Director of Intelligence at Khartoum, argued that 
i f the Government refused, i t would be ungracious to a body of deserving 
cund i n f l u e n t i a l men. And i f the Government persisted i n i t s polioy of 
t o l e r a t i o n towards conscientious iM'ahdists, and at the same time treated 
Mahdism as an exploded c u l t , that would be i l l o g i c a l . He recommended that 
they should be allowed t h e i r marquee. S l a t i n Pasha, then the Governor-
General of the Sudan, thought W i l l i s ' s note important enough t o ref e r i t t o 
Wingate, then B r i t i s h High Commissioner i n Egypt, who r e a d i l y approved the 
45 measure. 
The permission t o erect the marquee was followed by a permission by 
which the Government allowed pAbd ar-Rahman t o hold Friday prayer i n a 
mosque at Omdurman. This was indeed a great concession. I n December, 1918, 
Sayyid 'Abd ar-Rahman wrote to the A.D.I, t o ask whether there was any 
objeotion t o his holding Friday prayers i n his mosque at Omdurman. The A.D.I, 
consulted the matter with the Grand Qadi, who raised no objeotion from his 
point of view. The A.D.I, further thought that the Government should have no 
45* H i l l , S l a t i h Pasha, op.cit., p.139. 
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objection t o t h i s , because interference with worship of any sbr;t, he 
thought, would be contrary t o Government policy. The A.D.I, l a t e r 
communicated his decision to the Governor-General who also raised no 
objection. The decision of the Government was duly conveyed to Sayiid 
fAbd ar-Rahman. The Government decision was simultaneously followed by a 
- l e t t e r from the Grand Qadi on 19th December, 1918, t o Abd ar-Rahman. 
The Grand Qadi wrote to'Abd ar-Rahman d i r e c t , . . . " I authorise you personally 
to hold such prayers as, also, I authorise you t o nominate any one else t o 
hold them f o r you". 
The entire matter of obtaining permission t o hold prayer i n a 
mosque carried great significance f o r the Mahadists. I t i s a w e l l known 
fac t that when the Muslims f i n d themselves collected together either i n a 
mosque or elsewhere, they are free t o elect anyone of t h e i r members t o lead 
them i n prayer, without any o f f i c i a l sanction whatsoever. So what 'AbdUar-
Rahman sought and obtained was an o f f i c i a l acknowledgment of the existence 
of a 'specially Mahdist mosque1 and the r i g h t of the Mahdists, as such, t o 
assemble together f o r prayer under t h e i r own leader. This indeed greatly 
helped the Mahdist leader to organise his followers. 
Along with a l l these, the Government also relaxed the r e s t r i c t i o n s 
on the reading of the Ratib, which from now onwards became more and more 
public. With the changed policy of the Government, t h i s of course became 
unavoidable. I n 1917, the A.D.I, submitted the Ratib and various other 
Mahdist writings t o the Grand Qadi f o r examination. 
4 6 . Memorandum on the policy of the Sudan Government towards the Mahdist 
c u l t , o p . c i t . , p.6. 
117 
The Grand Qadi, i n a l e t t e r dated 7 t h November, 1917, communicated his views 
regarding the Ratib and i t s use by the Mahdists, "From the beginning t o the 
end", the Grand Qadi wrote, "there was nothing i n the Ratib that showed a 
c a l l f o r Mahdism, nor was there anything objectionable from a religious or 
p o l i t i c a l point of v i e w " ^ The Grand Qadi, of course, pointed out that i n 
'three places' i n the Ratib there were some texts from the Qur'an which might 
give the ignorant readers the impression that the w r i t e r of the Ratib had 
composed them with the i n t e n t i o n of c a l l i n g f o r Jihad. But i n r e a l i t y , the 
Grand Qadi added, they are parts of texts from the Qur'an "completing the 
preceding parts of the te x t which cannot be l e f t incomplete". The Grand Qadi 
recommended that the presence of those texts should not, however, be a 
cause f o r preventing people from reading the Ratib, as they were few of 
many texts from the Qur'an which are used by a l l the Muslims. The Grand Qadi 
f i n a l l y advised the Government not t o prevent the people from reading the 
Ratib, but to "give them a free hand t o use i t as they l i k e " . 
Although i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o ascertain what action was taken on 
the recommendation of the Grand Qadi s t i l l the Government policy towards the 
reading of the Ratib by the Mahdists became clear i n 1921. I n that year the 
A.D.I, wr i t i n g f o r the D.I., requested the C i v i l Secretary t o obtain the 
decision of the Governor-General on the question of whether the followers 
of the Mahdl should be allowed t o read the Ratio i n congregation. The 
point arose out of an incident i n the Funj province, where a Mahdist, 
4 7 . I b i d , p . 4 
4 8 . I b i d . 
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reported t o be f a n a t i c a l , had begun the practice of collec t i n g some 
t h i r t y .-six people together f o r reading the Ratib. The C i v i l Secretary 
a f t e r consulting the Governor-General wrote t o the A.D.I, on December 
1 5 t h , 1921, that there could be no objection i f a 'Mahdist teacher' 
following his tenets ' i n an orderly manner1 reads the Ratib i n an 
49 
assembly. The Government, not only allowed the reading of the Ratib 
i n the assembly 'in an orderly manner', but also appeared to have made 
50 
no objection when the said book was published t h r i c e between 1921 and 1924. 
Besides the Ratib, a l l other specimens of the Mahdist l i t e r a t u r e 
such as Mahdl's c i r c u l a r s , proclamations etc, were submitted t o the Grand 
Qadi f o r his opinion. The Grand Qadi condemned a l l these i n the formula 
that 'they should not be used at a l l ' , as they contained "accounts of the 
Mahdl's c a l l t o his mission and the miracles which attended i t , encouragements 
t o Jihad, stories of interview between Mahdl and the Prophet, l e t t e r s t o 
51 
Gordon and t o Senussi, and so on". 
Among other things, a book on the 'sayings and conversations of 
the Mahdi' was also submitted t o the Grand Qadi f o r examination. I n a 
l e t t e r dated November 1 2 t h , 1917, the Grand Qadi gave his views to the A.D.I. 
The Grand Qadi wrote: " I have marked i n pencil the passages which should be 
rejected, and what I have l e f t unmarked i s of no harm. The parts marked 
should be struck out, but i f Sayyid Abdul Rahman decides t o revise these 
4 9 . I b i d , p.7. 
50 . I b i d . 
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and cut the paragraphs I have marked, then I would see no objection t o i t s 
52 
being adopted"-; Continuing f u r t h e r , the Grand Qadi wrote: " I f you are, 
however, inclined t o i t s being printed and published, i t should be necessary 
to change the terms used, v i z , 'The Mahdi said, 'peace be on him' ' by 
something more appropriate, such as: 'He said, mercy be on his soul', or 
something similar t o t h i s " . 
I t i s , however, d i f f i c u l t t o know what action was taken by the 
Government on the above recommendations of the Grand Qadi, but whatever 
might have been the f a c t , i t i s ce r t a i n that the year 1919, witnessed 
fur t h e r recognition of Sayyid eAbd ar-Rahman as the leader of the followers 
of Mahdi. I n that year, the Sayyid was sent t o London as a leading member of 
the delegation which went t o congratulate His Majesty the King on the v i c t o r y 
of the A l l i e s i n World War I . This step of the Sudan Government f i n a l l y 
completed the reversal of the policy of 'non-recognition' persistently 
followed u n t i l the outbreak of the war. I t meant the o f f i o i a l recognition 
of the Mahdists as a corporate body and.of the Sayyid as t h e i r leader. 
A l l these encouraged the Mahdists so much so, that by 1920, Sayyid 
fAbd ar-Rahman could, without any d i f f i c u l t y or Government objection, appoint 
two kinds of Agents — emissaries sent out from headquarters, and the l o c a l 
representatives of the c u l t . But i n 1921, following the rainy season, 
there took place amongst the Agents a sort of competition, i n charitable 
organization. I t gave r i s e t o such confusion, that i n many areas many 
pseudo and se l f - s t y l e d Agents appeared. And where t h i s was the Case, the 
52. I b i d 
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Sayyid had been able t o disclaim the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y on the ground that the 
so called Agent was a 'mere impostor'. Hence, to clear the matter up, 
the Sayyid, at the instance of the Intelligence Department, prepared i n 
53 
November, 1921, a l i s t of his authorised Agents i n various provinces. 
The Government approved the l i s t of Agents i n the same year, and thereby 
recognised the entire machinery of Agents of the Mahdists. This undoubtedly 
constituted a great gesture of friendliness and recognition on the part of 
the Government towards the Mahdists and t h e i r leader. 
Besides recognising the machinery of the Mahdist Agents, the 
Government hence forward made no objection t o the pilgrimage of the Mahdists 
t o the Aba Island, 'the cradle of Mahdism'. Along wi t h t h i s , the 
co l l e c t i o n of Zakat by the Agents of the Sayyid was not objected to by the 
authority. 
Thus, i n view of the pre-war days, the post-war policy of the Sudan 
Government towards the Mahdists speaks of a radical change. The war and 
post-war days saw, i n t e r a l i a , the recognition of the Sayyid as the leader, 
and of the Mahdists as a corporate body. 
But i t would be a gross mistake t o assume that while pursuing i t s 
new and changed policy the Government bestowed absolute freedom upon the 
Mahdists t o go as they l i k e d . I n f a c t , t o every concession and p r i v i l e g e 
granted t o the Mahdists was attached a string of r e s t r i c t i o n s . Whilst the 
reasons of such r e s t r i c t i o n s amidst privileges and concessions w i l l be 
discussed l a t e r , l e t us review the r e s t r i c t i o n s f i r s t l y . I t can be 
53. I b i d , p.10 
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recalled that following the entry of Turkey i n t o the World War I , Sayyid 
Abd ar-Rahman was sent t o Jezira t o counteract the pro-Turkish feelings 
there. But while sending the Sayyid t o Jezira i n 1915, Col.Symes, the 
Private Secretary of the Governor-General, i n concurrence with the Governor-
General, warned the Sayyid against taking that opportunity t o organize 
Mahdists and t o l d him clearl y that he would be held responsible personally 
i f the Government was kept i n ignorance of any r e v i v a l i s t a c t i v i t y among 
them?21" 
The Sayyid's tour i n the Jezira, was, i n the opinion of the 
Government, u t i l i z e d f o r a great deal of Mahdist propaganda, and although 
the anti-Turkish cause might have been served, some of Sayyid's reported 
a c t i v i t i e s , i n the. opinion of the Government, were perturbing. So he was 
,55 
somewhat urgently recalled early i n 1916 
Again, as may be recalled, the Government permitted i n 1917* the 
Sayyid t o hold Friday prayers i n the mosque of Omdurman. I t has also been 
indicated e a r l i e r , how t h i s could afford the Mahdists t o organise them-
selves under a leader of t h e i r own choice. But i t must be remembered that 
before permitting the Sayyid t o hold prayers i n his Omdurman mosque, the 
Government made i t s u f f i c i e n t l y clear that the mosque should never be used 
f o r "any purposes of propaganda, but merely f o r religious ceremonies 
according t o the normal r i t e s of Islam". 
We have also seen how the Government became quite moderate when i t 
54 . I b i d , p . 9 . 
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no longer viewed the reading of the Ratib i n public; and even the 
Government made no objection when i t was published t h r i c e between 1921 
and 1924. But when i t was suspected by the authorities t h a t , encouraged 
by the publication of the Ratib i n 1924, the Sayyid hoped that he could 
equally through the same Agency, publish and get i n t o c i r c u l a t i o n a book 
whose tendency would be 'to stimulate the ardour of his followers to a 
great degree 1, then at t h i s juncture the G-overnment considered the 
57 
publication highly undesirable and i t was subsequently confiscated. 
As stated e a r l i e r , the Government i n 1921, recognised the machinery 
of Agents of Sayyid*AMi:ar-Rahman. But a f t e r two years, i . e . i n 1923, when 
0 
the Governmentb received reports that the a c t i v i t i e s of the Mahdist Agents 
i n the Western provinces of Darfur and Kordofan produced 'a widespread 
r e v i v a l and extension of the c u l t 1 the Sayyid, by the order of the 
Government, had to withdraw his Agents from Kordofan, Darfur, the Nuba 
58 
mountains and the Southern part of the White Nile province"; 
Again, f o r so long the Government did not raise objection with the 
c o l l e c t i o n of Zakat by the followers of <"Abd ar-Rahman, but a f t e r the 
Sayyid's re t u r n from England, the Mahdist Agents were so active i n 
collecting the Zakat, that i t immediately i n v i t e d Government attention. 
(Consequently, i n 1923, the whole question of Zakat was reviewed by the 
Government i n consultation with the Grand Qadi and the M u f t i , with the 
resul t that the c o l l e c t i o n of Zakat by the Mahdist Agents and also by other 
59 
religious chiefs, was forbidden. 
57 . I b i d , p.8. 
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S i m i l a r l y , i n the post-war days, the Government put forward no 
objection t o the pilgrimage of the Mahdists t o the Aba Island. But 
when there was a constant and massive flow of v i s i t o r s from the West 
t o the Island, p a r t i c u l a r l y a f t e r the Sayyid's return from England, 
the Government found i t necessary to check i t . The question was 
discussed at the Governors' Meeting, i n 1922, and subsequently i t 
emerged that "pilgrimage to Aba Island should be discouraged"^ Even 
the C i v i l Secretary proposed certain measures to stop the stream of 
v i s i t o r s to the Island, and those were subsequently sanctioned by the 
61 
Governor-General. The measures devised by the C i v i l Secretary, are 
as follows. The Shaikhs of a l l provinces were to be instructed that 
the pilgrimage t o the Aba Island was forbidden. I n addition t o t h i s , the 
Governors were to be authorised to confine Fellata pilgrims to the main 
routes other than v i a Aba, t o t u r n back immigrants from Darfur, and t o 
deal with other cases by blocking the approaches to the Aba Island, as 
62 
f a r as possible, through the agency of police or Shaikhs. Accordingly , 
orders were issued t o the Governors^ 
I n the above have been indicated the r e s t r i c t i o n s on the Mahdists 
even when the Government adopted a changed policy towards them. Now attempt 
may be made to explain the causes of imposing such r e s t r i c t i o n s . Apart 
from the apprehension on the part of the Government of the widespread 
r e v i v a l of the cul t which might threaten the peaoe and security, the 
r e s t r i c t i o n s imposed by the Government had another s i g n i f i c a n t aspect. 
60 . I b i d . 1 / : : . 
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When a f t e r the outbreak of the World War I , Sayyid^Abd ar-Eahman aligned 
himself on the A l l i e d side,from that point 'the r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of the 
....Mahdists became an obvious necessity*. Moreover, at t h i s stage 
the G-overnment came t o realise that i t would be a t r a g i c error to continue 
t o t r e a t the MahdI's son, because of his parentage, with enmity and 
suspicion. Again, as the Mahdist 'sect* was numerous and powerful, the 
G-overnment considered i t wrong to keep them unnoticed any longer. The 
Government realised that the only way t o control the 'sect* was through 
t h e i r leader. Hence, through the post-war concessions and p r i v i l e g e s , 
the Government t r i e d t o conciliate the Mahdist leader and thereby to oontrol 
his followers. 
Perhaps, more than these, the Government through i t s . r econciliatory 
policy aimed at the emergence of fAbdia*-Rahman as a 'potential p o l i t i c a l 
leader' — which the Government considered most important t o the country. 
But very often, SayyideAbd-.a^Rahman 'over-stepped hiB l i m i t s ' and t r i e d t o 
u t i l i z e the privileges accorded t o him, t o display his own personal ambitions. 
For example, soon a f t e r his r e t u r n from London, i n 1919, the Sayyid began t o 
develop the idea — which he l a t e r communicated t o the Director of 
Intelligence — of the Mahdist as per excellence "the Government party t o 
the exclusion of others", and t o envisage a Mahdist Sudan under B r i t i s h 
tutelage. His return was followed by a crop of rumours that he was t o be 
the 'Sultan of the Sudan'. _ Furtiiexaoig,_his r e t u r n from England saw the 
a c t i v i t y of the Agents i n the West f o r the c o l l e c t i o n of Zakat, and the 
64 . Sudan Monthly Inte l l i g e n c e Report, No.346. (Marked Seoret), May,1923, 
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streams of v i s i t o r s t o the Island of Aba. A l l these had t o be checked f o r 
good reasons. 
Early i n 1923, the Government received reports that the increased 
a c t i v i t y of the Mahdist organization had been causing apprehension among 
the native chiefs, who f e l t that the Mahdist a c t i v i t i e s had been undermining 
65 
t h e i r influence. I n order t o counteract t h i s , the Government l a i d down 
that whilst i t recognised " l i b e r t y of conscience, i t could not counteract 
66 
any organization subversive of i t s own administration". Thus, when the 
Government considered the presence of the Agents of *Abd ar-Rahman, i n a 
sense detrimental t o i t s i n t e r e s t s , the l a t t e r was at once instructed t o 
withdraw his Agents from Darfur, Kordofan and the Sekim Baggaraf^ 
Besides, there was another reason which urged the Government t o put 
some r e s t r i c t i o n s on the a c t i v i t i e s of the Mahdist leader. The increased 
a c t i v i t i e s of Sayyid fAbd ar-Rahman coincided with ah acute r i v a l r y between 
' A l l al-Mirghanl and Sayyid <"Abd ar-Rahman. Both parties, made demonstrations 
*68 
t o show t h e i r importance and popularity. The Sayyid held a mass prayer 
meeting at Aba Island t o celebrate the end of Ramadan and had been 
• 
contemplating a further demonstration i n Jezira. At t h i s point i t became 
necessary to stop these displays,which the Government f e l t , "were beginning 
69 
t o disturb public opinion". Thus, when the Government ordered f o r the 
withdrawal of the Mahdist Agents from the West, i t made i t s policy clear that 
6 5 . Sudan Monthly Intelligence Report, No.345. (Marked Secret), April*1 9 2 3 ; 
66 . I b i d . p.4. 
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the Sudan Government, while admitting the p r i n c i p l e of complete 
l i b e r t y of conscience t o the individual i n re l i g i o u s matters, cannot 
permit .... t o encourage a b e l i e f i n the p o s s i b i l i t y of a reconstitution 
of the Mahdist regime"?^ 
Although the Government was not ready t o allow the Sayyid t o 
give vent t o the idea of the ' p o s s i b i l i t y of a reconstitution of the 
Mahdist regime', yet i t never ceased to use the leader of the Mahdists 
f o r i t s own p o l i t i c a l purposes. With the Egyptian revolution i n 1919, 
and the events of 1920's, the influence of Egypt considerably declined. 
For so long the Government had favoured Sayyid ' A l l al-Mirghanl, the head 
of the Khatmiyya f r a t e r n i t y , but under the changed circumstances, and with 
the Egyptian influence considerably declined i n the 1920's, the Government 
found i t no longer wise to bestow favour on Sayyid*A1I al-Mirghanl, "whose 
dynastic history was closely bound up with that of Egyptian influence i n 
the Sudan".* Henceforward, the pool of g r a v i t y shifted from Sayyid 
f A l I al-Mirghanl to Sayyid^Abd ar-Rahman, i n whom the Government found a 
suitable weapon t o f i g h t the Egyptian influence i n the Sudan. Towards the 
end of 1923, an Egyptian propaganda against the B r i t i s h i n the Sudan assumed 
a menacing shape, as the r e s u l t of a v i s i t by the Watanist leader, Hafiz Bey 
Ramadan t o Khartoum, and i n 1924 the victorious V&fd party gave s t i l l more 
powerful backing t o the subversive organizations i n the Sudan. During these 
times, even more urgently than i n 1915, i t was f e l t that the Sudan Government 
70; Memorandum on the policy of the Sudan Government towards the Mahdist 
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could not afford t o neglect any available means to counteract that 
propaganda. Sayyid fAbd ar-Rahman was more i n f l u e n t i a l i n 1924 than 
71 
i n 1915, and "his influence was again used on the Government's behalf". 
Thus, the Egyptian troubles of the 1920*s saw the Sayyid exorting the 
people t o be calm and to do everything possible to help the Government. 
Owing t o these invaluable services, the Government adopted such a favourable 
a t t i t u d e towards the Mahdists and t h e i r leader, that S l a t i n Pasha, now the 
ex-Inspector General of the Sudan, i n a l e t t e r t o Wingate exclaimed: 
" as i f the Mahdi was a l o y a l subject t o the B r i t i s h Government, and 
72 
his off-springs have to be rewarded"! I n f a c t , one of the off-springs 
of the Mahdi was rewarded f o r his services, t h i s was Sayyid eAbd ar-Rahman. 
An Honorary K.B.E. was bestowed upon him i n 1926. 
From now onwards, the Government, least interested i n the r e v i v a l 
ofthe d o c t r i n a l aspect of Mahdism, i n which i t always calculated a danger, 
became more and more conscious about the p o l i t i c a l significance of the 
Mahdists and t h e i r leader, and directed i t s policy accordingly. But t h i s 
i s another story and f a l l s outside the scope of t h i s work. 
* * * 
7 1 . I b i d , p.12. 
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CHAPTER V 
The Government, Missionaries and 
the Sudan - North and South. 
I 
The Christian missionary a c t i v i t i e s i n the Sudan well preoede the 
establishment of Anglo-Egyptian administration. Long ago, Sudan was a 
Christian land. But i t l o s t i t s touch with C h r i s t i a n i t y i n the sixteenth 
oentury when the Funj kingdom was established i n Sennar. Since then there 
was no attempt to revive C h r i s t i a n i t y ; nor did the country a t t r a c t the 
a t t e n t i o n of the Christian Missions. I t was only i n the mid-nineteenth 
century that the a t t e n t i o n of the Christian Missions was focused upon the 
Sudan. 
To a great extent, the conquest of the Sudan by the Turko-Egyptians 
2 „ 
i n 1820 " opened the way t o f i r s t heroic .... missionary enterprise. 
During the Turko-Egyptian period, the Church of Rome was the f i r s t t o 
consider and attempt the missionary enterprise i n the vast Sudan. By a 
decree of Pope Gregory XVI, the Apostolic Vicarate of Central A f r i c a was 
created i n 1846. The sole motive was to convert the Negroes to Christianit; 
For undertaking the missionary enterprise i n central A f r i c a , Khartoum was 
chosen as a suitable base of operation. There the missionaries established 
a church and opened a school f o r the 'black children'. 
1. For the history of C h r i s t i a n i t y i n the Sudan, see, Trimingham, Islam 
i n the Sudan, op.cit. pp.39-75* 
2. Trimingham, The Christian approach to Islam i n the Sudan, opQsit, p39-&i, 
3 . SvN.R., Vol.XXVII, 1946, p . 9 9 . j- ' 
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The Turko-Egyptian authority r e a d i l y permitted the missions t o 
Convert the pagans; hut i t d e f i n i t e l y forbade the missionary work amongst 
the Muslims of the Sudan « a r e s t r i c t i o n against which the missionaries 
very often lodged protests^ Apart from t h i s , the r e l a t i o n between the 
Turko-Egyptian Government and the missionaries i n the Sudan was, on the whole, 
cor d i a l . The Government cherished no hatred towards the Christian bodies t o 
5 
whom i t re a d i l y accorded t o l e r a t i o n . 
But the t o l e r a t i o n accorded to the missionaries by the Turko-Egyptian 
regime did not l a s t long. The 'Mahadist theocracy 1 that replaced the s i x t y -
two years of Turko-Egyptian regime i n the Sudan 'was uncompromisingly 
intolerant of a l l dissident, whether Muslim or otherwise'. Consequently, the 
Christian missionaries who had good days i n the Sudan during the Turko-
Egyptian regime, had no chance at a l l under the Mahdists. Fanatical as they 
were, the Mahdists overran the various mission stations at Delen, El-Obeid 
and Khartoum. Many of the missionaries f e l l prisioner at t h e i r hand. The 
Khartoum mission s t a f f , however, could manage t o withdraw t o Cairo where i t 
became a 'Sudan Mission i n e x i l e ' , under the d i r e c t i o n of the Apostolic 
Vicar, Bishop F.Sogaro. 
The misfortune that b e f e l l the missionaries i n the Sudan during the 
Mahadist days, however, did not i n any way dishearten them. The destruction 
of the Mahdist power i n 1898 by the j o i n t Anglo-Egyptian e f f o r t s and the 
subsequent reoccupation of the country was considered, by the missionaries 
4. Trimingham, The Christian Approach t o Islam i n the Sudan, op.cit; p.9. 
5. H i l l , Egypt i n the Sudan, 1820-1881; op.cit; p.162. 
6. S.N.R., Vol.XXTII, 1946; p. 125. 
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as an opportunity f o r the opening of a new era of hope and prospect f o r 
the missionary enterprise i n the whole of the Sudan. Even before the 
actual reoccupation of the country, when i n 1895 there was a rumour that 
an offensive against the Mahdists would not be long delayed, Major General 
F.T.Haig, l a t e of the Indian Army and an extreme Evangelical, addressed a 
memorandum to the Church Missionary Society, wherein he outlined a plan 
f o r the evangelizing of the Nile Valley! 
Following the reconquest, the Sudan Government, so to say, came 
i n t o a face t o face confrontation with Christian missionaries who urged 
the opening of the whole country f o r missionary enterprise. Thus, at the 
very beginning of the Anglo-Egyptian rule i n the Sudan, Cramer, then 
His Majesty's Consul-General i n Egypt, and Wingate, the Governor-General 
of the Sudan, were repeatedly requested by many missionary bodies and 
individuals i n Great B r i t a i n and the United States of America, t o open the 
ent i r e country t o Christian missionary a c t i v i t i e s , to introduce the teaching 
of C h r i s t i a n i t y i n Gordon College, and to make the Christian Sunday instead 
of Muslim Friday the universal weekly holiday. The s i t u a t i o n was rendered 
so acute and d i f f i c u l t that i n a private l e t t e r addressed to Lord Lansdowne, 
Cromer described his p o s i t i o n i n the following words: " I am being vigorously 
assailed on a l l sides to allow active proselytism i n the Sudan. The 
Catholics, backed up by the Austrian Government, the High Church party, 
with vigorous i n f l u e n t i a l Bishops behind them, the Church Mission and other 
g 
societies, a l l j o i n i n the cry". 
7. M.E.S., Vol.1, No.2; p.117. 
8. Cromer t o Lansdowne, 9th March, 1900; P.R.0./F.0., 633/8 
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Behind t h e i r demands, the missionaries, p a r t i c u l a r l y those of 
B r i t a i n , had a strong emotional basis. The t r a g i c death of Gordon at 
the hands of the Mahdists, his Christian l i f e , the reconquest of the 
Sudan, the sufferings of the missionary prisoners of the Khalifa - had 
a l l caused i n England a wave of proselytising and missionary zeal f o r 
the Sudan f i e l d . Even "quite big sums of money had been l e f t under 
9 
s t r i c t testamentory dispositions f o r the conversion of the Muslims11. 
From the very beginning, the problem of Christian missionary 
a c t i v i t i e s i n the Sudan proved to be a thorny question f o r the Sudan 
Government, because the majority of the population of the Sudan, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y of the Northern Sudan1,0 were Muslims, and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y 
— they were not only Muslims — but 'fanatical Muslims'. Hence, the 
Government f u l l y realised what would fo l l o w i f the entire country, whose 
bulk of the population was Muslim, was l a i d open f o r the operation of 
Christian missions. This was r e a l l y a d i f f i c u l t s i t u a t i o n which required 
a cautious and careful handling on the part of the new Government. Now 
l e t us see whether the authority yielded to the requests of the missionaries 
and opened the entire country to the Christian missionaries, or whether i t 
devised a policy of i t s own to protect the Muslims of the Northern Sudan 
from Christian evangelization. 
I I 
Just a f t e r the reoccupation of the Sudan, the a t t e n t i o n of the 
9 . Wingate, R., Wingate of the Sudan, London,1955; p.147. 
10 . Areas of the Sudan situated north of the 10 th p a r a l l e l . 
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Government was so much absorbed i n various c i v i l and m i l i t a r y occupations 
that at the outset i t became p r a c t i c a l l y impossible to devise a f i r m and 
d e f i n i t e policy i n t h i s respect. But s t i l l there are evidences that the 
Government, i n spite of i t s multifarious pre-occupations, displayed i t s 
pious i n t e n t i o n t o keep the missionary influence out of Northern Sudan. 
This noble i n t e n t i o n of the Government became clear and public i n 1898, 
when Cromer paid a v i s i t t o Omdurman just a few weeks aft e r the reconquest 
of the Sudan. I n Omdurman, Cromer i n clear terms, assured the assembled 
Muslim notables that the missionaries would not follow the Xian v i c t o r y 
and that he would uphold the int erests of Islam and on no account should 
11 
the Muslims entertain the fear of Christian proselytism. Just a f t e r 
his v i s i t t o Omdurman, Cromer expressed almost the same feelings when he 
wrote to Sir John Kennaway: " Personally, I am inclined t o deprecate 
haste i n dealing with the Sudan a f f a i r s from the point of view of 
12 
missionary e f f o r t " . Following t h i s , Cromer made his views and 
a t t i t u d e on the matter fu r t h e r clear when he explained his own a t t i t u d e 
t o Lord Lansdowne: " I have no objection t o giving the missionaries a 
f a i r f i e l d amongst the black pagan population i n the equatorial regions, 
but t o l e t them loose at present amongst the Muslims of the Sudan 
13 
would, i n my opinion be l i t t l e short of insane". 
So f a r as the Muslim North was concerned, the d e f i n i t e assurance 
of Cromer t o the Omdurman notables and his sincere feelings expressed t o 
Sir John Kennaway and Lord Lansdown, formed the basis f o r the future 
missionary p o l i c y of the S udan Government. This was certa i n l y confirmed 
11. Cromer's speech at Omdurman, 1898; W.P. 453/613. 
12. Cromer to Sir John Kennaway, Cairo, Dec.7th, 1899; P.R.O./F.O. 633/8. 
13. Cromer t o Lansdowne, 9th March, 1900; P.R.O./F.O., 633/8. 
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when he directed Kitchener, the f i r s t Governor-General of the Sudan, to 
disallow the Christian missionaries to carry on t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s f o r 
prose l y t i z a t i o n i n the Muslim areas of the Northern Sudan. At the same 
time he, however, permitted the missionaries t o have f u l l freedom of action 
i n the pagan areas of the Southern Sudan and to maintain i n Khartoum 
15 
simply a depot. 
The Government polioy which unquestionably tended t o r e s t r i c t the 
missionary enterprise i n the Muslim North, however, was the product of two, 
i f not several factors. The Sudanese, as the Government realised, were 
'fa n a t i c a l ' Muslims, henoe, the operation of the missionary work amongst 
them might in j u r e t h e i r religious feelings,and t h i s was p a r t i c u l a r l y 
dangerous when there was already a fe e l i n g amongst them that the object of 
the English i n conquering the Sudan was t o make them Christian. Thus, i t 
was quite natural that the Government, which was responsible f o r the 
administration of a population that 'displayed the excess of fanaticism', 
should be cautious about the effects of free permission of Christian 
missionary a c t i v i t i e s amongst them. 
The second reason f o r adopting such a r e s t r i c t i v e policy was we l l 
explained by Cromer himself. According to him, the population of the Sudan 
was 'ignorant and u n c i v i l i z e d ' and hence i t was quite impossible f o r them 
"to distinguish between the action permitted by the Government t o the 
16 
i n d i v i d u a l and the action of the Government i t s e l f " . 
14. Cromer to Kitchener, 7 t h Dec. 1899; W.P. 269/12. 
1 5 . I b i d . 
1 6 . Reports by His Majesty's Agent and Consul-General on the Finances, 
Administration and Condition of Egypt and the Soudan i n 1904; Egypt No.1 
(1905) , cd. 2409; p.140. 
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Hence, under such circumstances, when fanaticism was r i f e and 
ignorance amongst the mass was common, i t was not at a l l u n l i k e l y that 
the Christian missionaries might have been looked upon by the Muslim 
population as 'the Government o f f i c i a l s ' . Thus, any o f f i c i a l encourage-
ment of the mission work would ce r t a i n l y have given the people the 
impression that the Government was seeking t o change t h e i r r e l i g i o n i n t o 
C h r i s t i a n i t y . A l l these well-founded considerations precipitated the 
immediate p r o h i b i t i o n of the missionary work amongst the Muslim population 
of the Northern Sudan. 
On the part of the Government, however, the execution of the above 
pol i c y , i . e . the protection of the Muslim North against the influence of 
the Christian missionaries, proved to be a formidable task. As stated 
e a r l i e r , the Christian missionaries from the very beginning t r i e d t o 
penetrate the whole of the Sudan North, as well as the South, oh the 
grounds that f o r the 'preaching of the word of God' there should not be 
any l i m i t or demarcation of boundary. On many occasions the Government 
had t o face the b i t t e r c r i t i c i s m of various Christian missionary bodies. 
I n the eyes and judgment of the missionaries, the policy of the Sudan 
Government towards the Sudanese Muslims was nothing but ' p a r t i a l * . This 
general conviction of the missionaries was'expressed i n words by a churchman, 
the Rev.A.Shaw: " The Anglo-Egyptian Government i s a machinery f o r spread-
17 
ing Mohammedanism". This observation makes i t clear how the missionaries 
d i s l i k e d the 'protective policy' which the Government pursued i n the 
Northern S udan. 
17. Shaw to C.M.S., August 9 t h , 1910; C.M.S., G3, S/PI 
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Now i t can be examined what concrete steps the Government adopted 
t o keep the Northern Sudan free from the missionary influence. The f i r s t 
attempt on the part of the missionaries t o establish a foothold i n 
Northern Sudan came about i n September, 1898, j u s t a few days a f t e r the 
ba t t l e of Omdurman. On get t i n g hints of a Government proposal to found i n 
Khartoum 'an unsectarian College and a medical mission 1, Dr.F.J.Harpur, 
the head of the Church Missionary Society Hospital i n old Cairo asked Cromer 
18 
i f his Society could send a mission t o the Sudan. Cromer, who was not 
prepared t o consider the request alone, submitted i t t o Kitchener f o r the 
l a t t e r ' s opinion. The r e s u l t was that Dr.Harpur's request was refused on 
the ground that i t was not possible to allow missionaries i n Khartoum as 
19 
i t could w e l l excite Muslim fanaticism. But the Government refusal i n 
no way disheartened Dr.Harpur, who, sometime afterwards i n the same year, 
made another proposal f o r sending a mission to Fashoda. The Government, 
however, stood f i r m i n i t s decision, and again refused the proposal of 
Dr.Harpur on the plea that "the time was s t i l l distant enough when the 
20 
mission work could be permitted amongst the Muslim population of the Sudan". 
The missionaries were, however, permitted t o begin t h e i r work South of 
21 
Fashoda, i f they so l i k e d . 
F a i l i n g to gain access t o the Muslim Sudan by making approaches t o 
the authorities i n Cairo and Khartoum, the missionaries made fu r t h e r attempts 
on a d i f f e r e n t l i n e . I n 1898, a few months a f t e r the b a t t l e of Omdurman, 
18. M.E.S., op.cit, p.216. 
19 . I b i d . 
20. Cromer's speech delivered at a dinnBr party i n Khartoum i n 1903; .W.P. 
2 1 . I b i d . ^ 1 . 
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nhen Kitchener returned to England, a deputation from the Church Missionary 
Society waited on him with t h e i r plans to carry out missionary work i n the 
Sudan. Their plan, without mistake, included the t h i c k l y populated Northern 
Sudan too, but the plans of the deputation r e l a t i n g to the missionary work 
i n Northern Sudan was not approved by Kitchener on the s o l i d ground that i t 
was not the policy of the Government t o do or to allow something which could 
22 
lead t o the f a n a t i c a l outburst of the Muslims of the Sudan. He, of course, 
ox 
gave permission f o r the missionary work amongst the pagans of the South. J 
For the execution of i t s policy to protect the Muslim North from the 
invasion of the missions, the Government at the beginning appeared to be 
over cautious. I n the early days of i t s administration, the Christians were 
not even allowed to have conversation with the Muslims about r e l i g i o n — a 
p i 
r e s t r i c t i o n which lasted u n t i l 1903. Apart from t h i s there were other 
r e s t r i c t i o n s . A permit was not generally issued t o anyone styled an 
evangelist, t o enter i n t o the Sudan f o r making public preachings i n the 
. 25 open a i r . 
I n 1899» Dr.L.H.&wynne, a C.M.S. churchman, was conscripted by 
the Governor-General as Chaplain to the B r i t i s h Forces stationed i n Khartoum 
26 
and Omdurman. The appointment of Gwynne, however, as Chaplain, did not 
leave the B r i t i s h Consul-General i n Cairo without anxiety. Just a f t e r a 
few days of Gwynne*s appointment t o the said post, Cromer sent a wire to 
the Governor-General to make himself f u l l y sure that Gwynne's appointment 
22. Trimingham, The Christian Approach to Islam i n the Sudan, op.cit, P.12. 
23. I b i d . 
24 . I b i d . p.24. 
25 . I b i d , p.30. 
26 . Trimingham, The Christian Approach to Islam i n the Sudan, op.cit, P .13. 
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as Chaplain led to no 'clandestine missionary work' and that Gwynne was 
27 
not pr o s e l y t i z i n g . The anxiety of the Government to r e s t r i c t the a c t i v i t i e s 
of the missionaries i n the North found i t s better expression when Cromer 
requested the Governor-General that the chaplains posted t o the B r i t i s h 
troops i n the Northern Sudan ought to be commissioned as chaplains, and not 
as 'casual clergymen 1 because they might w e l l "turn out t o be missionaries 
28 
i n disguise". Again i n 1904, Cromer made i t very clear that proselytism 
formed no part of the Government programme and that the missionary 
enterprise was e n t i r e l y i n the hands of the private individuals and without 
29 
any f i n a n c i a l aid from the Government. 
Apart from i t s d i r e c t measures to p r o h i b i t the missionary work 
amongst the Muslims of the Northern Sudan, the Government adopted some 
in d i r e c t but ef f e c t i v e steps. I t i n s t i t u t e d a strong censorship through 
the Customs and postal services over a l l 'printed matter' entering i n t o 
the Sudan, which might augment hatred and i l l - f e e l i n g s between the 
Christians and the Muslims. Thus, i n 1905, i t so happened that the 
Director of I n t e l l i g e n c e , Cairo, cautioned the editor of an 'unnamed new 
Christian journal' that the c i r c u l a t i o n of the journal i n the Sudan could 
only be permitted provided they were sent only t o the Christians and that 
on no account were they to be sold or openly circulated i n the Sudani 0 
A l l the r e s t r i c t i o n s mentioned above were not, however, o f f i c i a l l y 
codified u n t i l 1905, when they were formulated as well-defined Government 
27 . Cromer t o Kitchener, 7 t h Dec. 1899; W.P. 2 6 9 / 1 . 
28. Cromer to Wingate, 9 t h March.1900; W.P. 270/3 . 
29 . Reports by His Majesty's Agent and Gonsul-General on the Finances, 
Administration and condition of Egypt and the Soudan i n 1904: op.cit, 
3 0 . Cecil t o Wingate, Cairo, Jan .15th 1905; W.P.276/1. P-139. 
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regulations. The Sudan Government 'Missionary Regulations' f i n a l l y 
r e s t r i c t e d the missionary work and prohibited the establishment of 
mission stations "north of the 10th p a r a l l e l " , i . e . i n the whole of 
the Northern Sudan^1 but the regulations made s u f f i c i e n t provision f o r 
32 
the missionaries amongst the pagans of the South. 
Obviously, the 'Regulations' were very much discouraging f o r the 
missionaries who were excluded from the Northern Sudan. That the 
regulations were extremely unpalatable f o r the missionaries became 
evident from the comment that E.Cecil made, even before they were o f f i c i a l l y 
announced. With his sense of humour, he called them " milk and water 
with very l i t t l e milk"-! 3 
Although the missionaries were not permitted i n the Northern Sudan, 
s t i l l there were some exceptions to t h i s regulation. I n spite of the 
p r o h i b i t i o n of the missionary work i n the Northern Sudan, permission was 
granted, i n 1903, f o r the opening of a Mission School i n Khartoum. With 
warm feelings, Cromer wrote to Gwynne: " I am very glad, i n consultation with 
the Sidar, to give permission f o r a mission school to be established at 
3k « 
Khartoum. Even e a r l i e r than t h i s , permission was accorded t o the Church 
35 
Missionary Society to open a school f o r g i r l s i n Khartoum, i n 1902. The 
deviation of the Government policy may also express i t s e l f i n the building 
of an Anglican Cathedral i n Khartoum i n 1910.^ 
3 1 . Administrative Regulations, 1933, Chapt. X V I I I , p.133. 
3 2 . I b i d . 
3 3 . Cecil t o Wingate, Dec.28th, t9>C4; W.P. 275 /9. 
34 ; Cromer t o Gwynne, March, 1 3 t h , 1903; P.R.0./P.0., 633/8. 
35 . See Bapers Concerning the Missionaries; W.P. 103 /6 . 
36 . Martin, P.P., The Sudan i n Evolution, op.cit., p.22»4. 
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I t would, of course, be an error, i f the Government action i n 
granting permission f o r opening the missionary school and the Cathedral 
i n Khartoum was looked upon as an attempt by the authority to v i o l a t e 
regulations l a i d down by i t s e l f . The above actions certainly had good 
reasons behind them. The Government action that led t o some amount of 
relaxation of r e s t r i c t i o n s , imposed e a r l i e r on the missionaries, can be 
j u s t i f i e d on the grounds that the population of Khartoum i t s e l f was not 
wholly Muslim and there were Christian residents of various denominations^ 
Moreover, as the schools and the Cathedral were established i n the heart of 
Khartoum, which was also the seat of the G-overnment, the a c t i v i t i e s of the 
missionary bodies, the G-overnment thought, could be c a r e f u l l y supervised. 
Besides, the Muslim population i n Khartoum, being i n immediate touch with 
the governing authorities could more readily realise the actual policy 
39 
adopted by the G-overnment than those residing i n the outlying provinces. 
Above a l l , the G-overnment was otherwise compelled t o allow the missionaries 
to s t a r t schools, as i t was unable at that time t o meet the demand f o r 
education from itw own scanty resources^ Hence, under such exceptional 
circumstances, i n order t o meet the educational and re l i g i o u s needs of 
the Christian population of Khartoum, the G-overnment accorded permission f o r 
the opening of the missionary sohools and the Anglican church i n Khartoum. 
37• I n 1906 the t o t a l population of Khartoum province was 92,386J out of 
t h i s , 3»578 were European Christians of d i f f e r e n t n a t i o n a l i t i e s , vide, 
The Reports on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Sudan 
- 1906, Part I I , p.39. 
38 . Reports of His Majesty*s Agent and Consul-General on the Finances, 
Administration and Condition of Egypt and the Soudan i n 1904, op.cit., 
39 . I b i d . p . 140 . 
4 0 . I b i d . 
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I t i s also interesting that i n these mission schools, Muslim students, 
along w i t h the Christian boys, were allowed t o be admitted^ 
Should the establishment of these missionary schools i n Khartoum 
and the admission of the Muslim students thereto be misinterpreted by the 
Muslims of Egypt and the Sudan, these schools were allowed t o function 
only under s t r i c t Government regulations. The regulations were made 
public by Cromer i n 1906. They are as follows: 
(a) "Before Mohammedan children are permitted t o attend the mission 
school, the director or head of the school has to s a t i s f y himself that 
the parents or guardians understand that the school i s a Christian school". 
(b) "The f u l l consent of the parents or guardians must be obtained by 
the director or head of the school before any p u p i l i s given any reli g i o u s 
i n s t r u c t i o n s , no matter of what n a t i o n a l i t y or r e l i g i o n the pupil may be". 
(c) "V/hen religious i n s t r u c t i o n i s being carried out, no other children, 
except those whose parents have given the necessary consent, must be 
present". 
(d) "The School sh a l l be open at a l l times t o the inspection of the 
Governor-General or his representative". 
A l l the regulations stated above clearl y indicate a policy by which 
the Government t r i e d t o avoid any suspicion or doubt which might appear i n 
the minds of the Muslims. And with a l l good in t e n t i o n , the Governor-General 
4 1. I b i d . 
4 2 . Reports by His Majesty's Agent and Consul-General on the Finances, 
Administration and Condition of Egypt and the Soudan i n 1906, Egypt No.1 
(1907) , C-3394; p.139. 
141 
43 
deputed i n 1907, Major Phipps, the C i v i l Secretary t o the Sudan Government, 
to v i s i t the missionary schools from time t o time and to make a very careful 
inquiry i n t o the manner i n which they were conducted, and t o report t o the 
Governor-General whether the regulations as l a i d down were f u l l y observed. 
A l l these again go to prove that the Government had no hidden inte n t i o n when 
i t allowed the opening of the missionary schools i n Khartoum. And to the 
s a t i s f a c t i o n of a l l , the missionaries s t r i c t l y adhered to a l l the regulations. 
I n 1907, Bishop F.X.Geyer was the f i r s t t o inform the C i v i l Secretary that 
the conditions of the Government were being carried out and that no re l i g i o u s 
i n s t r u c t i o n had been given t o pupils except with permission of t h e i r parents 
or guardians^/*" Again, a f t e r a few days of t h i s correspondence, the Bishop 
brought to the notice of the C i v i l Secretary that the Muslim students of the 
45 
school were not allowed by t h e i r parents t o attend the religious i n s t r u c t i o n s . 
The Bishop fur t h e r informed that at the time of re l i g i o u s i n s t r u c t i o n , which 
was obviously Christian, eleven Muslim g i r l students, instead of attending 
46 
these classes, were sent out to play i n the garden, under the care of a Sister. 
The policy of the Government t o give every protection to the Muslims 
of the Northern Sudan continued f a i r l y w e l l and unintBrrupted. I n 1911 , 
Kitchener, i n his capacity as the B r i t i s h High Commissioner i n Egypt, 
emphasised the continuance of the said p o l i c y i n the following words: 
"Missionary a c t i v i t y cannot be allowed i n the North .... Our policy i s t o 
avoid a l l suspicion of proselytizing Missionary work i s t o be purely 
private and without f i n a n c i a l aid ...."V 
43^ Wingate t o Cromer, Khartoum, 26th Jan. 1907; W.P. 103 /3 . 
4 4 . ' Geyer t o Phipps, 16 th Jan. 1907; W.P. 103/6 . 
4 5 . Geyer t o Phipps, undated, 1904; W.P. 103 /6 . 
4 6 . I b i d . 
4 7 . Lord Kitchener'a Memorandum (14 .8 .1911) i n the form of advice to Nigeria, 
on the Sudan Government Missionary p o l i c y . See Summary of F i l e 46,A1., 
pp.26-31; W.P. 485 . 
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The policy of the Sudan Government 'to avoid a l l suspicion of 
prose l y t i z i n g ' expressed i t s e l f again i n 1912. I n that year, the A l l Saints 
Church of Khartoum was t o he consecrated. Dr.E.H.Winnington-Ingram, the 
Bishop of London, was chosen t o perform the ceremony of consecration on the 
26th January, 1912. But jus t before a few months of t h i s date, the Bishop, 
i n a speech i n London, attacked Islam i n a way which revealed his in t o l e r a n t 
a t t i t u d e t o , and u t t e r ignorance of, the basic and fundamental principles of 
Islam. The speech of the Bishop of London was immediately followed by 
1 Q 
l e t t e r s t o The Times, i n which Professor G.Margolionth of Oxford University, 
and Mirza 'Abbas e A l I Baig, an Indian Muslim, c r i t i c i s e d and reproved the 
Bishop. The ho s t i l e remarks of the Bishop placed the B r i t i s h authorities i n 
Cairo and Khartoum i n a state of anxiety. I n the proposed a r r i v a l of the 
Bishop of London, they sensed an 'agressive missionary p o l i c y ' on the part of 
the Bishop. Lee Stack, Director of M i l i t a r y Intelligence i n Cairo, realised 
that the Bishop of London, on his a r r i v a l i n Khartoum f o r the consecration 
of the Cathedral might implant the seed of 'aggressive missionary policy* i n 
49 
the Sudan. Further, the B r i t i s h authorities i n Egypt and the Sudan, 
apprehended that the coming of the Bishop of London i n Khartoum might lead 
t o considerable tension between the Muslims and the Christians, because of 
the Bishop's hostile remarks on Islam. Following t h i s , the Governor-General 
informed Gwynne that as the adverse comment of the Bishop of London on the 
tenets of Islam had caused considerable trouble, and led t o counter attack 
i n Egyptian press, Kitchener (then B r i t i s h Consul-General i n Egypt), might 
cancel the programme of the Bishop's v i s i t t o Khartoum f o r the consecration 
4 8 . The Times, London., 29th S ept. 1911 . 
4 9 . Wingate to Phipps, Khartoum, March 6 t h , 1910; W.P. 2 9 0 / 3 / 1 . 
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of Khartoum Cathedral. 
The Bishop's programme was, however, not cancelled, as everything 
was ready f o r the ceremony, but when the Bishop arrived, the B r i t i s h 
a u t h o r i t i e s i n Cairo and Khartoum were always v i g i l a n t . When the Bishop 
actually arrived i n Cairo, Lee Stack, at the Sudan Agency, was very a l e r t 
t o see that the Bishop did not u t t e r anything unpalatable at any gathering 
of the missionaries i n Cairo. Lee Stack was relieved of his duty of keep-
ing a watch on the Bishop, only when the l a t t e r boarded the t r a i n f o r 
Khartoum. I t i s quite interesting that when the Bishop made his r e t u r n 
journey to Cairo from Khartoum, the Governor-General wrote t o Lee Stack i n 
advance: "The more I see the Bishop of London, the more I am convinced that 
he w i l l have t o be ca r e f u l l y taken i n hand by someone i n the Agency, i n 
Lord Kitchener's absence, or there may be trouble ... I greatly doubt his 
being the r i g h t man t o send out t o Eastern Countries of the p o l i t i c a l and 
social conditions of which he knows absolutely nothing, t o advise on the 
51 " 
very delicate matters connected wi t h the relations between Church and State. 
Thus, the Government took every precaution so that the 'fanaticism' 
and f a n a t i c a l utterings of the high dignitaries of the Church might not 
inj u r e the religious' sentiment of t h e i r Muslim subjects. And henceforth, 
the Government f e l t i t quite necessary t o lay down a 'definite system of 
cont r o l ' without which i t thought that "the missionary enthusiasts i n the 
Sudan, who were e n t i r e l y oblivious t o the p o l i t i c a l consequences, might 
52 
create a l o t of trouble f o r the authority". 
50 . Wingate to Gwynne, Oct. 10-fch 1911; W.P. 301 /4 . 
5 1 . Wingate to Stack, 31st Jan, 1912; W;P. 180/1. 
5 2 . I b i d . 
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Prom the very beginning of the Anglo-Egyptian r u l e , the Christian 
missionaries t r i e d t h e i r utmost t o introduce some Christian influence i n 
the Sudan. This they desired t o achieve by convincing the Government t o 
53 
made Christian Sunday instead of Muslim Friday as a day of r e s t . The 
f i r s t attempt i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n i s appeared t o have been made i n 1907, when 
the Rt.Rev.Bishop Tailor Smith requested the Governor-General of the Sudan 
54 
t o introduce Sunday as a day of rest , at least f o r the Christians. The 
Governor-General was not the man to y i e l d so easily. Pointing out the 
d i f f i c u l t y of introducing Sunday as a day of r e s t , he replied: "You must 
remember that the country i s Mohammedan and that we are governing i t i n 
the f i r s t instance i n the in t e r e s t of the Mohammedan population ..... and 
I am sure i f I raised the Sunday observance question i n an acute form ... 
55 
I should be running serious r i s k " . 
The introduction of Friday as a day of rest i n the Sudan, however, 
did not pass u n c r i t i c i s e d by Christian missionaries i n Great B r i t a i n . I n 
the year 1910, was held a World Missionary Conference i n Edinburgh. At 
the Conference, Rev.J.K.Giffen took the opportunity to c r i t i c i s e the 
Anglo-Egyptian authority i n the Sudan f o r introducing Friday and not 
56 
Sunday as a universal weekly holiday. Just a f t e r t h i s Conference, when 
Bishop Gwynne again requested the Governor-General to i n s t i t u t e a Christian 
Sunday, the l a t t e r replied by t e l l i n g him that any idea of adopting Sunday 
53. This was an Islamic innovation of Cromer, f o r never i n the history of 
Islam has Friday been recognised as a day of res t . I t i s simply the 
day when the Muslims are expected to attend the congregational prayer 
at a mosque. 
54 . Bishop T.Smith to Wingate, ?th March, 1907; W.P. 280/3 . 
5 5 . Wingate to Bishop T.Smith, 25th March, 1907; W.P. 280/3. 
56 . .'Scotsman, 21st June, 1910. 
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as a day of rest would d e f i n i t e l y "meet with most strenuous opposition, 
not only on the part of the Muslims, but also on the part of the r u l i n g 
57 
authority i n Egypt". And t h i s Sunday question f i n a l l y f r u s t r a t e d the 
missionaries, when the Governor-General informed Bishop Gwynne that he 
had referred the matter t o Cairo authority, but the r e s u l t was that i t 
did not receive the approval of Kitchener who "had no i n t e n t i o n of taking 
58 
up the question immediately, or i n the distant future". 
Besides t h e i r attempt t o have Christian Sunday introduced i n the 
Sudan, the missionaries t r i e d to use Gordon Memorial College as an 
instrument f o r the spread of Christianity and i t s influence i n the country. 
They greatly resented the permission of the teaching of Islam i n the -
59 
College? This action of the Government was vigorously attacked by 
Rev. C.R.Waston, the Secretary of the Board of Foreign Missions of the 
A ag a i n s t 
United Presbyterian Church of North America. Protesting „eek the teaching 
of Islam i n Gordon College, he voiced his resentment and dis s a t i s f a c t i o n : 
"This i s a Christian College, founded i n the name of a Christian martyr, 
through the contributions of Christian men and women under the administra-
t e -
t i o n of a Christian Government. At the Edinburgh Conference i n 1910, 
the Rev.J.K.Giffen supported the Rev.C.R.Waston and emphasised that 
61 
"Gordon College ought t o be a l i v i n g witness t o the l i f e of Gordon". 
He also vehemently attacked the Sudan Government f o r making no provision 
57. Wingate to Gwynne, 17 th May, 1911; W.P. 3 0 0 / 5 / 1 . 
58 . Wingate to Gwynne, 10 th Oct, 1911; W.P. 301 /4 . 
59 . Teaching of Islam i n Gordon Memorial College has been discussed i n 
Chapter I I . 
60 . Missionary Review of the World, Vol. X V I I I , 1905; p.91 . 
6 1. Scotsman, op.cit. 
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f o r the teaching of the Bible i n the said College. Two years a f t e r the 
Edinburgh Conference, the Rev.C.R.Waston, supporting the charges of the 
Rev.J.K.Gdffen, wrote a l e t t e r t o the Governor-General, i n which he 
expressed that i t was "... an extremely widespread and deep desire of the 
Christian public that the memorial t o Gordon's name should bear a closer 
r e l a t i o n t o his religious practices and convictions". But the criticisms 
of the missionaries bore no f r u i t . The Government not only turned a deaf 
ear to the protests of the missionaries who f a i l e d t o convert Gordon 
Memorial College i n t o a purely Christian educational i n s t i t u t i o n , but, at. 
the same time, showed not the slig h t e s t i n t e n t i o n of making the College 
anything else other than a 'predominantly Muslim i n s t i t u t i o n 1 i n an almost 
wholly Muslim Northern Sudan. 
The policy of the Government t o keep the missionaries and t h e i r 
influences out of Muslim Northern Sudan, continued f a i r l y w e l l inspite of 
every attempt of the missionaries to penetrate that region. I n 1911» 
Bishop Gwynne made a request t o the Governor-General, urging him f o r the 
absolute removal of r e s t r i c t i o n s on the missionaries, and t o open the 
entire country f o r missionary work. But the reply of the Governor-General 
was s i g n i f i c a n t , as i t displayed his wide sense of duty and obligation 
as a representative of the Khedive of Egypt. Replying t o Bishop Gwynne, 
he wrote, although I am a Christian myself, I am i n t h i s country as 
the representative of the King and the Khedive, and I am responsible f o r 
maintaining an even balance over a l l subjects i n the Sudan - whether 
Christian or Moslem". Thus, the policy of the Government r e l a t i n g t o 
63 . Waston t o Wingate, May 2 0 t h , 1912; W.P. 181 /2 . 
64 . Wingate t o Gwynne, May 1 7 t h , 1911; W.P. 3 0 0 / 5 / 1 . 
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Northern Sudan stood unchanged and that part of the Country remained 
uninvaded by the Christian missionaries. This policy of the 6-overnment 
was c r i t i c i s e d so much so that many came to believe that i n the Sudan 
the B r i t i s h administrators favoured only the Muslims and not the Christians. 
Apart from the Rev.Archdeacon Shaw's conviction that: "The Anglo-Egyptian 
65 
Government i s a machinery f o r spreading Mohammedanism", there were others 
who shared t h i s b e l i e f . Even as l a t e as 1919, Sir Richmond Palmer, a 
B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l i n the Nigerian Service, whilst coming t o the Sudan from 
Nigeria, remarked i n the same tone, " there i s nothing more certain 
than the general b e l i e f that the English, though not Muhammedans themselves 
66 
look with approval on Islam as a r e l i g i o n ". The same o f f i c i a l 
also formed an idea from his v i s i t t o the Sudan that the English 
administrators were very p a r t i a l t o the Muslims^ 
I I I 
The above was thus the Sudan Government policy towards the 
Christian Missions i n the Northern Sudan. I n the analysis of the polioy 
i t has been indicated how the Government, against varying degrees of 
pressure, succeeded i n keeping the northern region free from the influence 
and a c t i v i t i e s of the Christian missions. This policy was so successful 
and so appreciated by the Muslims that i t did not give r i s e to any form of 
controversy amongst the Muslim religious bodies established i n the Sudan 
6 5 . See above p.134. 
6 6 . Palmer, H.R., Report on a Journey from Maidugari ... to Jeddah; (etc) 
Colonial o f f i c e , Africa (W est) No.1072, Aug. 1919] p.13. 
67 . I b i d . 
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and that the responsible heads of the religious bodies were f u l l y 
68 
convinced i n the soundness of that policy. 
Now we can proceed to analyse the Sudan G-overnment policy towards 
the Christian missions, vis-a-vis Islam, i n the Southern Sudan. 
The Southern Sudan i s a vast region, comprising an area of over 
a quarter of a m i l l i o n square miles. I t l i e s south of about 10° North 
l a t i t u d e and extends down t o about l a t i t u d e 4°. Three provinces, namely 
the Upper N i l e , Bahr-El-G-hazal and the Equatoria, cover t h i s area. The 
Southern Sudan i s the home of numerous Negroid t r i b e s . I n the Upper Nile 
and i n a great part of Bahr-EJL-G-hazal, the majority of the people belong t o 
one of the three most famous groups, such as the Dinka, the Nuer and the 
Shilluk. The anthropologists c a l l them N i l o t i c s ^ I n Equatoria there are 
not less than f o r t y d i f f e r e n t t r i b e s , each with t h e i r own t r a d i t i o n s , 
b e l i e f s and customs. The most numerous of these are Azandee and the Baria. 
They speak d i f f e r e n t languages and dial e c t s . These people of the Southern 
Sudan, and especially the N i l o t i e s occupying the Upper Nile and Bahr-El-
G-hazal, are pagans, and due to the nature and geographical positi o n of 
t h e i r country they were almost untouched by the impact of c i v i l i z a t i o n -
whether Arab or European. • 
From t h i s b r i e f description i t emerges that the Southern Sudan 
contains a bewildering v a r i e t y of ethnic groups and languages. Unlike the 
68. Reports by His Majesty's Agent and Consul-G-eneral on the Finances, 
Administration and Condition of Egypt and the Soudan i n 1905, Egypt No.l 
(1906) Gd. 2817; pJ24. 
69 . For greater details of these tribes see, Seligman, C.G., Pagan tri b e s 
of the N i l o t i c Sudan, London, 1932. 
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Northerners, i t s people are not generally Muslims nor do they claim Arab 
descent; so the unifying tendencies of Islam and Arab speech, which made 
f o r a broad c u l t u r a l unity throughout the North, are lacking i n the 
Southern Sudan. This difference of the South from the North i s p a r t i c u l -
a r l y important, because i t i s t h i s difference which, among others, guided 
the Sudan Government's missionary policy i n the South. 
As has been said e a r l i e r , proselytism, as d i s t i n c t from educational 
and medical a c t i v i t i e s , was d e f i n i t e l y discouraged i n the Northern Sudan, 
f o r i t was f e l t that the natives could not or would not distinguish between 
the action of the Government, as such, and the individuals appearing t o 
act with i t s approval. Misunderstandings as to the fundamental r e l a t i o n -
ship between the secular r u l e r and the subject would thus i n e v i t a b l y arise 
and impair that confidence which i s essential t o peaceful progress. But 
i n the Southern Sudan which was backward and where each t r i b e had i t s own 
pri m i t i v e b e l i e f s and code of morality, such considerations were 
applicable with less or no v a l i d i t y . Hence, from the very beginning the 
Government found the South to be the most suitable ground f o r the 
Christian Missions. Thus we f i n d , while the missions had no foothold i n 
the Muslim North, f u l l freedom of action was accorded t o them i n the Soutn^ 
and Lord Kitchener while i n England i n 1899 also gave the same assurance t o 
the delegates of the Church Missionary Society i n London!^ 
70. S ee above, pp,i32~i33. 
71. See above, p. ist . 
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The missionaries were thus encouraged by the Government t o begin 
t h e i r work i n the South. To avoid c o n f l i c t between them, the whole of 
the Southern Sudan was divided i n t o spheres of influence. The p r i n c i p l e 
adopted was "one area, one mission". The American Presbyterians were 
a l l o t t e d the Abyssian Border, the Roman Catholics and the Church Missionary 
Society were a l l o t t e d Bahr-El-Ghazal and the Upper N i l e , respectively. 
I t may appear to the c r i t i c s that while granting the spheres of 
influence t o the Christian Missions i n the Southern Sudan, the Government 
excluded the Muslims by not granting them a similar zone which could w e l l 
be t h e i r sphere of influence. But f o r t h i s the Government cannot be blamed 
that by doing so i t t r i e d t o exclude Islam from the South, because, as 
there existed no organised Islamic Missionary Society f o r that purpose, the 
question of granting a sphere of influence t o such a body or group, did not 
• 72 arise: 
Again i t i s charged that by allowing the missionaries, and by 
putting r e s t r i c t i o n s on the Northern Muslim traders' entry i n t o the South, 
the Government, thus excluding Islam, t r i e d t o convert the whole South t o 
Chr i s t i a n i t y . But t h i s charge has less s o l i d foundation. Although the 
Government allowed proselytization i n the South,- yet behind granting the 
permission t o the missionaries i n t h i s area the authority had another 
objective i n mind, which i t considered more important than the proselytiza-
t i o n . 
As the Southern Sudan was much more backward than the North and 
since the Sudan Government i t s e l f was short of money and dependent on the 
Egyptian Treasury f o r balancing i t s 'modest' budget, no work of construction 
could be contemplated or service provided i n the South,beyond what 
72. A r t i n , Y.P., England i n the Sudan, p.35. 
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was necessary f o r the maintenance of Government personnel, aril hence 
law and order. Under such circumstances, the best and the only thing 
that could be done by way of general improvement i t was f e l t was to 
allow the Christian missions t o operate i n the region i n the hope that 
along with conducting the education of the South at t h e i r own expense, 
t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s there would prove a c i v i l i z i n g influence?^ 
Far from entertaining the i n t e n t i o n of excluding Islam and 
implanting Ch r i s t i a n i t y i n the South, the object which the Government had 
i n view when i t allowed the Missions i n the South, was educational^ and 
i n the f i e l d of educational a c t i v i t i e s i n the South, the Government was 
not unduly p a r t i a l t o the Missions who themselves wished t o monopolise i n 
that respect. Thus, w r i t i n g on the 6th December, 1904, a l e t t e r t o the 
C.M.S., Lord Cromer made the point quite clear: "No communications have 
yet been received from private individuals requesting permission t o 
establish schools i n the Southern Sudan, at t h e i r own expense, i n which 
the r e l i g i o n of Islam would be taught, but i n order t o avoid any possible 
misapprehension as to the nature of the policy adopted by the Government, 
I wish to add t h a t , should such requests be received, they w i l l be favourably 
75 
considered". 
Hence, i t shows that the Government was ready t o allow any 
voluntary body of Muslims to s t a r t schools i n the South, where Islam could 
be taught. 
73. Reports by His Majesty's Agent and Consul-General on the Finances, 
Administration and Condition of Egypt and the Soudan i n 1905, Egypt No.1 
(1906) Cd. 2817; p. 125. 
74. Reports by His Majesty's Agent and Consul-General on the Finances, 
Administration and Condition of Egypt and the Soudan i n 1904, Egypt No.1 
(1905) Cd. 2409; p. 141 . 
75. As quoted i n the H.M's Agent and Consul-General's Annual Report f o r 1904 
I b i d , p . 1 4 1 . 
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No doubt the Government put certain r e s t r i c t i o n s on the entry of the 
Northern traders i n t o the South, but t h i s action was not motivated by 
the i n t e n t i o n to prevent the spread of Islam i n the South. The main 
objective which motivated the Government t o impose r e s t r i c t i o n s on the 
Northern Muslim traders, however, l i e s elsewhere. 
From the very early days, f o r reasons h i s t o r i c a l and administrative, 
the Sudan Government administered the Northern and the Southern Sudan 
separately. The unifying tendencies of Islam and the Arabio speech, which 
made f o r a broad c u l t u r a l unity throughout the North, were lacking i n the 
Southern Sudani Again, i n the Northern Sudan, the Government inherited 
a w e l l rooted t r a d i t i o n of centralized Government derived from i t s Turko-
Egyptian and Mahadist t r a d i t i o n s . But t h i s was not the case with the 
Southern Sudan, where the Government inherited insecurity and a host of 
warring t r i b e s who were a l l the more backward than the Northerners. Under 
such circumstances, the main task of the Government, along with the 
maintenance of law and order i n the South, was to win the confidence of 
the Southerners f o r the new regime!^ Whilst t h i s was the Government po l i c y , 
i t was reasonably thought by the administrators that i f the Northern 
merchants were allowed a free and unrestricted entrance i n t o the South, 
i t would work against the success of the said policy. The Government knew 
very w e l l that these Northern merchants were associated i n the eyes of the 
Southerners as slave-raiders and expoliters. Hence, t o l e t loose 
76 . For a l l these reasons and f o r the lack of communication i n the South, 
General Gordon, as Governor of Equatoria, also made a request t o the 
Khedive of Egypt t o administer Northern and Southern Sudan separately. 
77. Reports by His Majesty's Agent and Consul-General on the Finanoes, 
Administration and Condition of Egypt and the Soudan i n 1905, o p . c i t , 
p.125. 
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these merchants i n t o the South, would have meant the e x p l o i t a t i o n of the 
ignorant Southerners at the hand of'clever Gellabas' and t h i s alone could 
shatter the objectives of the Government. Hence, with a view t o winning 
the confidence of the Southerners, the Government b u i l t up a protective 
b a r r i e r against the Northern merchants. 
Another incident which could well create misimpression on the minds 
of the Muslims, and i n f a c t did so i n the case of the Sudanese Nationalists 
i n l a t e r days, was the encouragement ani eventual introduction of English 
and not Arabic as the o f f i c i a l language of the Southern Sudan. This 
s i t u a t i o n becomes s t i l l more complicated when i t i s found that the 
Government adopted the said measure on the recommendation of the Christian 
78 
Missions working i n the region; But t h i s action of the Government was not 
inspired by any idea that the Government deliberately discarded Arabic, the 
language of the majority of the people of the Sudan. I t oan be recalled 
that Lord Cromer, i n his l e t t e r t o C.M.S., made i t clear.that any request 
from the voluntary Muslim bodies t o establish schools i n the South would 
79 
be favourably considered. But unfortunately, no such Muslim body approached 
the Government with any programme t o carry out educational work i n the 
South. This l e f t the missionaries uncontested i n the South, where day by 
day they gained a strong foothold. 
Now, u n t i l 1910, the Sudan Government business i n the Southern 
Sudan was conducted at the lower l e v e l , mostly i n Arabic, Btat as the 
missionaries alone were act i v e l y engaged i n the educational a c t i v i t i e s i n 
78. M.E.S., op.cit. p. 132. 
79. See above, p. }5\. 
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the South, so i t was d i f f i c u l t f o r the mission school pupils t o obtain 
government employment so long as Arabic was the o f f i c i a l language. As 
the missions were allowed, so the Government had to see that the mission 
school pupils were suitably employed. And i t i s fu r t h e r more interesting 
to learn that the introduction of English i n t o the South, at. least i n the 
f i r s t two decades, only gave the Christian missionaries some s l i g h t 
chance and not the overwhelming advantages which Islam seemed to possess 
8b 
i n the Southern Sudan at that time. 
Of course the c r i t i c s may say that instead of English, the 
Government could select Arabic as the language of the missions and of 
81 
the schools. Surely i t s introduction i n the Southern Sudan would not 
have been as f a n t a s t i c as i t might appear at f i r s t sight t o a Christian 
missionary. Because Arabic i s one of the h i s t o r i c languages, i f not a 
l i t u r g i c a l language, of Christendom. But unfortunately, Wingate and 
his advisers i n Khartoum had l i t t l e idea of the merits of Arabic. After 
a l l , i n 1910, when English was chosen and selected f o r the South, there 
was no sign of an Arabic r e v i v a l i n the West; only few schools of Arabic 
and Islamic Studies were open, and W estern Orientalists were s t i l l 
w r i t i n g Arabic grammars f o r grammarians. 
The introduction of English, the predominance of the Christian 
Missionaries and the r e s t r i c t i o n s imposed on the entry of the Northern 
Muslim merchants — a l l these undoubtedly brought a strong Christian 
W. Gwynne t o Wingate, 26th Dec. 1910; W.P. 103/7/2. 
81. As early as 1886 and 1890, Major General F.T.Haig, la t e of the Indian 
Army, and an extreme Evangelical, made two tours t o the Red Sea, on 
behalf of C.M.S., f o r the purpose of examining sites f o r Mission 
Stations. I n his report, the Major General insisted that the language 
of the future S udan Mission must be Arabic. M.E.S., op.cit, p.117. 
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influence i n the South, But i n spite of t h i s , the Government was quite 
aware of the religious needs of the Muslim c i v i l o f f i c i a l s ani Muslim 
garrisons stationed i n the Southern Sudan. For them the Government made 
necessary provisions f o r the construction of mosques, a fac t which beyond 
doubt exercised a great influence on the pagan minds. But the missionaries, 
both Catholics and Protestants, vehemently opposed the building of mosques 
i n the South. I n 1911, one named Gordon, a B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l i n the Egyptian 
army, b u i l t a mosque at WaUj the capital of Bahr El-Ghazal, f o r the Muslim 
c i v i l i a n s and garrisons. I n the same year, Bishop Gwynne lodged a complaint 
to the Governor-General,that the erection of the mosque at Wau d e f i n i t e l y 
82 
encouraged the growth of Islam i n that region. I n f a c t , the building of 
t h i s mosque at Wa.u had the effect of a t t r a c t i n g many of the natives t o i t . 
One of the impacts of constructing the mosque was f e l t when i t was found 
that the boys attending the mission school had so decreased i n number that 
"... the Mudir (Governor) had to hunt up boys f o r them from outside". 
Even the army too could not escape the influence and impact of the mosque 
which "undoubtedly had the effect of turning pagans i n t o Muslims, simply by 
85 
i t s example". 
When a l l these outcomes of the Wau mosque became quite evident, 
Gwynne complained to C.M.S., "whoever appointed such a man (the o f f i c e r 
who b u i l t the mosque) — a l i b e r t i n e and sensual t o a degree — ought'to 
be t o l d of his error of judgment. I would t o God i t was possible f o r 
86 
married men t o work amongst these pagan t r i b e s " . The Governor-General, i n 
W. Gwynne to Wingate, 29th Aug, 1911; W.P. 301/2. 
83. Vide, the Report of Col.Assier, on his tour t o Bahr-El-Ghazaland Malakal 
Sept. 8th, 1911; W.P. 301/3. 
Qk. I b i d . 85. 6 Shaw to the Church Missionary Society, 1st March, 1910; C.M.S., G3,S/P1 
156 
a l e t t e r t o Gwynne, admitted that the building of a mosque at Wau 
87 
helped t o encourage the growth of Islam there. But Wingate did not 
order f o r the withdrawal of the Wau mosque. On the otherhand, i n a 
l e t t e r t o Gorst, he defended his of f i c e r s from what he called the 
88 
calumnies of "wrong-headed and f a n a t i c a l missionaries". The 
G-overnment never paid any heed t o the missionary protests and by 1915» 
there were three public mosques, (one at Wau, one at Renk and the 
89 
t h i r d at Kodok) i n the Southern Sudan. 
Thus, the Sudan Government missionary p o l i c y , whilst favouring 
the missions i n the South, took i n t o account to protect the interests 
of the Muslims and of Islam i n the North; This the Government had t o 
do even by dis s a t i s f y i n g the well-organized Christian missionary bodies. 
87. Wingate t o Gwynne, October 9th, 1911. W.P. 300/3. 
88. Wingate to Gorst, October 10th, 1911. W.P. 300/5. 
89. Martin, P.F., The Sudan i n Evolution, op.cit, p.2^7. 
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CHAPTER VI 
The wartime B r i t i s h Muslim policy 
and i t s Sudanese phase, 1914-1918. 
I 
I n preceding chapters we have discussed the policies of the 
Government i n r e l a t i o n t o d i f f e r e n t aspects of Islam. We have also 
noticed how the Government protected the Northern Sudan from the 
possible invasion of the Christian missions. A l l these r e f l e c t a 
good amount of wisdom which the Government displayed i n pursuing i t s 
policies towards Islam. I n t h i s chapter, however, we s h a l l t r y t o 
outline how at a time of c r i s i s the Government exploited the r e l i g i o u s 
sentiment of the people to achieve a purely p o l i t i o a l end. 
The Turkish entry i n t o World War I and the subsequent B r i t i s h 
declaration of war on Turkey, placed Great B r i t a i n i n a very d i f f i c u l t 
p o s i t i o n , f o r the Sultan of Turkey was the s p i r i t u a l head of the Muslims. 
He was the Caliph, who i n the eyes of the orthodox Muslims i s the l i v i n g 
emblem and personification of the temporal and s p i r i t u a l unity of the 
•i 
'house of Islam 1. The root of the trouble was, w i t h i n the B r i t i s h 
Empire there were millions of Muslim subjects. The bulk of the Indian 
army was Muslim, Egypt and i t s army - a l l Muslim, and i t s r u l i n g classes 
Turkish; the Sudan a l l Muslim. 
For f u l l discussion on the i n s t i t u t i o n of Caliphate, see -
Arnold, T.W., Caliphate, O.U.P. 1924. 
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Thus, when Great B r i t a i n declared war against the Sultan of 
Turkey, the Caliph of the Muslims, f o r the B r i t i s h Government the 
l o y a l t y of a l l i t s Muslim subjects became a matter of doubt. The 
B r i t i s h Government perfectly realised how d i f f i c u l t a task i t would be t o 
explain t o i t s Muslim subjects that war against Turkey — and as such, 
against the s p i r i t u a l head of Islam — was not inconsistent with the 
l o y a l t y of B r i t i s h Muslim subjects t o t h e i r King, and Emperor, i n the 
case of I n d i a , and with the l o y a l t y t o the protecting power i n the case 
of Egypt. The B r i t i s h apprehension had some s o l i d grounds; and indeed 
i t was a d i f f i c u l t task t o convince the Muslim subjects, as such. 
Although at that time the pr i n c i p l e of na t i o n a l i t y was beginning t o gain 
ground i n the Eastern countries, s t i l l the bond which held the Muslim 
societies together was reli g i o u s rather than p a t r i o t i c . So i t was not 
un r e a l i s t i c on the part of the B r i t i s h authorities to fear that when the 
Caliph of the Muslims was threatened, t h e i r B r i t i s h Muslim subjects would 
react. This s i t u a t i o n demanded the B r i t i s h Government t o re-define i t s 
policy towards Islam and Muslims, even when war against Turkey was not 
declared; and also, of course, when war with Turkey became ine v i t a b l e . 
Just before the outbreak of the war, the question of the B r i t i s h 
Muslim policy received due at t e n t i o n of both Houses of the B r i t i s h 
P arliament. The subject was debated — though not hotly. I n his 
parliamentary speech on August 12th, 1913$ Sir Edward Grey, the then 
Secretary of State f o r Foreign A f f a i r s , c l e a r l y outlined the policy of the 
2 
B r i t i s h Government towards Islam. I n his speech, the Foreign Secretary 
2. S ee, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 1913; Vol. LVT; July 28th t o 
August, 1915. pp.2291-2292. 
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assured that the ' r a c i a l sentiments' and 'religious feelings' of the 
Muslim subjects of the Crown, would be respected, and that the B r i t i s h 
p o l i cy would never be one of 'intolerance or wanton and unprovoked 
aggression' against a Muslim power. At the same time he made i t clear 
that Great B r i t a i n could not undertake the duty of protecting Muslim 
Powers outside the B r i t i s h Dominions 'from the consequences of t h e i r 
own action*. But he admitted that under 'exceptional circumstances', 
say, ' i f a pilgrimage t o Holy Places was i n t e r f e r r e d w i t h ' , i t was 
absolutely necessary, i n the interests of the Muslim subjects, t o see 
that 'the outrage was not done to the Muslims of the Empire'. 
This was the p o l i c y outlined by the Foreign Secretary. But 
the discussion of the p o l i c y was confined not only to the House of 
Commons. Even i n the House of Lords there were some who took up the 
matter quite seriously. A prominent member of the House of Lords drew 
up an important memorandum wherein he indicated the steps t o be taken 
by the B r i t i s h Government when the l a t t e r would enter i n t o war with 
Turkey. The author of the memorandum was Lord Cromer who had a long 
association with the Muslims of the East. I n his memorandum, Lord Cromer 
urged his Government t o d r a f t a proclamation stating the causes which 
brought about a war with Turkey and England. He also suggested that t o 
make i t more f r u i t f u l , the proclamation was to be signed by an English 
minister. I n the proclamation, Lord Cromer suggested, i t was t o be made 
quite clear that i t was Turkey and not England, who was the aggressor. 
3. Memorandum by Lord Cromer respecting the steps to be taken i n the 
event of war with Turkey - 0 c t . l 6 t h , 1914; from a copy i n W.P. 193. 
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Next, he suggested that the B r i t i s h Government should state i n 'suitable 
language i t s promise t o preserve the sanctity of the Holy. Places of Islam'. 
He also advised the Government t o assure the Muslim subjects that whatever 
might be the issue of the war, the Government and administration of the 
Holy Places would be l e f t e n t i r e l y i n Muslim hands. The memorandum f u r t h e r 
indicated that i t would be a great advantage i f , i n addition t o the English 
proclamation, some manifesto could be issued and signed by the i n f l u e n t i a l 
Muslims themselves. These were some re a l steps suggested by Lord Cromer 
t o the B r i t i s h Government when war with Turkey became imminent. The 
causes which led Great B r i t a i n to declare war on Turkey do not come w i t h i n 
the scope of t h i s thesis and may be read elsewhere. The fact i s , Great 
B r i t a i n had to declare war against Turkey on November 7th, 1914; and when 
t h i s came about, i t devolved not only upon the B r i t i s h Government, but 
also upon the B r i t i s h authorities i n I n d i a , Egypt and the Sudan t o 
materialise the policy enunciated by Sir Edward Grey'4' and t o translate 
5 
i n t o action the t h i r d suggestion of Lord Cromer. 
I I 
During these days the Governor-General of the Sudan was i n 
regular correspondence with Lord Cromer who was s t i l l watching the a f f a i r s 
of Egypt and the Sudan with utmost i n t e r e s t . Naturally, Wingate at once 
received a copy of Lord Cromer's memorandum which, beyond doubt, gave him 
a good deal of guidance. At f i r s t sight i t might appear that i n a state 
of war against Turkey i t would be easier i n the Sudan than anywhere else, 
4. See above p.t5"<3. 
5. See above p. isq. 
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t o work on the lines suggested by Lord Cromer. For the Sudanese Muslims 
had genuine grievances against the misrule of the Turks whom they once 
drove out from the Sudan. But i n spite of t h i s , i t could not be denied 
that whatever grievances the Sudanese might have against the Turks, as 
S unni Muslims they had some sympathy f o r the Sultan of Turkey, who was 
the Caliph of Islam and the only independent Muslim power. Sometime 
before the outbreak of World War I , Wingate was able t o realise i t f u l l y . 
Describing the reactions of the Sudanese Muslims t o the Balkan war he 
wrote t o Bryan Mahon: "The effect of the Balkan troubles i n t h i s country 
i s not as serious as one might have expected. As a matter of f a c t , the 
old horror of rule of the Turk s t i l l rather holds the people, and except 
that they are c o - r e l i g i o n i s t s , I do not think they much care what happens 
to them: but on the other hand, one must never discount thetremendous 
power of Islam as a building force, and i f at any time the actual jihad*' 
were declared, i t would be a d i f f e r e n t story"! This was how Wingate 
fathomed the depth of the Sudanese Muslims' sympathy f o r Turkey. Wingate 
quite r i g h t l y calculated the amount of danger which the declaration of 
jihad could bring about; and t h i s time Wingate had t o face the t r i a l , f o r 
Turkey r e a l l y declared jihad against the i n f i d e l s . I n Turkey were issued 
c a l l s t o the jihad. An extract from such a ' c a l l ' may be given i n the 
following:-
"My brethren i n God, .... the nations of Europe, the worshippers 
of the Cross, have determined from hundreds of years- ago t o f i g h t Moslems, 
6. Holy W ar. 
7. Wingate t o Bryan Mahon, Khartoum, Dec. 12th, 1912; W*P. 183/3. 
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wipe out t h e i r r e l i g i o n and abolish t h e i r Sultanate from the face of 
the Earth .... these i n f i d e l s , who have ignored the Faith of G-od and 
His Apostle, intend surely t o destroy the Kaaba and the tomb of the 
Prophet and to burn the honoured Quran, wipe out Islam, convert Moslems 
to Ch r i s t i a n i t y and baptise them by a l l possible means 
Unite i n the Union of Faith and gather together against these 
i n f i d e l s and drive them out of your countries and homes ..... 
8 » 
Help one another i n t h i s Holy War which i s incumbent on you. 
This was the thing that Wingate feared most. Moreover, apart from 
the p o s s i b i l i t y that the Sudanese Muslims might respond to the c a l l t o 
ji h a d , the s i t u a t i o n i n the Sudan contained other elements of danger. 
The Egyptian army stationed throughout the Sudan and many c i v i l o f f i c i a l s 
of the Sudan Government constituted no less a pot e n t i a l threat, because 
there could be no doubt, wrote Wingate, that a large number of of f i c e r s 
9 
and o f f i c i a l s i n the Sudan Government sympathised with the Turks. 
This sympathy of the Sudanese o f f i c e r s and o f f i c i a l s f o r the Turks was f a r 
from being only s u p e r f i c i a l , f o r many of these o f f i c e r s came from Egypt 
and had not only Turkish connections but many of them had Turkish blood i n 
t h e i r veins. So the declaration of jihad by Turkey was most l i k e l y t o 
i n c i t e them t o r i s e against the B r i t i s h authority i n the Sudan Government. 
Hence, during the war period and i n a c r i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n l i k e t h i s , i t 
became one of the main objects of the Government t o maintain the l o y a l t y 
8. From the translations of c a l l t o the jihad, issued i n Turkey. This 
copy was obtained by the Intelligence Department, War Office, Cairo, 
on November 5th, 1914; from a copy i n W.P. 193. 
9. Wingate t o Savile, Khartoum, Aug. 19th, 1915; W.P. 195/2. 
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of the Sudanese Muslims and to counteract any attempt of Turkey to 
spread the ideas of jihad i n the Sudan. 
I n his estimate of the s i t u a t i o n , Wingate was quite correct. 
Out of 14,000 troops i n the Sudan almost a l l were Muslims. When i t 
became quite evident that Great B r i t a i n was to go t o war with Turkey, 
reports reached Wingate that " i n Khartoum, El-Obeid and large garrison 
towns, a d i s t i n c t f e e l i n g of uneasiness prevailed among the army and 
10 
Moslem o f f i c e r s " . 
The war against Turkey was not yet declared, but meanwhile Wingate 
f u l l y prepared himself as t o what he would have to do when the war was 
declared. He arranged with Colonel Symes, the Sudan Agent i n Cairo, t o 
write t o him at once the t e x t of the war proclamation against Turkey 
that was to be issued i n Cairo. At the same time he obtained authority 
from Cairo t o modify his Sudan proclamation i n any way he thought f i t , 
and also, i f necessary, to issue 'some expression of views' from the 
11 
leading Muslim religious authorities of the Sudan. With the l a t t e r object 
i n view he had prepared a very carefully worded Arabic Address, from him 
to the Religious Shaikhs and *Ulama; and thousands of printed copies of 
12 
the Address were ready at hand. But he kept a l l these quite secret u n t i l 
the war against Turkey was o f f i c i a l l y declared. 
The 7th of November, 1914, was an eventful day. On t h i s day 
Great B r i t a i n deolared war against Turkey. Now Wingate exposed everything 
10. Wingate t o Cromer, Khartoum, No*27th, 1914; P.R.0./F.0., 633/23. 
11. I b i d . 
12. I b i d . 
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that he had so long kept secret. At 10 a.m. on the 8th November, 1914, 
the Governor-General assembled about f i f t y of the Senior Regimental 
Officers, B r i t i s h and native, i n the Palace, and addressed them i n English 
and Arabic, reading out the war proclamation and c a l l i n g upon them a l l t o 
scrupulously carry out t h e i r duties. Writing l a t e r on to Cromer, Wingate 
wrote that " a l l was received i n silence, and the disclosure of the war 
13 
proclamation came to them as a thunder clap". And when the Governor-
General called upon some of them present t o get up and make any statement 
they wished, they one and a l l expressed t h e i r complete readiness t o carry 
out a l l orders "but none of them made any attempt t o address the 
14 
meeting". The Governor-General was wise enough t o order a similar 
procedure t o be carried out i n a l l the p r i n c i p a l garrison towns by the 
governors or commandants, at p r a c t i c a l l y the same time. 
To achieve success i n ensuring the l o y a l t y of the army, the 
Governor-General had long ago taken some major steps. He knew very w e l l 
that the majority of the younger o f f i c e r s came from Cairo schools, which 
he believed were the 'home of Nationalist and a n t i - B r i t i s h propaganda, and 
i n some cases, pro-Turkish'. A l l these young o f f i c e r s were, i n Wingate's 
view, 'dangerous elements'. To keep these young o f f i c e r s i n order, the 
Governor-General used some of the older and senior o f f i c e r s , who i n his 
15 
opinion, "had everything t o lose and nothing t o gain by d i s l o y a l t y " . 
Even before the Governor-General addressed the Army o f f i c e r s , he had warned 
the senior o f f i c e r s that he would punish any young offi c e r s who would show 13. I b i d . 
14. I b i d . 
15. I b i d . 
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the sli g h t e s t sign of d i s a f f e c t i o n . This action of Wingate produced 
the desired e f f e c t , and i n playing t h e i r roles t o keep quiet the young 
17 
o f f i c e r s , "the senior Egyptian o f f i c e r s played w e l l " . 
After the Army came the t u r n of the Religious leaders and cUlama 
whose l o y a l t y was to be ensured. I t was quite evident that i f they could 
be controlled then t h e i r followers were automatically controlled. With 
t h i s end i n view, the Governor-General, on November 8th, 1914, assembled 
the p r i n c i p a l Religious Shaikhs and ^Ulama i n the Palace and gave them an 
18 
Address which he had prepared beforehand, but kept secret u n t i l then. 
This Address of the Governor-General t o the r e l i g i o u s Shaikhs and Ulama 
commands great significance, f o r i n clear terms, i t expressed what would 
be the war-time policy of the B r i t i s h Government towards Islam and the 
Muslims. As i t does so, i t w i l l be necessary t o quote frequently from the 
English version of that Address. Reminding the Sudanese ? Ulama of the 
past services that the Sudan Government rendered t o Islam, the Address read 
"God i s my witness that we have never i n t e r f e r r e d with any man i n 
the exercise of his r e l i g i o n . We have brought the Holy Places w i t h i n a 
few days journey of Khartoum. We have subsidised and assisted the man of 
r e l i g i o n . We have b u i l t and given assistance f o r the building of new 
19 
mosques a l l over the country ". 
Further, i n the course of his speech, the Governor-General assured 
the 'Ulama and rel i g i o u s Shaikhs that the 'world p o l i c y 1 of Great B r i t a i n 
16. I b i d . • 
17. I b i d . 
18. See, Wingate's Speech to the * Ulama, Nov.8th, 1914; W.P. 192. 
19. I b i d . 
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would remain unchanged; she would ever maintain and enforce 'on others 
the maintenance of the sanctity and i n v o l a b i l i t y of the Holy Places'. 
Referring t o the past p o l i c y , the Governor-General said that Great 
B r i t a i n would shelter and protect a l l Muslims and mosques w i t h i n her 
border, i n the same way as f o r over one hundred and f i f t y years she had 
guarded the interests of the sixty-two m i l l i o n Muslims i n India. The 
Governor-General f i n a l l y stressed that Great B r i t a i n would continue t o 
improve i n every possible manner the ' f a c i l i t i e s f o r pilgrimage and f o r 
the practice of the Mohammedan Religion 1 • 
The assurances of the Governor-General did not end there. The 
speech continued, "you i n the Sudan have had b i t t e r experience of the 
evils of Turkish ru l e ... But you may f e e l — and believe me I sympathise 
with you t r u l y i n t h i s matter .... a certain sorrow at t h i s war. You may 
fear, some of you, that the resu l t of t h i s war may i n some way af f e c t the 
s i t u a t i o n of Mohammedans i n other parts of the world. I assure you before 
God that your fears are groundless, and that i n the B r i t i s h Empire the 
po s i t i o n of no single Mohammedan w i l l be changed one i o t a and no single 
p r i v i l e g e granted t o Islam w i l l be repudiated". 
At the end of the speech, the Governor-General asked the Religious 
Shaikhs and ^ Ulama t o take back his message t o the peoples of the Sudan. 
The speech was concluded thus: 
"Now I ask you at t h i s present time, you men of r e l i g i o n , learning 
and experience, t o give honourable and wise counsel t o the people who w i l l 
l i s t e n to you; f o r here i n the Sudan, as elsewhere i n the world, the fools 
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w i l l l i s t e n t o the wise, the ignorant t o the learned, and the common 
people t o men of wisdom and education. 
I ask you then, and I r e l y upon you t o publish true reports, t o 
be careful and wise i n your words, and by your example t o a l l a y baseless 
and ignorant fears, to contradict false or alarmist rumours, and by a l l 
means i n your power t o ensure a sane and reasonable judgment of events 
by your co-r e l i g i o n i s t s and the natives of the country". I n t h i s way, 
the Governor-General indicated what was to be the duty of the Religious 
Shaikhs and 'Ulama, i n the c r i s i s of the war. 
The speech of the Governor-General c l e a r l y brings out the war-time 
Muslim policy of the B r i t i s h Government and i t s representatives i n the 
Sudan. Amongst other things, i t reassured with greater emphasis the 
continuance of the tolerant p o l i c y of the GoverniiBnt. A few days l a t e r , 
the Governor-General, i n a l e t t e r t o Lord Cromer, expressed how the 
speech had a very enthusiastic audience and how the S haikhs and *Ulama 
"vied with one another t o get up and make protestation of Loyalty"^?o the 
Government. I n the same l e t t e r the Governor-General wrote that i n making 
the 'protestation of Loyalty' the person prominent was a descendant of 
the Prophet, Sharif Yusuf al-Hindi, who had enormous influence i n the 
country. He also reported that the Mahdi's eldest son was very enthusiastic 
and 'vouched f o r the l o y a l t y of a l l the Mahdists'. 
But a l l these 'protestations of Loyalty 1 on the part of the 
Religious Shaikhs and the *Ulama did not f u l l y s a t i s f y the Governor-General 
20. Wingate t o Cromer, op.cit., P.R.0./F.0., 633/23. 
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who wanted something more from them. To determine how keen a l l were t o 
show t h e i r l o y a l t y t o Great B r i t a i n , the Governor-General aent them a l l 
down t o one of the offices i n the Palace and asked them that i f they 
wished t o put t h e i r feelings on paper i n a form which he could communicate 
21 
to the B r i t i s h Government, they could do so. They applied f o r some 
clerk or secretary t o assist them, but the Governor-General refused and 
asked them t o do i t e n t i r e l y by themselves. After threequarters of an 
hour's deliberation, they produced an excellent document which was signed 
by fourteen of the pr i n c i p a l r e l i g i o u s d i g n i t a r i e s of the Sudan. As 
the valuable document unequivocally expressed the l o y a l t y of the Religious 
Shaikhs and the'Ulama, extracts from i t may be quoted: 
"We, the .... Ulema, Religious Sheikhs and Notables of the Sudan" 
runs the declaration, "beg to submit to our just Government the expression 
of our deepest and most cordial s i n c e r i t y and l o y a l t y . We a f f i r m hereby 
o 
that we have never experienced other than the greatest respect f o r our 
r e l i g i o n ; that material support has been given t o our. Places of Worship; 
that Ulema have been appointed to teach the precepts of our r e l i g i o n , 
and judges to s e t t l e a l l questions pertaining t o the Mohammedan Law; 
that f a c i l i t i e s have been given f o r us f o r the performance of the Holy 
22 
Pilgrimage t o Mecca and f o r v i s i t i n g the Holy P laces; " 
Then, repudiating the action of Turkey, the document concluded: 
" The action of Turkey has been inspired by the advice and example of 
Germany, we have therefore no connection whatever with the present acts of 
21. I b i d . 
22. The text i s from, The Sudan Book of Loyalty, Khartoum, 1915; p.1. 
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Turkey or with the war which she i s now waging against Great B r i t a i n and 
Her A l l i e s , and which war i s i n no way whatever waged f o r the benefit or 
interest of Islam or the Mohammedans". When the Religious Shaikhs and 
theMJlama produced the above document, the Governor-General gave them 
numbers of printed copies of his Address to d i s t r i b u t e t o t h e i r friends. 
Although the Religious Shaikhs and^Ulama seemed t o be easily 
convinced, yet i t remains that the Governor-General *s actions t r i e d t o , 
and succeeded in, e x p l o i t i n g the religious sentiment of those Muslims 
f o r some p o l i t i c a l ends. And the p r i n c i p l e set by the Governor-General 
i n the Capital was followed everywhere else. 
Before meeting and addressing the Religious Shaikhs and the*Ulama 
i n Khartoum, the Governor-General had sent t o the p r i n c i p a l towns of the 
Muslim provinces, copies of his Address and detailed instructions as t o 
how the Governors were t o address t h e i r Religious Shaikhs. I n the 
provincial headquarters the Governors read out the Governor-General's 
speech i n the presence of the Religious Shaikhs. Some of the Governors 
even undertook tours of the d i s t r i c t s of t h e i r provinces with the object 
of reading the Governor-General's speech to the rel i g i o u s and other Shaikhs. 
I n the provinces too, response was quite satisfactory. The Governor of 
the White Nile provinces, K.U.P. Struve, wrote t o the Private Secretary of 
the Governor-General that he had interviewed eighteen re l i g i o u s Shaikhs and 
many other Shaikhs and notables, and that he had gained "an excellent 
23 
impression of the general feeling with regard t o the war with Turkey". 
Further, the same Governor wrote that the various messages, notably the 
25. Governor of the W h i t e Nile Province to the Private Secretary t o the 
Governors-General, Duem, November 23rd, 1914; W.P. 192. 
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Governor-General's Address t o the fUlama, the declaration of i n t e g r i t y of 
the Holy Places, a l l these had a very enthusiastic reception. Even many 
of the Shaikhs, the Governor mentioned, were sincere i n t h e i r offer of 
volunteers and some one even made a suggestion f o r a war tax. 
The strategy of the Governor-General worked perfec t l y w e l l , 
Some time a f t e r , with complete s a t i s f a c t i o n , he could w r i t e t o Lord Cromer: 
"The r e s u l t of a l l t h i s has been l i t t l e short of a miracle". Indeed, i n 
the next few days which followed his Address t o the Religious Shaikhs and 
the *Ulama i n Khartoum, there poured i n l e t t e r s and telegrams t o the 
Governor-General from a l l parts of the country; a l l of them contained the 
words of Loyalty. From Kassala, ' A l l al-Mirghani, whose influence had 
greatly increased i n the Sudan during those days, sent on November 12th, 
1914, an excellent telegram t o the Governor-General. Expressing his 
l o y a l t y t o Great B r i t a i n he wrote: "we regret exceedingly and our hearts 
are f i l l e d w i t h g r i e f at Turkey's action i n p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n a war against 
Great B r i t a i n . This act i s assuredly against the desire of the Sultan and 
his councillors and has given great offence t o the Moslems i n a l l four 
25 
quarters of the Globe". Further, attacking and accusing Germany f o r 
drawing Turkey i n t o the war, the message concluded: "The Germans have 
sacrificed Turkey upon the a l t a r of t h e i r ambitions and purposes which 
must end i n complete and u t t e r r u i n . This war (of Turkey) i s against the 
interests of the Muslims and has nothing whatever t o do with r e l i g i o n . 
we hereby beg t o declare our most sincere and l o y a l attachment .... 
to Great B r i t a i n , that just Government whose great respect f o r our r e l i g i o n 
24. Wingate to Cromer, op.cit., P.R.O./F.O., 633/23. 
25. The Sudan Book of Loyalty> op.cit., p.2. 
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and i n t e r e s t i n our welfare i s proved by the progress which has been made 
i n our country through j u s t i c e and c i v i l i z a t i o n " . On the next day the 
Governor-General received a similar l e t t e r from Ahmad al-Mirghanl, the 
younger brother of * A l i al-Mirghanl. Ahmad al-Mirghanl accused the Turko-
G-erman alliance and said, "we dissociate ourselves from t h i s action, as 
she (Turkey) has exceeded a l l l i m i t s and committed a crime at the 
i n s t i g a t i o n of the Germans, which i s contrary to the interests of the Moslems 
ii 26 
and of Islam. Praising Great B r i t a i n f o r the respect which she accorded 
t o Islam by adherence to the laws of the 'Mohammedan j u r i s d i c t i o n 1 , he 
proclaimed his l o y a l t y and adhesion t o the B r i t i s h Government i n a l l 
circumstances. There were also similar l e t t e r s of l o y a l t y from other 
Religious Shaikhs and the pUlama from various parts of the Sudan. 
A study of these l e t t e r s of l o y a l t y surely surprises the reader. 
I t i s r e a l l y hard t o believe that the Muslim rel i g i o u s d i g n i t a r i e s could 
pay such a t r i b u t e of l o y a l t y t o a non-Muslim power. However, i t cannot 
be denied that a l l t h i s was inspired by the Government i t s e l f . As stated 
e a r l i e r , the Governor-General pressed the Religious Shaikhs and ''Ulama t o 
27 
•put t h e i r feelings on paper'f and i t i s not u n l i k e l y that a si m i l a r 
process was followed by the Governors of the provinces. 
But whatever i t might be, the assurances given by the Governor-
28 
General t o the Religious Shaikhs and the tUlama i n his Address, were 
f u l f i l l e d . "No single p r i v i l e g e 1 granted e a r l i e r t o the Sudanese Muslims 
was 'repudiated' during the war period.v I n the turmoil and c r i s i s of the 
26. I b i d , p.3. 
27. S ee above, p. its. 
28. See above, pr. . 
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war the rel i g i o u s l i f e of the Muslims of the Sudan remained undisturbed 
and uninterferred. I n spite of the fact that Mecca was s t i l l under the 
control of Turkey, now the enemy of B r i t a i n , the Sudan Government made 
no attempt t o check the Muslims to go t o that Holy Place t o perform 
pilgrimage. Moreover, i n an answer to a question what he would do with 
the pilgrims f o r Mecca i f Turkey entered i n t o the war, the Governor-
General categorically wrote t o W.D.Kenny: " I n any case I am not going t o 
i n t e r f e r e w i t h the departure of any pilgrims from the Sudan who wish t o 
29 
v i s i t the holy places of Islam". Even when there arose the question of 
sending warships t o Jeddah, Lord Cromer strongly doubted the a d v i s a b i l i t y 
of doing so?^ For he believed that the action might create a bad 
impression i n the minds of the Muslims., who would view the presence of 
warships i n Jeddah as a menace to t h e i r Holy Places. When the war was 
going on i n f u l l swing, the crossing of the Red Sea on the part of the 
pilgrims became a highly r i s k y job; but the r i s k was greatly minimised 
when the Sudan Government Red Sea Patrol Order, 1915, provided a great 
r e l i e f f o r the pilgrims. I t declared the Holy Places of Islam free from 
a l l molestation and that no hostile operations were t o be undertaken i n 
those waters? 1 Thus, the Red Sea waters became quiet and the pilgrims 
were safe. 
But i n spite of the Sudan Governments1 extremely pro-Muslim 
p o l i c i e s , the Sudan could not enjoy complete t r a n q u i l i t y while the war with 
Turkey was going on. During t h i s period, there were obvious indications 
29. Wingate to Kenny, Khartoum, Sept.23rd. 1914; W.-P.191/3, see also above, 
30. Memorandum by Lord Cromer respecting the steps t o be taken p. 4 l i 
i n the event of war with Turkey, op.cit. 
31. The Red Sea Patrol orders, 28th May, 1915. Vide Patrol Order No.28/l(a); 
W.P. 195/6; see also above, p. 4.1, 
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that the Turko-German propaganda and ideas of Pan-Islamism were i n f i l -
t r a t i n g i n t o the country. A few months a f t e r the Turkish entry i n t o 
the war, the Governor-General came t o realise that the Turko-German 
propaganda which was then so r i f e i n Egypt, had been "gradually 
32 
f i l t e r i n g through t o the Sudan". 
With the declaration of war with Turkey, Egypt was proclaimed 
t o be a B r i t i s h Protectorate and Khedive * Abbas Pasha I I , was deposed 
f o r his 'pro-Turkish leanings 1. Under the t i t l e of Sultan, Husain 
Kamel, the senior representative of the l i n e of Muhammad f A l l Pasha, 
succeeded 6 Abbas Pasha I I . The B r i t i s h authorities i n Egypt and the 
Sudan believed that the deposed Khedive, then i n Constantinople, was 
doing everything t o inspire the peoples of Egypt and the Sudan with the 
ideas of jihad . I n A p r i l 1915, the Sudan Government authorities 
detected some undated circulars under the caption, "Circular by the mouth 
of Abbas Pasha Hilmi I I , the Khedive of Egypt"2^ I t was also found out 
that 'one Murgan Khairullah, a Sudanese o f f i c e r ' had been entrusted with 
the task of d i s t r i b u t i n g those pamphlets?1" The circulars could have been 
a good weapon i n subverting the minds of the Sudanese Muslims, had they 
not been timely intercepted. "This i s t o make you, the natives of the 
Sudan", read the c i r c u l a r , "understand that the English are making every 
contrivance f o r the eradication of the Mohammedan r e l i g i o n aid that they 
are t r y i n g and thinking t h e i r best t o eradicate the Islam f a i t h t o t a l l y " . 
32. Wingate t o Henry, Khartoum, March 10th, 1915; W.P.194/2. 
33. Translated copies of these 'Circular Jihad Propaganda1 are i n W.P.253/5-
34. From the note attached t o the 'Circular Jihad Propaganda', W.P., I b i d . 
174 
The c i r c u l a r proceeded, "Emir-el-Mumineen, i,e . the Sultan, 
orders you not t o mention but his name i n your prayers, otherwise your 
prayers are i n vai n ..... They (English) state that they are protecting 
the Holy Land, while they are throwing t h e i r bombs on i t " . The ci r c u l a r 
needs no comment as to how i t could work on the minds of the average 
Sudanese Muslims. Besides the above, some more copies of the same 
cir c u l a r were found by the customs people i n a bale of cotton at Port 
35 
Sudan, and s i g n i f i c a n t l y , they were a l l addressed to the Sudanese Shaikhs. 
But the timely intervention prevented the circulars from reaching t h e i r 
proper destinations. 
S t i l l i n 1915 there were two small r i s i n g s . Paki f A l I , one of 
the most l o y a l Nuba chiefs i n Southern Kordofan, revolted against the 
Sudan Government. Another f a k l i n G-edir, one of the strongholds of the 
Mahdists, declared jihad against the Government only with a handful of 
followers, numbering between t h i r t y and f o r t y . Both these r i s i n g s were, 
however, promptly suppressed. 
The most serious of a l l the pro-Turkish r i s i n g s , however, was the 
rev o l t of ' A l l Dinar, the Sultan of Darfur. The case of Sultan r A l l Dinar 
needs a b i t of elaboration. A member of the royal house whom the Egyptians 
had overthrown i n 1878, f A l l Dinar had f i l l e d a minor post i n Mahadist 
Omdurman where he had been compelled t o l i v e . But p r o f i t i n g from the 
confusion that arose from the defeat of Khalifa *Abd-Allah, 01 A l l Dinar f l e d 
westward with a few followers i n a bid t o gain his patrimony before any 
r i v a l should f o r e s t a l l him. He succeeded i n i n s t a l l i n g himself as the 
~W. Wingate to Fitzgerald, Khartoum, A p r i l 10th, 1915; W.P. 195/2. 
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Sultan of Darfur and became a t r i b u t a r y t o the Sultan Government. 
Since the inception of the new Sudan Government, the r e l a t i o n 
between Sultan p A l i Dinar and the Sudan Government was quite c o r d i a l , 
but i n the winter of 1914-15, the Sultan began w r i t i n g t o the Sudan 
Government i n abusive terms. Moreover, he went so f a r as to make an 
agreement with the Turks. At l a s t he wrote to the Governor-General 
they had declared a jihad against the English at the order of the Sultan 
of Turkey.^ Thus, the Governor-General was forced t o take action. I n 
the course of 1916, an Egyptian force assisted by three B r i t i s h a i r c r a f t 
conquered Darfur and k i l l e d e A l i Dinar. 
The cause of a l l these pro-Turkish ris i n g s were at t r i b u t e d by 
the Sudan Government to the Turkish propaganda of jihad which the 
Government believed was being propagated a l l over the Sudan by the Fellata 
pilgrims who "were soaked with the Jehad propaganda when they were on 
pilgrimage". Long before the Sudan Government adopted appropriate 
measures t o check the menace. As early as 1914, the Governor-General 
wrote to Doughty Wylie, " at the moment, the Sudan Government i s 
c h i e f l y concerned with the p r o b a b i l i t y of dangerous views and teachings 
being disseminated by the pilgrims returning from the Hedjaz and well 
59 
primed by the Turks f o r the purpose". But the remedy f o r t h i s was ready 
at hand. " a l l such ( p i l g r i m s ) " wrote the Governor-General, "have t o 
undergo a kind of moral d i s i n f e c t i o n at Khartoum, carried out by the l o c a l 
36. For det a i l s of 4 A l l Dinar and his reign, see, Theobald, A.B., 
e A l I Dinar, Last Sultan of Darfur. 1898-1916, Longmans, 1965. 
37. Wingate t o Brigadier General N.M.Smyth, A p r i l 12th, 1916; W.P.195/6. 
38. Wingate to Owen, A p r i l 20th, 1915; W.P. 195/1. 
39. Wingate t o Wylie, Khartoum, Dec.21st, 1914; W.P. 192. 
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r e l i g i o u s chiefs, before being allowed t o return t o t h e i r homes. 
P a r t i c u l a r l y , the pilgrimage applications from the followers of Sultan 
* A l i Dinar were care f u l l y examined, f o r the pilgrimage aspect of t h e i r 
desires was greatly suspected by the GovernnB ntV 
Besides i n s t i t u t i n g 'a kind of moral d i s i n f e c t i o n 1 f o r the 
pilgrims returning from Mecca, the Governor-General also t r i e d some other 
methods to counteract the Turkish jihad propaganda and any pro-Turkish 
feelings. For t h i s , he i n s t i t u t e d a sort of 'mild press campaign' by 
having inspired a r t i c l e s inserted p r i n c i p a l l y i n the Arabic portion of 
the Sudan Times. These a r t i c l e s t r i e d t o c l a r i f y the p o s i t i o n of Great 
B r i t a i n and t o explain the r e a l nature of the war between Great B r i t a i n 
and Turkey. On November 9th, 1914, there appeared i n the Sudan Times an 
a r t i c l e under the t i t l e , "This i s what 'Hind' was t r y i n g t o avoid". 
The following extract from the t r a n s l a t i o n of the a r t i c l e w i l l show how 
the Governor-General conducted his press campaign i n collaboration with 
the Muslim rel i g i o u s d i g n i t a r i e s . The English t r a n s l a t i o n of some 
portions of the a r t i c l e i s as follows:-
"In a c r i s i s l i k e t h i s , people of l i t t l e i n t e l l e c t and weak 
judgment .... may t h i n k that the Christians have r i s e n against the Moslems 
purely from religious motives i n an endeavour t o secure the ascendency of 
one f a i t h over another He w i l l f i n d that the Christians have divided 
i n t o two pa r t i e s , each party f i g h t i n g the other and sparing no pains t o 
destroy and crush one another. The reason f o r t h i s deadly s t r i f e has 
nothing whatever to do with r e l i g i o u s considerations. I t i s simply due to 
40. I b i d . 
41. I b i d . 
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the ambitions of each party which so much d i f f e r from the other. 
Everybody knows that England and Russia d i f f e r i n t h e i r religious ideas 
and s t i l l they are A l l i e s . The f a c t that Mohammedan Turkey has thrown 
i n her l o t w ith Germany (ifliich i s certainly not a Mohammedan power) i n 
t h i s war does not denote that she i s undertaking a religious war i n order 
to uphold the word of God. This i s simply an ordinary c i v i l or p o l i t i c a l 
war...." 
The w r i t e r of the a r t i c l e , however, did not sign his name, and i n 
i t s place stood the pseudonym "By a prominent Mohammedan w r i t e r " . Of course 
from a l e t t e r which the Governor-General wrote t o Clayton, we come t o know 
that the 'prominent Mohammedan w r i t e r 1 was "no other than the Grand Qadi of 
the Sudan"^2 
But the measures adopted by the Governor-General by no means 
confined themselves only t o the c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the s i t u a t i o n . When 
occasion arose, he did not hesitate to launch a vigorous anti-Turkish 
campaign. I n the anti-Turkish campaign, the Governor-General took great 
i n i t i a t i v e . He himself admitted that as early as i n August, 1914, he had 
started an anti-Turkish propaganda^ Moreover, with every frankness he 
could write to Lord Cromer: "Publicly I keep the people's mind on the 
German menace and p r i v a t e l y l e t some of my pr i n c i p a l native friends know 
that our r e a l enemy would probably be Turkey.... "V*" I n carrying out his 
anti-Turkish propaganda, the Governor-General got a good advisor i n the 
person of Khan Bahadur cAbd al-Qadir of Aden. The Khan Bahadur who was 
k2~. Wingate to Clayton, Nov.12th, 1914; W.P. 192. ! 
43. Wingate to G.P.Archer, Aug.13th, 1916; W.P. 201/4. 
44. Wingate t o Cromer, Khartoum, Nov.27th, 1914; P.R.O./P.O.633/23. 
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once the Governor-General's Arabic teacher used t o advise his pup i l as 
to how the Arabs of the Sudan could be s t i r r e d up against the Turks. 
46 
I n a private l e t t e r t o the Governor General, the Khan Bahadur drew the 
l a t t e r ' s a t t e n t i o n t o the famous t r a d i t i o n , namely, "The f i r s t people 
who w i l l deprive them (my nation) of t h e i r possessions and what God has 
granted them are the children of Kawitura ( i . e . T u r k s ) " ^ by which the 
Prophet had denounced the Turks before t h e i r appearance. He also assured 
the Governor-General that the t r a d i t i o n could be found i n the most 
approved books of the Prophet '.s t r a d i t i o n ; and further t o l d that the 
Prophet's predictions came tr u e , f o r the l a s t 'AbbSsids were conquered 
by the Turks and one of them was put i n a bag and kicked u n t i l he died. 
The Governor-General highly appreciated the advice of the Khan Bahadur. 
He even thanked the Khan Bahadur f o r quoting the extracts from the 
I Q 
t r a d i t i o n and considered them invaluable f o r propaganda purposes. 
Continuing f u r t h e r , the Governor-General wrote that he was taking steps 
49 
t o have " a r t i c l e s w r i t t e n i n the Morattam and other papers" on the lines 
suggested by the Khan Bahadur. 
The r e s u l t of the e f f o r t s of the.Governor-General was that during 
the war period, the Jihad and Turko-German propaganda could maj&e almost 
no headway i n the Sudan. Explaining the causes of the 'comparative f a i l u r e ' 
45. H i l l , .... S l a t i n Pasha, op.cit., p.106. 
46. Khan Bahadur eAbd al-Qadir t o W ingate, Aden, May, 1916; W.P. 200/4. 
47* The t e x t of the t r a d i t i o n i s from the Khan Bahadur's l e t t e r ; 
W.P. I b i d . 
48. Wingate t o Khan Bahadur pAbd al-Qadir, June 1st, 1916; W.P. 200/5. 
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of the Turko-German propaganda i n the Sudan, the Governor-General wrote 
t o Lord Hardinge^°the Indian Viceroy, that " the past events of 
Turkish misrule and the anti-Turkish movement which I encouraged as much 
as possible i n the e a r l i e r days of the war " largely accounted f o r 
the comparative peace which the Sudan enjoyed during the war period. 
* * * 
I I I 
A few months a f t e r the Turkish entry i n t o the war, the B r i t i s h 
Government, through a Proclamation issued t o the Arabs i n Arabia, Sudan 
and the Western Desert, gave an i n d i c a t i o n that the Arabian Peninsula 
and i t s Muslim Holy Places would remain independent at the end of the 
51 
war. But the facts indicate that even before the war ended, the 
B r i t i s h a uthorities shaped i t s policy towards the Muslim holy places of 
Mecca and Medina. The policy was mainly directed t o free these two 
Holy Ci t i e s , which were then s t i l l under the Turkish control. And f o r 
the actual working of t h i s p o l i c y , Egypt and the Sudan were used as the 
bases of operation. 
While the war was w e l l i n progress, Turkey possessed the suzerainty 
of the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina. Well beforehand, Turkey had made 
arrangements f o r an access t o one of the (Medina) by railway. This greatly 
50.. W ingate t o Lord Hardinge, Sept.23rd, 1915; W.P. 196. 
51. From ffihe Proclamation issued t o the Arabs i n Arabia, Sudan and 
Western Desert. Copies are i n W.P. 101/17/3. 
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strengthened her moral pos i t i o n , f o r she could assert t h a t , as guardian 
of the Holy C i t i e s , she was f u l f i l l i n g one of the duties of the Caliph — 
who could not indeed claim t o continue as such i f she lapsed i n t h i s 
respect. So England, with several m i l l i o n Muslim subjects i n her Empire, 
did not f a i l t o see the 'danger of a resurgent Islam based on the possession 
by the Caliph — however nominal he might be — of the Holy C i t i e s ' . For, 
the pilgrimage t o Mecca i s obligatory f o r true believers. England, long 
before, had attained her influence over the Muslim subjects not only by 
permitting the free practice of t h e i r r e l i g i o n , but by f a c i l i t a t i n g and 
encouraging, through her sea power, the pilgrimage t o Mecca by the easiest 
route available. 
As long as Turkey had been no more than a potential enemy, Turkish 
control of the Holy Cities was only a po t e n t i a l p r a c t i c a l menace, and an 
imponderable moral menace t o England. But Turkey at war with England 
turned the Holy Cities i n t o a d e f i n i t e moral and p o l i t i c a l counter which 
England was determined t o play on her side of the table. The key position 
of the Hezaj was universally recognised, and everyone was convinced that 
free access t o the Holy Cities f o r pilgrimage would have t o be assured. 
The B r i t i s h p o l icy makers realised that the Muslim subjects of t h e i r King 
might forget about the Sultan of Turkey being the Commander of the f a i t h f u l 
f o r he was only mentioned automatically as such i n Friday prayers 
52 
but i f the pilgrimage was stopped, every Muslim would hear of it. 
52. Wingate, R., Wingate of the Sudan, op.cit., p.181. 
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The B r i t i s h apprehension that Turkey might deny access of the 
Muslim pilgrims of the B r i t i s h t e r r i t o r i e s , however, does not seem to 
have a very s o l i d ground. For whatever animosity might have existed 
between Turkey and England, i t was not possible f o r the former t o stop 
the Muslim pilgrims from anywhere i n the world from entering i n t o the 
Holy C i t i e s . This she could not do, as i t would have been an i r r e l i g i o u s 
act which would have undermined her p o s i t i o n at the bottom. 
Thus, driven by her wrong logic or motivated by 'some other ends* 
England was urged by Lord Kitchener t o set herself at once t o f i n d out 
53 
ways and means to free the Holy Cities from the Turkish control. Contact 
was established with Sharif Husain, the Amir of Mecca. England t r i e d her 
best t o persuade the Sharif, by offers of assistance and guarantees of his 
future autonomy and independence, to throw o f f the Turkish supremacy and 
52. 
to keep open the Holy Cities f o r the Muslim pilgrims of the A l l i e s . 
I n December, 1914, a l e t t e r was despatched t o the Sharif through the 
55 
B r i t i s h Residency at Cairo. After that date, Henry MacMahon, the 
B r i t i s h High Commissioner i n Egypt, pursued the negotiations with the 
Sharif u n t i l June 9th, 1916, when the l a t t e r formally and f i n a l l y declared 
his independence of Turkey. 
I n organising the r e v o l t of Sharif Husain and i n i n s t i g a t i n g the 
l a t t e r with the object of freeing the Holy Cities from the Turkish control, 
the Governor-General of the Sudan was destined to play a great r o l e . Indeed, 
he was the r i g h t man t o do i t . Ever since England's rupture with Turkey, 
53. I b i d , p.181 
54. I b i d , 
55. I b i d , 
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Wingate had been an enthusiastic advocate of a policy which the B r i t i s h 
56 
Government just now adopted. He was even quite confident that should 
the policy succeed i t would bring enhanced prestige f o r the B r i t i s h 
57 
Government from her Muslim subjects.' He also keenly f e l t that t o help 
the Muslims t o maintain the dominance of t h e i r f a i t h , i t was essential 
t o set up an independent Arab Kingdom, which should be entrusted with the 
58 
guardianship of the Holy Places of Islam. 
As he was so much interested, so the burden of the task f e l l upon 
him. At the j o i n t request of the High Commissioner of Egypt, and the 
G.O.C., Egyptian Expeditionary Force, Wingate accepted the general control 
of the m i l i t a r y matters oonnected with the assistance of the Sharif. 
Wingate sent Wilson Pasha, the Governor and Commandant of the Red Sea 
province, t o Jeddah as a pilgrimage o f f i c e r . By doing so, Wingate hoped 
that Wilson's presence at Jeddah i n an o f f i c i a l capacity would enable him 
t o get i n close touch with the Sharif who might be advised with regard t o 
59 
the various matters connected with the r e v o l t . 
The B r i t i s h p o l icy was successful i n inducing Sharif Husain t o 
cast o f f the Turkish allegiance. The Holy Cities were now free from the 
Turkish suzerainty. Even a f t e r the r e v o l t was accomplished, Wingate kept 
him busy i n strengthening the Sharif by various means. He proposed t o 
Sir William Robertson, Chief of the Imperial General St a f f , that on the 
successful termination of the East African operations, as many Muslim 
567 Wingate t o W.G. Thesiger, Erkoit, July 13th, 1916; W.P. 201/3. 
57. Wingate t o Wigram, E r k o i t , July 26th, 1916; W.P. 201/3. 
58. I b i d . 
59. Wingate t o Sultan of Egypt, Erkoit, July 26th, 1916; W.P. 201/5. 
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troops as possible should be sent t o assist the Sharif. Wingate was 
wise enough not t o send any Christian soldiers t o Hezaj, because he 
believed that t h i s action might put a dangerous propaganda weapon i n 
the hands of the Turks. " the rel i g i o u s question i s a serious bar", 
he wrote t o Maxwell, "to giving more p r a c t i c a l help i n the way of an 
expeditionary force (composed of Christian s o l d i e r s ) , as the Hezaj Arabs 
are p a r t i c u l a r l y averse t o anything l i k e Christian interference i n 
61 
proximity t o the Holy Places of Islam". The re s u l t was that Wingate 
had to employ only the Egyptian Muslim soldiers, and also t o borrow the 
services of some specialist Indian Army Muslim personnel. 
* * * 
IV 
I t i s a f i r m conviction of the majority of the Muslims that the 
dign i t y and welfare of Islam are ihspearable from i t s perpetuation as an 
independent p o l i t i c a l system, as contrasted with a creed or a mere school 
of ethics; and demand f i r m guarantee f o r the perpetual sanctity and 
i n v i o l a b i l i t y t o access by Christians or other non-Muslims, of the lands 
containing the holy shrines, p a r t i c u l a r l y those of Mecca and Medina. 
I t i s worth noting that on the a b i l i t y of the Ottoman Sultans to give 
such guarantees, by reason of the m i l i t a r y supremacy and geographical 
p o s i t i o n of the Ottoman Empire, was based t h e i r surest claim t o the 
60. Wingate t o Robertson, August 17th, 1916; W.P. 201/4. 
61. Wingate t o Maxwell, Erkoit, August 23rd, 1916; W.P. 201/6. 
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Caliphate. This brings i n t o l i g h t the importance of the Caliph f o r the 
Muslims. 
Thus, when the prospect of the war was i n favour of the A l l i e s 
and when i t was quite evident that the doom of Turkey was inevitable, 
the question of who was to replace the Turkish Sultan as the Caliph of 
Islam, appeared as a sign of interrogation i n the minds of many educated 
Muslims. I n view of the importance of the i n s t i t u t i o n of Caliphate f o r 
the Muslims, i t was indeed a problematic s i t u a t i o n . As the defeat and 
f a l l of Turkey became quite certain, the "young Arab P art y " vigorously 
placed t h e i r case t o f i l l the vacuum: 
"Without the guarantee afforded by an independent Caliphate, the 
future of the Muslims w i l l be that of the Jews - v i z , complete p o l i t i c a l 
dependency; .... the independence and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of the (A s i a t i c ) 
Arab countries are essential t o the existence of such a Caliphate; .... 
the i n v i o l a b i l i t y of the Holy Places of Islam t o access by non-Moslems 
can best be secured i f t h e i r approaches by land are allowed to remain 
" 62 
under independent Arab control. 
But i t was not the Muslims who were alone troubled with the future 
state of the Caliphate. S i g n i f i c a n t l y enough, a few of the Englishmen 
closely associated with the a f f a i r s of the Muslims, quite r i g h t l y shared 
the anxiety of the Muslim i n respect of the future of the Caliphate. 
Wingate, perhaps, was the f i r s t t o express his concern, " I am inclined t o 
think" he wrote to St.Loe Strachey, "that w i t h the trend of events i n the 
Constantinople d i r e c t i o n i t i s about time that the public mind i s , t o a 
62. As quoted by Col.G.S.Symes i n his a r t i c l e (Typescript): "The Caliphate 
and the Future of Islam". I t i s i n W.P. 194/2. 
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certain extent, concentrated on the general question of Islam and what i s 
to happen i f Turkey f i n a l l y collapses".^ " I n other words", he concluded, 
"the much vexed question of the Moslem Khalifate w i l l have t o be faced". 
Wing ate even did not stop there; he went a step further with his own 
suggestion. To Charles Edward Grey he wrote: " I hope that with the 
downfall of the Ottoman kingdom and Khalifate, i t may be possible t o 
reward the splendid l o y a l t y of Indians, Sudanese and other Empire Moslems, 
by holding out some hope that t h e i r co-religionists i n Arabia would be 
allowed t o establish an independent Arab Caliphate under B r i t i s h a e g i s " . ^ 
One of the chief architects of the Arab Revolt, he with great eagerness 
expressed t o Lord Cromer that the B r i t i s h G-overnment should declare the 
65 
name of Sharif Husain of Mecca f o r the future post of the Caliph. 
To cir c u l a t e his own views i n the B r i t i s h press, Wingate instructed 
66 
Col.G.S.Symes, his private S ecretary t o prepare a r t i c l e s j u s t i f y i n g his 
support f o r an Arab Caliphate. For the future post of Caliph, Wingate so 
much recommended the name of Sharif Husain t h a t , without he s i t a t i o n , he 
wrote t o Sir Edward Grey: " as f a r as we can see at present, the 
most l i k e l y candidate ( f o r the future Caliphate) — when the house of 
Ottoman disappears from the scene i s the Sharif of Mecca"^ Within the 
Sudan, Wingate t r i e d t o convince the rel i g i o u s authorities on the same issue 
and i n t h i s he believed t o have achieved considerable success. "As f a r as 
~ST. Wingate t o Straohey, Khartoum, A p r i l 7th, 1915; W.P. 195/2. 
64. Wingate t o Grey, Khartoum, March 15th, 1915; W.P. 194/3/1. 
65. Wingate t o Cromer, August 3rd, 1915; W.P. I b i d . 
66. "The Caliphate and the future of Islam". (Typescript) and "A furt h e r 
note on the B r i t i s h Policy i n Arabia and i t s r e l a t i o n t o B r i t i s h 
Moslem policy" (Typescript). Both a r t i c l e s are i n W.P. 194/2. 
67. Wingate t o Grey, Khartoum, July 20th, 1915; W.P. 196. 
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I can make out", he wrote t o Gen. C.E.Callwell, "there seems t o be 
a concensus of opinion amongst Sudan reli g i o u s authorities that the 
Sharif Husain of Mecca has a l l the qualities and a t t r i b u t e s t o f i l l 
the important positi o n and they are strongly i n favour of t h i s 
68 
nominee". Even before w r i t i n g t o Callwell, he wrote t o Lord Hardinge, 
"Syed A l i al-Mirghani plumps f o r the present Sharif of Mecca as a 
suitable man as Khalifa i n succession t o the present S u l t a n " ^ He also 
advised the Indian Viceroy t o prepare the minds of the Indian Muslims 
to accept the Arab Caliphate?^ Wingate was so keen i n t h i s matter 
that he, at his own i n i t i a t i v e , arranged f o r a messenger t o establish 
connection between the gharif and f A l l a l Mirghanl? 1 He hoped t h i s 
would f a c i l i t a t e good understanding between the two. 
While chapioning the cause of Sharif Husain f o r the Caliphate, 
Wingate greatly disfavoured the pro-Turkish a t t i t u d e of the Indian 
72 
Muslims; But i n spite of the Indian Muslims 1 i n c l i n a t i o n f o r the 
Ottoman dynasty, he suggested t o Clayton that "a propaganda on the l i n e 
of Pan-Arab Pan-Islamic movement'^was the need of the hour. "On the 
otherhand" he furt h e r stressed, " i f we hesitate t o support by every means 
i n our power the Pan-Arab Pan-Islamic movement, we sh a l l f i n d our enemies 
running i t f o r a l l they are worth the moment the Ottoman Dynasty begins 
to crumble11?*1' I t seems i t was only t h i s apprehension which urged Wingate 
to advocate the oause of Pan-Arab Pan-Islamic movement and that of the 
68. Wingate t o Callwell, Oct.19th, 1915; W.P. 197/1/2. 
69. Wingate t o Hardinge, May 14th, 1915; W.P. 195/6. 
70. I b i d . 
71. Wingate t o Cromer, Nov.11th, 1915; W.P. 197/2/1. 
72. Wingate t o Clayton, October 20th* 1915; W.P. 197/1/2. 
73. I b i d . 
74. I b i d . 
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Arab Caliphate. He did not want t o see his enemy stealing a march upon 
him i n matters of establishing a new Caliphate f o r the Muslims. 
While Wingate was doing everything i n his power t o back Sharif 
Husain, he was at the same time aware that the Egyptian nationalists 
might argue and claim the new Caliphate on the obvious grounds that 
Egypt was f a r more prepared than any other Muslim State t o run arrangements, 
as i t took the lead i n religious education and had a good number of highly 
75 
educated Muslims who could be entrusted with the a f f a i r s of the State. 
But f a r from supporting the Egyptian views, Wingate was greatly against 
i t . The reasons f o r his opposition are quite evident. He believed that 
i f B r i t i s h G-overnment sanctioned such an arrangement, i t would pave the 
way f o r re-asserting Egyptian independence. For, the new independent 
Caliph and Sultan would not owe his positi o n and t i t l e t o a 'Christian 
Protector 1. He warned Clayton, " a recrudescence of Egyptian 
nationalism under the guise of the embryonic sovereign State and Khalifate 
76 
i s something t o be watched f o r . " 
The policy of the Governor-General to influence the B r i t i s h 
Government t o render support and help f o r the creation of an Arab Caliphate, 
however, could not draw any support from the o f f i c i a l c i r c l e s i n England. 
On the point of establishing either an Arab Caliphate or an Arab Kingdom, 
the stand of the B r i t i s h policy makers was clear. I t can be read from a 
l e t t e r of the Governor-General of the Sudan to the Indian Viceroy. "His 
Majesty's Government" wrote Wingate t o Lord Hardinge, "have decided that 
an essential condition of peace w i l l be that the Arabian Peninsula and i t s 
75. Wingate to Clayton, Erkoit, May 15th, 1915; W.P. 195A< 
76. I b i d . 
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sacred shrines shall remain i n the hands of an independent Sovereign S t a t e d 
that the question must be decided by the Moslems without the interference 
of the Powers, but that should the Moslems decide and declare t h e i r 
adherence to an Arab Caliphate, t h e i r decision w i l l naturally be respected 
by His Majesty's Government; t h i s decision, however, i s one f o r the Muslims 
78 
t o make." Thus, the policy of the B r i t i s h Government was t o favour the 
creation of an independent Arabian Kingdom and not an Arab Caliphate. 
" the future of the Caliphate" stressed the Marquess of Crewe, "Must 
be a matter f o r the Muslim world i t s e l f , I t i s not f o r us .... t o attempt 
79 
t o impose a Caliph on the Muslim world". Even he considered i t highly 
i m p o l i t i c t o bring about by any f o r c i b l e means a s i t u a t i o n which would i n 
80 
practice compel the choice t o f a l l on a pa r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l . This view 
gathered so strong a support i n England that S.Loe Strachey refused t o 
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publish the a r t i c l e s of Col.Symes i n $he Spectator, only because the 
a r t i c l e s put forward the case of Sharif Husain f o r the future Caliph. 
Making a pointed reference t o the B r i t i s h policy with regard t o the 
question of Caliphate, Strachey remarked: we are not going t o impose 
any conditions on t h e i r (Muslim) f a i t h or impose any candidate f o r the 
Caliphate. The matter i s a holy mystery which only Mohammadans can deal 
with"? 2 
Here, at t h i s stage an attempt may be made t o explain the 
i n d i f f e r e n t a t t i t u d e of the B r i t i s h Government to the future question of 
the Caliphate. Apart from the f a c t that the matter was 'a holy mystery' 
77* I t may be noted that t h i s independent Arab State was not created as 
promised; and t h i s constitutes one of the t r a g i c chapters of the Arab 
Revolt of 1916. 
78. Wingate t o Hardinge, Erkoit, A p r i l 28th,.1915; W.P. 195/3. 
79. Speech of the Marquess of Crewe i n .the House of Lords, A p r i l 20th,1915; found i n a press-cutting i n P.R.0./F.0* 633/32. 80. I b i d . 81. See above p.igs. 82. Strachey t o Cromer, August 9th, 1915; W.P. 196. 
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which could be dealt with only by the Muslims, the whole a f f a i r involved 
some major complications which prevented the B r i t i s h Government from 
p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the debacle. I n the f i r s t place, i t was undoubtedly a 
matter which was purely f o r the Muslims to decide; and on t h i s ground the 
B r i t i s h Government, a non-Muslim and above a l l a Christian Power, was 
r i g h t not to i n t e r f e r e . 
Secondly, many i n England held the opinion that i n the event* of 
the Caliphate being abandoned by the Sultan of Turkey i t would not be at 
a l l impossible that the Muslim world would revert t o the state of things 
which existed before the Ottoman Sultan Selim had 'usurped1 the t i t l e i n 
the sixteenth century. This was p a r t i c u l a r l y the view of Lord Cromer who 
duly communicated i t to Wingate. 
Thirdly, by no means could the B r i t i s h Government afford t o 
disregard the general sentiment of the Indian Muslims who supported the 
cause of the Ottoman dynasty. "Indian Moslems and Ulema" wrote Lord 
8*4-
Hardinge, "are very pro-Turkish". This i s also indicated by the trend 
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of the Caliphate movement i n India. The pro-Turkish tendency of the 
Indian Muslims i s best i l l u s t r a t e d by Maurice -de-Bunsen, who on behalf 
of the Secretary of State, wrote t o Sir Henry McMahon, "The Agha Khan came 
t o see me today, and dwelt very strongly on the f a c t that the Moslems of 
86 
India are not well disposed towards an Arab Caliphate". And continuing 
83. Cromer t o Wingate, August 28th, 1916; W.P. 153/7. 
84. Hardinge t o Wingate, Simla, Sept. 1st, 1915; W.P. 196. 
85. The Indian Muslims r e a l l y favoured the Turkish Caliph and they almost 
showed no feelings f o r an Arab Caliphate although many of them fought 
f o r the B r i t i s h against the Turks i n Mesopotamia. 
86. Maurice-de-Bunsen to Henry McMahon, Nov.2nd, 1915; W.P. 197/2/1. 
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f u r t h e r he said, " I t would,therefore, be a great mistake f o r us t o get 
mixed up i n a movement f o r such a Caliphate and i t would cause a great 
87 
trouble i n India". 
Lastly, the B r i t i s h Government greatly apprehended that i t s 
i n i t i a t i v e t o back the case of Sharif Husain could bring them t o 
'loggerheads' with France which would then "run the Sultan of Morocco as 
88 
a candidate f o r the Caliphate". Certainly at that c r i t i c a l hour the 
B r i t i s h Government could by no means create a r i v a l r y with a f r i e n d l y 
power l i k e France. 
These are b r i e f l y the reasons that explain B r i t i s h Government 
action with regard to the question of the Caliphate. To repeat, what 
the B r i t i s h Government was ready t o concede was to favour an independent 
or autonomous Arabia i n the country inhabited by the Arabs. But anything 
they promised to the Arabs, or any action they were prepared t o take t o 
support the Arabs was t o be of a p o l i t i c a l and secular character. The 
B r i t i s h Government regarded the Caliphate question as a thing which i t 
preferred the Muslims t o s e t t l e without the interference of any non-
Muslim power. 
Although an independent Arab Kingdcmwas not created as was 
promised, yet the trends of events revealed that i n matters of the 
question of Caliphate, the policy of the B r i t i s h Governmsnt prevailed 
upon that of Wingate. And s i g n i f i c a n t l y enough, the question was f i n a l l y 
87. I b i d . 
88. Cromer t o Wingate, August 28th, 1916; W.P. 153/7-
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s e t t l e d , as always held by the B r i t i s h Government, by the Muslims 
themselves, when Mustafa Kamal of Turkey abolished the i n s t i t u t i o n 
i n 1924. 
* * * 
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CONCLUSION. 
To conclude, an attempt may be made t o evaluate the Islamic 
p o l i c i e s of the Sudan Government with a view t o showing i t s impact on 
Sudanese Islam and Sudanese Muslims. 
From the very beginning of t h e i r r u l e , the B r i t i s h administra-
tors i n the Sudan, as they claimed, had been s t r i c t l y observing the 
principles of tolerance and non-interference i n matters of Muslim 
r e l i g i o n . Lord Kitchener, the f i r s t Governor-General of the Sudan 
through his remarkable directives to his subordinates i n the provinces 
made i t quite clear that there would be no interference with the 
2 
r e l i g i o n of the Muslims. Again, during a period of great c r i s i s , 
Wingate re-emphasised the said policy i n his speech t o the eUlama.^ 
Trimingham called the Islamic policy of the Government as one of 
"protective t o the extreme".^ Now what were the factors that helped 
the B r i t i s h administrators follow such a tolerant and l i b e r a l policy? 
1. Here i t may be that the Muslim approach to r e l i g i o n i s quite 
d i f f e r e n t from that of the West." While West divides l i f e i n t o two 
watertight compartments, v i z , secular and r e l i g i o u s , t o the Muslims 
t h i s d i v i s i o n i s quite a l i e n . Hence t o the Muslims t h e i r r e l i g i o n , 
i . e . Islam, i s not merely a r e l i g i o n — i t i s a p o l i t i c a l , social 
and legal way of l i f e . As the term r e l i g i o n c a l l s up quite d i f f e r e n t 
perceptions with the Muslims from those i t calls up i n Western minds, 
so from the Muslim point of view, the expression 'non-interference i n t 
religion 1 has no legal basis. 
2. See above, p.7. 
3. See above, p^its-itfc. 
4. Trimingham,J.S., The Christian approach to Islam i n the Sudan, op.cit 
p. 26. 
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To the c r i t i c s , the B r i t i s h r e l i g i o u s policy i n the Muslim 
5 
t e r r i t o r i e s had always been "devoid of crusading s p i r i t " . This 
charge of the c r i t i c s i s cer t a i n l y t r u e . For, the B r i t i s h never 
embarked upon a policy of large scale conversion of the Muslims under 
t h e i r r u l e t o t h e i r own f a i t h . There were, of course, ample reasons 
f o r such a non-crusading poli c y . While engaged i n the administration 
of a Muslim country, the B r i t i s h administrators always took i n t o 
account one important f a c t . They could correctly realise that f o r 
t h e i r Muslim subjects, Islam provided a religious and c u l t u r a l i d e a l 
which they would most stubbornly defend. Thus, i t i s found that 
although very often the B r i t i s h administrators defamed many of the 
I s l a n i c i n s t i t u t i o n s "behind the backs of the r e l i g i o u s community i n 
t h e i r European publications",^ yet they did not make any attempt t o 
destroy the Islamic i n s t i t u t i o n s under t h e i r administration. 
Apart from the r e a l i z a t i o n of the fact that the Muslims would 
render a tough resistence t o defend t h e i r own c u l t u r a l and reli g i o u s 
values, there was another factor which made the B r i t i s h r e l i g i o u s policy 
devoid of every crusading zeal. I t was the t r a i n i n g and reli g i o u s 
outlook with which the B r i t i s h administrators were equiped. For example 
the very nature and character of the B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s at once made them 
non-crusaders. The reason was that almost a l l of them wsre the products 
of the B r i t i s h public schools; and naturally they inherited the attitudes 
prevailing i n them, vihich made these people 'i n d i f f e r e n t to r e l i g i o n and 
5. LenczowskL, G-, The Middle East i n World A f f a i r s , (second e d i t i o n ) , 
New York, p.520. 
6. The Muslim World, Vol. L I I , No.3., July, 1962, p.228. 
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a l l kinds of religious speculations'. I t i s a f a c t that as a body the 
B r i t i s h o f f i c e r s of the Sudan Government had almost no knowledge of or 
interest i n the history of Chri s t i a n i t y and Islam and t h e i r doctrines, 
' What they had of r e l i g i o n was i t s moral rather than doctrinal content'I 
Naturally t h i s religious a t t i t u d e of the B r i t i s h o f f i c e r s , which was 
largely shaped by the. B r i t i s h public schools and also by the environment 
i n which they grew up, made them most tolerant and least f a n a t i c . So, 
armed with these ideas and at t i t u d e s , they could never consider the 
reconquest of the Sudan as a God-sent opportunity t o avenge the death of 
General Gordon and t o convert the whole country, p a r t i c u l a r l y the Muslim 
North, t o Chr i s t i a n i t y which again was once the r e l i g i o n of the land'. 
On the contrary, there are evidences t o show how resolutely they prevented 
every such attempt.^ 
Another version of the o r i t i c i s m of the B r i t i s h policy of 
religious non-interference manifests i t s e l f i n the assertion that the 
9 
B r i t i s h Muslim policy was "one of extreme conservatism", which again i s 
a t t r i b u t e d t o two factors, namely, "a genuine concern f o r the fa t e of the 
•subject peoples' and a shrewd understanding of the interests of the 
10 
home country". Henoe, i t i s alleged that the religious courts, the 
religious law and the t r a d i t i o n a l Muslim educational i n s t i t u t i o n s were 
l e f t to t h e i r own fate and allowed'to go t h e i r own way.1 
7. This point i s thoroughly discussed by H i l l , see, S l a t i n Pasha, op.cit, 
p. 80; and also M.E.S., V o l . I , No.2, January, 1965; pp.114-115. 
8. See above, Chapter V. 
9. Muslim World, V o l . L I I . , op.cit; p.231. 
10. I b i d , pp.228-229. 
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From two e a r l i e r chapters , i t w i l l appear that these charges 
mainly levelled against Cromer's Islamic policy, are not wholly true 
i n the case of the Sudan. Beyond doubt, an exhaustive programme of 
reforms of Islam and i t s i n s t i t u t i o n s was certainly not launched. 
Apart from the f a c t that i n the early years the Government was mostly 
preoccupied with greater i n t e r n a l and external security, sound finance, 
and good communication, there were other p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s which 
stood i n the way of executing such a reforming pol i c y . Undoubtedly, 
i n the Sudan as elsewhere, Islam was i n a stagnant and degenerate state 
and no one could deny that i t needed urgent reforms. But t o introduce 
reforms i n Islam and i n i t s i n s t i t u t i o n s by a Government, with i t s non-
Muslim facade and p i l l a r s outside and inside, was i n every sense a 
dangerous proposition. This move was most l i k e l y t o encounter the 
opposition from the vast majority of the conservative peoples. 
I n spite of t h i s , i t i s not f u l l y correct t o presume that the 
B r i t i s h administrators did not t h i n k i n terms of reforms i n Muslim 
i n s t i t u t i o n s . What probably troubled Cromer was not how t o destroy the 
i n s t i t u t i o n s of Islam, but "how,without shattering a l l that i s worthy 
and noble i n Moslem r e l i g i o n , the quasi-religious i n s t i t u t i o n s of the 
country can be reformed t o such an extent as no longer t o constitute 
" 12 
an insuperable b a r r i e r t o progress. Furthermore, at the beginning of 
th i s century, Cromer suggested t o the leaders of the Islamic community 
that they introduce some moderate reforms i n the Islamic Courts, which 
11. See Chapters, I and I I . 
12. Reports by His Majesty's Agent and Consul General on the Finances, 
Administration and Condition of Egypt and the Soudan i n 1906; 
Egypt No.1. (1907) o. 3394; p.116. 
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were u t t e r l y i n e f f i c i e n t and corrupt. But the conservative c i r c l e opposed; 
and i n 1903, when a member of the Egyptian Legislative Council announced 
that nothing connected with the religious courts stood i n need of reform, 
13 
a majority confirmed the proposition. Even the sincere attempts t o 
i n i t i a t e reforms by the reformist and modernist l i k e Shaikh Muhammad*Abdu 
and his followers, also came under heavy f i r e . "Their task" wrote Cromer, 
" i s one of great d i f f i c u l t y , f o r they are constantly exposed to c r i t i c i s m 
11 14 
.... that t h e i r action i s not merely i l l e g a l but also sacrilegious . 
Thus, i n the face of opposition from the conservative and orthodox 
c i r c l e s , the B r i t i s h p o l icy was naturally bound to be 'conservative' i n 
matters of reform i n re l i g i o u s i n s t i t u t i o n s . Hence, throughout the period, 
the stand of the B r i t i s h was that " the demand f o r reforms should 
spring spontaneously from the Moslem population, and that the nature of the 
reforms t o be executed should, i n the main, be indicated by component 
Moslem authority with a minimum amount of European interference or 
assistance".^ 
The above arguments and contentions were t r u e , not only i n the case 
of Egypt, but were s i m i l a r l y applicable to the conditions of the Sudan, 
which was even more backward than Egypt. I n the Sudan the people were so 
backward and r e l i g i o u s l y conservative, that any reform, secular or 
re l i g i o u s , by a non-Muslim Government, was indeed a task next t o impossible. 
13. Colvin, Sir Auckland, The Making of Modern Egypt, London, 1906; p.285. 
14. Reports by His Majesty's Agent and Consul-General on the Finances, 
Administration and Condition of Egypt and the Soudan i n 1905; Egypt No.1 
(1906) cd. 2817; p.15. 
15. Reports on the Finances, Administration and Condition of Egypt and 
the progress of reform. Egypt No.2 (1897) C.8332; p.18. 
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But to his c r e d i t , Wingate, the successor of Kitchener, was shrewd enough 
to realise i t , and fortunately, his actions as the Governor-General of 
the Sudan, go a long way to mitigate the charge that the B r i t i s h administra-
t o r s were extremely •conservative' and 'devoid of reforming zeal' i n 
matters r e l a t i n g t o Islam. 
From the very beginning, Wingate was quite aware of the f a c t that 
many of the reforms that would be. necessary f o r a Western power t o introduce 
might "at f i r s t prove unacceptable to a people s t i l l l i v i n g l a r g e l y i n the 
16 
Mosaic t r a d i t i o n " . Thus, while the new administrative reforms were 
inevitable, at the same time he f e l t i t necessary to avoid wounding t h e i r 
s u s c e p t i b i l i t i e s by the introduction of these reforms. To persuade the 
Muslims to accept the 'innovations', he c a r e f u l l y prepared the ground i n 
advance. One of his f i r s t steps, therefore, was t o appoint a Board of 
?Ulama who "could not only advise on matters of re l i g i o u s procedure 
but, where new measures of social reform were t o be introduced, t o use 
t h e i r influence i n order t o get them adopted without f r i c t i o n " ! ^ 
The above point can be nicely i l l u s t r a t e d when t h i s Board of*Ulama 
came to help the Government t o introduce various hygienic reforms i n and 
around Khartoum. I n the old days of the Turko-Egyptian r u l e , Khartoum had 
been a very unhealthy c i t y owing t o the f a c t that malarial mosquitoes bred 
unchecked. I n time, a Sanitation Squad was formed, whose duty i t was t o 
hunt down mosquitoes wherever they happened to be. As these mosquitoes 
16. Papers concerning the Proposed Memoir (by? of ?) Gen.Sir .Reginald 
Wingate, 1946; op.cit. 
17. I b i d . 
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could breed i n wells, stagnant water i n the compounds of the houses, 
and even i n the saucers that caught the drippings from earthenware 
water-coolers that were to be found i n every house, i t was necessary 
f o r the Sanitary Inspectors t o v i s i t every house i n the town. This 
v i s i t a t i o n was not only unwelcome i n i t s e l f , but i t might mean intruding 
i n t o the privacy of the womens1 quarters, which i n a Muslim country, was 
almost unthinkable. This d i f f i c u l t y might have proved insuperable without 
the influence and support of the eUlama. To have made a f o r c i b l e entrance 
i n t o the houses would have aroused b i t t e r h o s t i l i t y and might w e l l have 
resulted i n violence and bloodshed. But the ffUlama carefully explained 
t o the people the reason, and arranged that at certain hours of the day, 
when the Sanitary Inspectors would c a l l , the women should be safely 
secluded. This was done, and malaria was combatedl^ This i s indeed, a 
nice example of how a necessary reform was effected without offending the 
reli g i o u s prejudice of the people. 
Apart from one or two minor reforms of t h i s type, no attempt was 
made by the B r i t i s h administrators t o i n i t i a t e reforms i n the main body 
of Islam owing t o the complications that involved the entire question. 
This greatly hampered the eradication of many social customs that became 
unduly interwoven with r e l i g i o n . Thus, we f i n d that the obnoxious practice 
of female circumcision continued u n t i l 1936, when the eUlama only took a 
step t o suppress i t . 
18. I b i d . 
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While t h i s was the actual picture, i t would s t i l l be wrong to 
hold that the f i r s t twenty-five years of j o i n t Anglo-Egyptian r u l e , 
and p a r t i c u l a r l y the B r i t i s h p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the administration of 
the Sudan, had no effect on Islam and i t s i n s t i t u t i o n s . I t may be 
recalled that during the Anglo-Egyptian rule the Muslim Qadis, administer-
ing religious law had been retained. We have also seen how these laws 
19 
were even sometimes modified by Government Ordinances or Regulations. 
But the most remarkable thing i n t h i s respect i s how these Muslim 
j u r i s t s under the new administration were beginning t o f e e l the need t o 
adapt t h e i r methods t o the times i n which they l i v e d , i n order t o avoid 
that i n e l a s t i c formalism which made Islam completely stagnant. The 
words of the Grand Qadi bear eloquent testimony t o t h i s changed a t t i t u d e . 
The new Government's recognition of the<Ulama 'as belonging t o 
representative body of educated Muslim opinion, either as judges or as 
counsellors' had surely a s o l i t a r y effect upon the Muslims of the land. 
The benefits of t h i s action of the Government manifested i t s e l f i n that i t 
beyond doubt worked t o s o l i d i f y the people of the Northern Sudan as 
Muslims by promoting 'a fe e l i n g of sober r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 1 . 
Thus, while Egypt's nominal association i n the administration of 
the Sudan had resulted i n the 'Islamic c u l t u r a l reinforcement' through 
Egyptian teachers and Egyptian books, the various reformatory measures 
of the English rulers had also produced some beneficial e f f e c t s . The 
19. See above, Chapter I . 
20. See above, p. |9, 
reforms and improvements of the c i v i l and criminal codes of law, 
reforms i n education, even a g r i c u l t u r a l and other programmes — a l l 
of which manifested the s c i e n t i f i c and technological superiority of 
the West, were just beginning t o produce a profound e f f e c t , not only 
upon the fUlaraa and o f f i c i a l r e ligious hierarchy, but even the Heads 
of the great tarlqas - 'the inheritors of the mantle of the great 
Fa3ds of the past 1 - began t o f e e l the impact of the new trends set 
by the new administration. Slowly these religious leaders came t o 
realise that the time had come to choose the 'path of progress'. Once 
imbued with t h i s new sentiment, these leaders with t h e i r enlightened 
leadership had been of much value to the new administration. Perhaps 
i t i s t h i s alone which had played a great contributary role t o lessen 
the hazards which accompanied l a t e r days' rapid transformation from 
the old ways to the new. 
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APPENDIX I 
THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN AGREEMENT OF 1899. 
Agreement between Her Britannic Majesty's Government and the 
Government of His Highness the Khedive of Egypt, r e l a t i v e t o the future 
administration of the Sudan. 
WHEREAS cert a i n provinces i n the Sudan which were i n r e b e l l i o n 
against the authority of His Highness have now been reconquered by the 
j o i n t m i l i t a r y and f i n a n c i a l e f f o r t s of Her Britannic Majesty's Govern-
ment and the Government of His Highness the Khedive; and WHEREAS i t has 
become necessary to decide upon a system f o r the administration of and 
f o r the making of laws f o r the said reconquered provinces, under which 
due allowance may be made f o r the backward and unsettled condition of 
large portions thereof, and f o r the varying requirements of d i f f e r e n t 
l o c a l i t i e s ; and WHEREAS i t i s desired t o give effe c t to the claims which 
have accrued to Her Britannic Majesty's Government, by r i g h t of conquest, 
t o share i n the present settlement and future working and development of 
the said system of administration and l e g i s l a t i o n ; and WHEREAS i t i s 
conceived that f o r many purposes Wadi Haifa and Suakin may be most e f f e c t -
i v e l y administered i n conjunction w i t h the reconquered provinces t o which 
they are respectively adjacent; 
NOW IT IS HEREBY AGREED AND DECLARED by and between the under-
signed, duly authorized f o r that purpose as follows: 
ARTICLE I 
The word 'Sudan' i n t h i s agreement means a l l the t e r r i t o r i e s south 
2®2 
of the 22nd p a r a l l e l of l a t i t u d e , which — 
1. Have never been evacuated by Egyptian troops since the year 
1882; or 
2. Which, having before the l a t e r e b e l l i o n been administered by 
the Government of His Highness the Khedive, were temporarily l o s t t o 
Egypt, and have been reconquered by Her Majesty's Government and the 
Egyptian Government, acting i n concert; or 
3. Which may be hereafter reconquered by the two Governments 
acting i n concert. 
ARTICLE I I 
The B r i t i s h and Egyptian flags s h a l l be used together, both on 
land and water, throughout the Sudan, except i n the town of Suakin, i n 
which l o c a l i t y the Egyptian f l a g alone s h a l l be used. 
ARTICLE I I I 
The supreme m i l i t a r y and c i v i l command of the Sudan sha l l be 
vested i n one o f f i c e r , termed the 'Governor-General of the Sudan'. He 
sha l l be appointed by Khedivial Decree on the recommendation of her 
33ritannio Majesty's Government and sh a l l be removed only by Khedivial 
Decree, with the consent of Her Britannic Majesty's Government. 
ARTICLE IV 
Laws, as also orders and regulations with the f u l l force of law, 
f o r the good government of the Sudan, and for regulating the holding, 
1. A separate agreement was signed about Suakin on the 19th January,1899 
but was repealed i n July of the same year and the administration of 
the town became the same as the rest of the country. 
203 
disposal, and devolution of property of every kind therein s i t u a t e , may 
from time t o time be made, altered, or abrogated by Proclamation of the 
G-overnor-G-eneral. Such laws, orders, and regulations may apply t o the 
whole or any named part of the Sudan, and may, either e x p l i c i t l y or by 
necessary implication, a l t e r or abrogate any existing law or regulation. 
A l l such Proclamations shall be f o r t h w i t h n o t i f i e d t o Her 
Britannic Majesty's Agent and Consul-General i n Cairo, and to the 
President of the Council of Ministers of His Highness the Khedive. 
ARTICLE V 
No Egyptian law, decree, m i n i s t e r i a l arrete, or other enactment 
hereafter to be made or promulgated shall apply t o the Sudan or any part 
thereof, save i n so f a r as the same s h a l l be applied by Proclamation of 
the Governor-General i n manner hereinbefore provided. 
ARTICLE V I I I 
The j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Mixed Tribunals s h a l l not extend nor be 
recognized f o r any purpose whatsoever, i n any part of the Sudan, except 
i n the town of Suakin. 
ARTICLE IX 
U n t i l and save so f a r as i t s h a l l be otherwise determined by 
Proclamation, the Sudan with the exception of Suakin s h a l l be and remain 
under mar t i a l law. 
ARTICLE X 
No Consuls, Vice-Consuls, or Consular Agents, s h a l l be accredited 
i n respect of nor allowed t o reside i n the Sudan, without the previous 
consent of Her Britannic Majesty's Government. 
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ARTICLE XI 
The importation of slaves i n t o the Sudan, as also t h e i r 
exportation, i s absolutely prohibited. Provision s h a l l be made by 
Proclamation f o r the enforcement of t h i s regulation. 
ARTICLE X I I 
I t i s agreed between the two Governments that special atten-
t i o n s h a l l be paid to the Brussels Act of the 2nd July, 1890 i n 
respect t o the import, sale, and manufacture of firearms and t h e i r 
munitions, and d i s t i l l e d , or spirituous l i q u o r s . 
Done i n Cairo, the 19th January, 1899. 
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1. Sudan Archive, School of Oriental Studies, University of Durham. 
Wingate Papers: Wingate Papers which form a major constituent 
part of the Sudan Archive i n the School of Oriental Studies, University 
of Durham, have been most extensively used f o r the preparation of t h i s 
work. These are the papers of the la t e General Sir.Reginald Wingate. 
They consist of many thousands of l e t t e r s , ranging from the most important 
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Letters and documents only up t o 1917 have been made available f o r the 
use of research works. 
B. PRINTED MATERIALS. 
1. Foreign Office Library, London. 
(a) P.O. Confidential P r i n t Series, Egypt 45: These include Intelligence 
Reports on the Sudan up to the year 1924. These reports were prepared by 
the Egyptian M i l i t a r y I ntelligence and transmitted t o the War Office i n 
London, where they were printed f o r confidential c i r c u l a t i o n . These reports 
have been very useful i n explaining the Government policy towards the 
Mahdists and t h e i r leader. 
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( i i ) Egypt No.1: Reports by H.M's Agent and Consul-General on the 
Finances, Administration and Condition of Egypt and the Soudan, 
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